Natanael

joined 11 months ago
[–] Natanael 2 points 1 week ago (1 children)

Upper management can certainly increase the budget. Your line manager probably can't

[–] Natanael 4 points 1 week ago

To me it reminds me of the quote on how a society handle their prisoners. They can never have power again and must feel the consequences, but we have to show some baseline level of respect for human life, and show what makes us better than them. It's not status or money, it's ideals and empathy

[–] Natanael 22 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago) (10 children)

finally my manager said something about the bonuses has already been communicated and people would be angry to get less

That's because they have a fixed budget and the proportions are tied to evaluated performance tiers, increasing your rating would contractually require them to compensate you more from the same pool of money

[–] Natanael 1 points 1 week ago (1 children)

You're missing the absolutely massive difference of the purpose of constitutional law VS federal or state law.

In a simplified form, the former is to constrain government actors to protect the people, the latter is to constrain individuals to protect them against each other.

There is no such thing as a right to be a president, but the constitution recognize the right to not be represented by seditionists. The constitution doesn't punish the candidate here in 14A3 - it simply constrains them from enacting the power of the government.

Criminal and civil punishment would be applied separately, where the candidate is directly afforded rights. But enacting constitutional restrictions is not limited by the results of civil and criminal procedures. Why else is congress allowed to impeach which just a vote?

Due process looks very different for the same reason - the process is designed to protect the public over the candidate, and the candidate's strongest claim is protecting representation, not protecting themselves.

[–] Natanael 7 points 1 week ago (1 children)

https://wealthpol.web.ox.ac.uk/article/how-rich-are-dictators

That wasn't hard was it

Ok and then they did what after industrialization? How come you're leaving that part out?

[–] Natanael 2 points 1 week ago (5 children)

What somebody formally owns and gets in income isn't the same as the wealth they actually control in authoritarian systems.

Also, wealth equality through being poor isn't that brilliant

[–] Natanael 15 points 1 week ago (1 children)

He thought the timeshare was a scam, which is ironic because usually you have to have brains to figure that out

[–] Natanael 1 points 1 week ago (3 children)

https://www.commondreams.org/news/conservative-scholars-trump-disqualified

https://www.citizensforethics.org/news/analysis/legal-experts-across-the-ideological-spectrum-agree-the-14th-amendment-disqualifies-trump-from-holding-office/

The standard under the constitution is what the standard under the constitution is, not that of current civil prosecution under federal and state law.

Precedence for nullifying the entirety of an invalid appointment and its consequences exist, and were applied when courts unrolled the illegal hostile takeover of USIP

The constitution explicitly were written to only require acts of congress to pardon, but not an act of congress to decide someone was guilty. It's not even close, that means courts gets to decide. SCOTUS lied.

[–] Natanael 1 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago) (5 children)

Then why does so many experts on constitutional history disagree?

Colorado didn't have jurisdiction to convict, but had jurisdiction to recognize it. The legal process over it was still ongoing then.

It would be absurd to assume you could just appeal yourself out of it, especially when the text clearly says courts can not declare you qualified again, NOT EVEN SCOTUS, 2/3 of congress has to do that - and they didn't

[–] Natanael 1 points 1 week ago (7 children)

No, it's clear enough, other rights could be enforced by courts before legislation was made explicit, this one specifically is very clear on what's expected even if it doesn't say by who. That's exactly where courts can say "until congress decides otherwise, this applies here" like the Colorado supreme court did, because if the method isn't specified but the result is then the court can choose the method.

In the case of disqualification it's pretty clear - anybody could challenge a candidate's right to be on the ballot based on their actions, pointing to the disqualification clause, which the Colorado state did - and then a court with jurisdiction to try constitutional rights test it, like the Colorado Supreme Court did.

All the "ambiguity" they point at is fake wordplay, pretending to not be aware of the history behind the rules which makes it exceedingly clear. There's no such thing as a constitutional right that can't be invoked, no matter how much SCOTUS pretends otherwise.

Otherwise constitutional rights simply do not exist, because all you have to do to invalidate them is create a scenario not legislated before.

... Oh right, SCOTUS already blessed "qualified immunity" for cops where not even a law is good enough, but rather a court having to enforce that specific law in that specific scenario - TLDR SCOTUS is full of liars who are exceeding the authority that the constitution gives them.

... But the lower courts have also already started to push back on SCOTUS now fortunately - including instances of reissuing orders blocked by SCOTUS simply motivated by the fact that SCOTUS made the choice to not leave a binding opinion (note that rulings without opinions don't create binding precedence) and even calling SCOTUS liars on the opinions they did issue. And that's what Colorado should have done too - reissued the ban against Trump motivated by the fact the SCOTUS did not address the facts and thus their opinion is not applicable.

Right now the real long term solution is taking back a majority in congress and packing the court, declaring the prior SCOTUS rulings invalid (reinstating the 14A3 disqualification and formally accusing the now 6 former justices of material support of enemies of the state)

[–] Natanael 22 points 1 week ago

You can't override contracts terms that take priority (GPL, which you as developers already agreed to when redistributing it) with a second one (their own ToS).

GPL explicitly prohibits adding restrictions, so attempting to claim the ToS severs their GPL right is invalid because it is GPL which instead overrides that term in the ToS.

