Natanael

joined 11 months ago
[–] Natanael 0 points 5 days ago (7 children)

Electric car charging works anywhere if you have an adapter

If you have a vehicle with a weird fuel type then there's very few gas stations you can go to

[–] Natanael 1 points 1 week ago (1 children)

Do you know there's like 10 different major vaccines of which the major variants include dead virus, live modified virus, mRNA, sub-protein units, and at least one other tech?

[–] Natanael 4 points 1 week ago (1 children)
[–] Natanael 10 points 1 week ago (1 children)

Because Amazon pushes sellers to use Amazon warehouses and shipping their product in advance

[–] Natanael 3 points 1 week ago

A market of lemons

[–] Natanael 7 points 1 week ago

They can still collaborate old school way. You can publish static mirrors of git, then take email patches lol

[–] Natanael 1 points 1 week ago

Deleted without justification lol

[–] Natanael 2 points 1 week ago

And I have in fact left that kind of jobs myself. Not trivial in a job market like this one though.

Need to make unions stronger again.

[–] Natanael 1 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago)

The main issue here is that there's a mismatch between userspace perception of state versus that of the kernel driver, and no standardized way to push that information (unless you make your desktop environment add that info by polling the filesystem driver)

Users definitely don't want blocking dialogs if the userspace visible state is already updated enough to keep working. And ideally your software would check what kind of drive you're using and report to you when it's actually fully done as you close the program, but like I said this isn't standardized

[–] Natanael 1 points 1 week ago (2 children)

Shouldn't be 5 min, but that's what you get if the drive don't have both enough RAM and capacitors to hold a decent write cache to extend it's lifetime. Then the OS have to either wait for drive to report it's done, or complete the sync from the file system driver's cache. Or else you simply deal with it being both slower and dying faster...

[–] Natanael 1 points 1 week ago (1 children)

On disc you have read/write misses and seeks, and due to constant RPM + geometry the read/write the speed literally varies with the physical distance of the written data from the center of the cylinder (more dots per arcsecond at the outer edge)

[–] Natanael 5 points 1 week ago (2 children)

No, as I said to another, upper management has every opportunity to fix the budget. Your direct manager however can not

2
submitted 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) by Natanael to c/crypto
 

Abstract Common verification steps in cryptographic protocols, such as signature or message authentication code checks or the validation of elliptic curve points, are crucial for the overall security of the protocol. Yet implementation errors omitting these steps easily remain unnoticed, as often the protocol will function perfectly anyways. One of the most prominent examples is Apple's goto fail bug where the erroneous certificate verification skipped over several of the required steps, marking invalid certificates as correctly verified. This vulnerability went undetected for at least 17 months.

We propose here a mechanism which supports the detection of such errors on a cryptographic level. Instead of merely returning the binary acceptance decision, we let the verification return more fine-grained information in form of what we call a confirmation code. The reader may think of the confirmation code as disposable information produced as part of the relevant verification steps. In case of an implementation error like the goto fail bug, the confirmation code would then miss essential elements.

The question arises now how to verify the confirmation code itself. We show how to use confirmation codes to tie security to basic functionality at the overall protocol level, making erroneous implementations be detected through the protocol not functioning properly. More concretely, we discuss the usage of confirmation codes in secure connections, established via a key exchange protocol and secured through the derived keys. If some verification steps in a key exchange protocol execution are faulty, then so will be the confirmation codes, and because we can let the confirmation codes enter key derivation, the connection of the two parties will eventually fail. In consequence, an implementation error like goto fail would now be detectable through a simple connection test.

3
submitted 5 months ago* (last edited 5 months ago) by Natanael to c/crypto
 

https://bsky.app/profile/tumbolia.bsky.social/post/3ltyahiem3s2u

We updated our paper on Fiat-Shamir!

We now take a closer look at the gap between what symmetric cryptography has focused on for over 10 years (indifferentiability) and what is actually needed for the soundness of ZKPs and SNARKs (something stronger!).

4
submitted 5 months ago* (last edited 5 months ago) by Natanael to c/crypto
 

Opossum is a cross-protocol application layer desynchronization attack that affects TLS-based application protocols that rely on both opportunistic and implicit TLS. Among the affected protocols are HTTP, FTP, POP3, SMTP, LMTP and NNTP.

Note: The vast majority of websites are not vulnerable as HTTP TLS upgrade (RFC 2817) was never widely adopted and no browsers support it.

2
submitted 5 months ago by Natanael to c/crypto
 

Context: https://bsky.app/profile/martin.kleppmann.com/post/3lr6ex2glkc2h

This system is baked into the Guardian's news app that millions of people have installed. Every regular user of the app generates cover traffic, and an attacker monitoring the network cannot distinguish someone using the secure messaging feature from a regular user.

Open source;

https://github.com/guardian/coverdrop

view more: ‹ prev next ›