ashar

joined 2 years ago
MODERATOR OF
 

Schedule from the website

The Youtube Playlist

BSidesAugusta is part of the Security B-sides (BSides) phenomenon, a worldwide community-driven framework for building events for and by information security community members.

BSidesAugusta holds an annual conference in the Fall with the goals of:

  • Providing a safe platform for relevant and interesting talks
  • Facilitating collaboration among professionals with diverse experience levels
  • Keeping the per-attendee cost affordable
2
submitted 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) by ashar to c/security_cpe
1
submitted 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) by ashar to c/security_cpe
 

Dream girlfriends, AI love scams, and an alleged spy who is said to have made a series of blunders.

All this and much much more is discussed in the latest edition of the “Smashing Security” podcast by cybersecurity veterans Graham Cluley and Carole Theriault, joined this week by Host Unknown’s Thom Langford.

Warning: This podcast may contain nuts, adult themes, and rude language.

#infosec #podcast

 

Slides

Talk's webpage

Video of the talk

Hidden Pathways: Exploring the Anatomy of ACL-Based Active Directory Attacks and Building Strong Defenses

We will cover the Active Directory attack path that arises from permissions granted in the ACLs of Active Directory objects. The talk will discuss common attack paths, the technical details of their existence, and how attackers can execute them with limited risk of detection. The presentation will also provide a comprehensive remediation plan for organizations to prevent these attack paths from emerging again, including best practices, tools, and techniques. Attendees will gain a deeper understanding of ACL-based attack paths in AD and practical knowledge on how to protect their organizations from these attacks.

This presentation will cover the Active Directory attack path that emerges from permissions granted in the ACLs of Active Directory objects. Specifically, we will discuss the attack paths we commonly see in the field, the technical details of why they exist, and how attackers can execute them with limited risk of detection.

Our talk will focus on the importance of understanding how ACLs work in Active Directory, how these attack paths occur, and the potential risks they pose to organizations. We will demo examples of how both old and new ACL-based attacks can be executed to escalate privileges in Active Directory and gain Domain Admin access, for example. Additionally, we will discuss the technical details of why the attack paths are hard to avoid in even a hardened Active Directory environment.

Finally, we will present a comprehensive remediation plan that organizations can use to build an OU structure and configure ACLs to prevent these attack paths from emerging again. We will share best practices, tools, and techniques for implementing these measures and ensuring that they effectively prevent similar attacks in the future.

Attendees will leave our talk with a deeper understanding of ACL-based attack paths in AD and the potential risks, as well as practical knowledge of how to protect their organizations from these attacks. Our talk will be of particular interest to both offensive and defensive security professionals, system administrators, and IT managers.

2
submitted 2 years ago by ashar to c/security_cpe
 

TROOPERS23 - 35 talks

(WINDOWS) HELLO FROM THE OTHER SIDE Dirk-jan Mollema

ALL YOUR PARCEL ARE BELONG TO US Dennis Kniel

ATTACKING ULTRA-WIDEBAND: SECURITY ANALYSIS OF UWB APPLICATIONS IN SMARTPHONES Jiska Classen Alexander Heinrich

BEYOND JAVA: OBFUSCATING ANDROID APPS WITH PURELY NATIVE CODE Laurie Kirk

CAT & MOUSE - OR CHESS? Fabian Mosch

DAS IT-SECURITY-LAGEBILD AUS HEISE-SICHT Jürgen Schmidt aka ju

DETECTION AND BLOCKING WITH BPF VIA YAML Kev Sheldrake

DUMPING NTHASHES FROM AZURE AD Nestori Syynimaa

EVERYONE KNOWS SAP, EVERYONE USES SAP, EVERYONE USES RFC, NO ONE KNOWS RFC: FROM RFC TO RCE 16 YEARS LATER Fabian Hagg

FACT BASED POST EXPLOITATION - OFFICE365 EDITION Melvin Langvik

FAULT INJECTION ATTACKS ON SECURE AUTOMOTIVE BOOTLOADERS Nils Weiss Enrico Pozzobon

FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF CEPH Florian Bausch

FORENSIC ANALYSIS ON REAL INCIDENTS INSIDE MICROSOFT REMOTE DESKTOP SERVICES Catarina de Faria Cristas

GPT-LIKE PRE-TRAINING ON UNLABELED SYSTEM LOGS FOR MALWARE DETECTION Dmitrijs Trizna Luca Demetrio

HIDDEN PATHWAYS: EXPLORING THE ANATOMY OF ACL-BASED ACTIVE DIRECTORY ATTACKS AND BUILDING STRONG DEFENSES Jonas Bülow Knudsen Alexander Schmitt