1
The cryptography behind passkeys (blog.trailofbits.com)
submitted 7 months ago by Natanael to c/crypto
 

From here;

https://chaos.social/@dbrgn/114386333844571387

dbrgn@chaos.social - Here are a few interesting details about the maximally privacy-friendly protocol design:

  • Everything related to synchronization between devices is completely end-to-end encrypted
  • Message recipients do not know from which device a message was sent
  • The Mediator Server of a device group does not know the corresponding Threema ID
  • The Chat Server only sees the IP address of the Mediator Server, but not the IP address of the end devices
1
submitted 8 months ago* (last edited 8 months ago) by Natanael to c/crypto
 

Announcement from here;

https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/_HH9A70BwJ6vgEfT2iSTvCQFhZE/

Hi folks,

We recently published an initial specification for a hybrid, post-quantum, augmented PAKE protocol, called CPaceOQUAKE+, located here:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake/

The motivation for this protocol can be roughly summarized as follows:

  • Post-quantum: None of the existing PAKE specifications are post-quantum. Rather than incrementally improve on PAKEs that are secure against standard adversaries, we felt it important to shift focus to post-quantum adversaries.
  • Augmented: Many PAKE deployments use augmented PAKEs (SRP and SPAKE2+, for example). A drop-in replacement for these use cases was therefore important.
  • Hybrid: CPaceOQUAKE+ is built on CPace and OQUAKE (which is specified in the document and based on the NoIC protocol in [1], and then composed with CPace using a variant of the combiner analyzed in [3]) as well as other standard building blocks (like ML-KEM). While CPace is well-understood, OQUAKE and the combiner itself are more new and thus warrant additional caution (from an implementation and analysis perspective). By making the primary protocol CPaceOQUAKE+ hybrid, we hedge against issues in the component pieces used in its construction and the maturity of their implementation(s).

This specification emerged from a number of relevant papers on the topic, including [1,2,3,4,5]. We are finishing security analysis of this protocol (and the core constituent parts) and hope to publish that soon.

We expect the shape and contents of this draft to change over time, especially as this community commences work on PQ PAKEs. We hope that by releasing this initial version we can get the conversation started on this important topic. IETF 123 is a little far out, but if folks would find it interesting, perhaps we can have an interim meeting of sorts to discuss PQ PAKEs and these specifications in the interim.

Best, Chris, on behalf of the editors

[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/231
[2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1621
[3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1630
[4] https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1400
[5] https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7qm0220s

 

See also discussion here; https://reddit.com/comments/1jv572r

4
submitted 8 months ago* (last edited 8 months ago) by Natanael to c/crypto
 

Cryptology ePrint Archive
Paper 2025/585
Adaptively-Secure Big-Key Identity-Based Encryption
Jeffrey Champion, The University of Texas at Austin
Brent Waters, The University of Texas at Austin, NTT Research
David J. Wu, The University of Texas at Austin

Abstract
Key-exfiltration attacks on cryptographic keys are a significant threat to computer security. One proposed defense against such attacks is big-key cryptography which seeks to make cryptographic secrets so large that it is infeasible for an adversary to exfiltrate the key (without being detected). However, this also introduces an inconvenience to the user who must now store the large key on all of their different devices. The work of Döttling, Garg, Sekar and Wang (TCC 2022) introduces an elegant solution to this problem in the form of big-key identity-based encryption (IBE). Here, there is a large master secret key, but very short identity keys. The user can now store the large master secret key as her long-term key, and can provision each of her devices with short ephemeral identity keys (say, corresponding to the current date). In this way, the long-term secret key is protected by conventional big-key cryptography, while the user only needs to distribute short ephemeral keys to their different devices. Döttling et al. introduce and construct big-key IBE from standard pairing-based assumptions. However, their scheme only satisfies selective security where the adversary has to declare its challenge set of identities at the beginning of the security game. The more natural notion of security is adaptive security where the user can adaptively choose which identities it wants to challenge after seeing the public parameters (and part of the master secret key).

In this work, we give the first adaptively-secure construction of big-key IBE from standard cryptographic assumptions. Our first construction relies on indistinguishability obfuscation (and one-way functions), while our second construction relies on witness encryption for NP together with standard pairing-based assumptions (i.e., the SXDH assumption). To prove adaptive security, we show how to implement the classic dual-system methodology with indistinguishability obfuscation as well as witness encryption.

 

Abstract;

In this paper, we present the first practical algorithm to compute an effective group action of the class group of any imaginary quadratic order O on a set of supersingular elliptic curves primitively oriented by O. Effective means that we can act with any element of the class group directly, and are not restricted to acting by products of ideals of small norm, as for instance in CSIDH. Such restricted effective group actions often hamper cryptographic constructions, e.g. in signature or MPC protocols.

Our algorithm is a refinement of the Clapoti approach by Page and Robert, and uses 4-dimensional isogenies. As such, it runs in polynomial time, does not require the computation of the structure of the class group, nor expensive lattice reductions, and our refinements allows it to be instantiated with the orientation given by the Frobenius endomorphism. This makes the algorithm practical even at security levels as high as CSIDH-4096. Our implementation in SageMath takes 1.5s to compute a group action at the CSIDH-512 security level, 21s at CSIDH-2048 level and around 2 minutes at the CSIDH-4096 level. This marks the first instantiation of an effective cryptographic group action at such high security levels. For comparison, the recent KLaPoTi approach requires around 200s at the CSIDH-512 level in SageMath and 2.5s in Rust.

See also; https://bsky.app/profile/andreavbasso.bsky.social/post/3ljkh4wmnqk2c

0
🕵️‍♂️ (infosec.pub)
submitted 8 months ago* (last edited 8 months ago) by Natanael to c/crypto
 
33
submitted 8 months ago* (last edited 8 months ago) by Natanael to c/crypto
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