HOMOPHONIC COLLISIONS: HOLD ME CLOSER TONY DANZA Justin Ibarra Reagan Short

HORROR STORIES FROM THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY Thomas Sermpinis

INTERNAL SERVER ERROR: EXPLOITING INTER-PROCESS COMMUNICATION IN SAP’S HTTP SERVER Martin Doyhenard

JUPYSEC: AUDITING JUPYTER TO IMPROVE AI SECURITY Joe Lucas

MONITORING SOLUTIONS: ATTACKING IT INFRASTRUCTURE AT ITS CORE Stefan Schiller

OAUTH AND PROOF OF POSSESSION - THE LONG WAY ROUND Dominick Baier

OOPSSEC - THE BAD, THE WORST AND THE UGLY OF APT’S OPERATIONS SECURITY Tomer Bar

PRIORITY FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION - A PRACTICAL MODEL FOR QUANTIFYING THE RISK OF ACTIVE DIRECTORY ATTACKS Mars Cheng Dexter Chen

REAL WORLD DETECTION ENGINEERING IN A MULTI-CLOUD ENVIRONMENT Aaron Jewitt

REPORTLY - KEEP YOUR HEAD IN THE CLOUDS. A NEW AZURE VISUALIZATION TOOL FOR ANALYZING USER ACTIVITIES. Sapir Federovsky

SAP (ANTI-)FORENSICS: DETECTING WHITE-COLLAR CYBER-CRIME Yvan Genuer

SECURITY HEROES VERSUS THE POWER OF PRIVACY Avi D Kim Wuyts

SO YOU PERFORMED A FOREST RECOVERY. HOW DO YOU RECONNECT YOUR AD AGAIN WITH AZURE AD? Jorge de Almeida Pinto

SPOOKY AUTHENTICATION AT A DISTANCE Tamas Jos

STAY FIT: HACK A JUMP ROPE Axelle Apvrille

TESTING AND FUZZING THE KUBERNETES ADMISSION CONFIGURATION Benjamin Koltermann Maximilian Rademacher

THE ANATOMY OF WINDOWS TELEMETRY PART 2 Tillmann Oßwald Dominik Phillips Maximilian Winkler

THE POWER OF COERCION TECHNIQUES IN WINDOWS ENVIRONMENTS Martin Grottenthaler

THE WIRE ON FIRE: THE SPIES WHO LOVED TELCOS Aleksandar Milenkoski

VULNERABILITIES IN THE TPM 2.0 REFERENCE IMPLEMENTATION CODE Francisco Falcon

2
submitted 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) by ashar to c/security_cpe
 

The Anti-Checklist Manifesto - Nick Selby

Third Party Risk (3PR) conversations have been center-tile on Buzzword Bingo cards for a few years now, but the way most firms approach 3PR hasn’t been effective at quantifying the risk a third-party provider actually presents. With several damaging software supply chain breaches in the course of a couple of months, executives are trying to understand how we got into this mess, and how we get out of it. There’s a lot wrong with how we strive to attain that understanding, typically reduced to handing vendors a spreadsheet groaning under the weight of baseline technology configuration questions written in the 1990s by accountants so that auditors may assess security – thus reducing “trust” to a checklist almost entirely unrelated to trustworthiness.

What is the way forward? How can we ask better questions that give us answers that are proxies for how much an organisation cares about trust and security? This talk proposes a new path forward, and a ten-question sample so you can get started.

Talk given on 23rd September 2021

#supplychain #risk #GRC

1
submitted 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) by ashar to c/security_cpe
 

Kim Zetter

Sun Stroke: How the SolarWinds hackers pulled off their ingenious operation and scorched the vulnerable underbelly of the software supply chain

slides:

In November 2020 when a Mandiant analyst decided to investigate a routine security alert that many others would have ignored, she had no idea what her simple sleuthing would uncover — a massive espionage campaign that slipped past the protections of some of the most secure government agencies and tech titans in the world and exposed a major vulnerability at the core of the software supply chain. In a single ingenious stroke that should have surprised no one, the hackers hijacked the build server of a global software supplier and injected their code into a trusted update. With that one feat they managed to infect more than 16,000 customers across government and industry — from the Department of Homeland Security to Microsoft and Mandiant, from VPN suppliers to managed service providers — and remain undetected for nearly a year.

This keynote will examine how the Russian spies behind the operation pulled off their masterful hack and how they were ultimately caught after several near-misses. It will look at the mistakes that were made — on the part of the intruders, investigators, and victims — and what the operation taught us. And it will reveal what we still don’t know about the campaign.

view more: ‹ prev next ›