The Military Balance 2023 - Series: Author(s): The International Institute for Strategic Studies
Got years of educated guesses for the military makeup of state actors and sometimes other groups. Your typical library might not have the books, but your typical university (online) library will.
The military spending of the countries is orders of magnitude different. Nigeria with close to 3 billion $ got a lot of potential, though since all countries are large and have tens of millions of people it might be hard to make advances that are not aimed at centers, elites or other powers of some kind of power. Controlling mine territory might ensure financial viability for some (i.e. Boko Haram / ISIS offspring) that had losses in the last years. The de stability from having ISIS bases in your vicinity is obvious and if the conflict becomes a military hot one the states have to spend more resources in combating that again.
Nigeria got 10 times the military spending of Niger for example and 10 times the population. Its army is used in counter insurgency and 100k strong, the navy 25k and air forces 18k numbers are reflecting its ability to maintain craft (list of vehicles is in the book). It also got a 80k strong gendarmerie/paramilitary force.
https://i.imgur.com/uh6ZAi3.png
Mali got with the 20-22 million population of which 1/4 is under 14 around 21k troops, also paramilitary up to 16k could be converted to fighting forces. However if war or military operations on larger and hot scale would break out increase of military size would be needed and that means resources would have to be focused on that, hindering the food security of the country. Some countries have effectively declared to be allied with Mali and some declared to accept the change in government. Since gold export is the main export income of those countries in the height of 10-15 billion they can likely export to other countries in terms of economic sanctions (currently the main countries taking the exports are the Swiss and Emirates with France nearly solely interesting in hundreds of millions of uranium and radioactive ore).
I agree with you that the numbers for Wagner are likely not recent. There is some discussion about Wagner core troops and not as integrated soldiers/mercenaries which (depending on the choice of your source) can push that number up to 25-50k though seasoned troops will be a minority of that number.
Since Wagner interests you I put what is written in the book so you can get its bias and what they did focus on:
Wagner group paragraph
The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, had been less active since the 2020 Tripoli debacle when it attempted to assault the city. But it maintained a significant presence, estimated to number between 1,500 and 2,000 troops, alongside Haftar’s troops and in key locations, including oil facilities. There was no discernible reduction in this presence after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as Libya remained a convenient pressure point for Russia against Turkey and European countries. Some of the combat aircraft previously associated with Wagner seemed to have been transferred to LAAF control. This situation led to relative quiet in the country but presaged violent competition as new contenders, courting foreign support, geared up to replace existing groups. Moreover, there were continued attempts to rearm.War in Ukraine
Regional effects of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine Many states in the region have preferred to remain neutral in the war in Ukraine or have only mildly condemned the Russian invasion without taking measures against Moscow or reducing their engagement. Over the past decade, Russia had emerged as a security interlocutor as well as a possible alternative to the US in the eyes of several countries who were unnerved by fluctuations in US policy and appreciative of Vladimir Putin’s ostensibly effective statecraft. Several countries – notably Algeria and Syria, but also Egypt, Iraq and other smaller states – have been traditional customers of Russian weaponry as well as defence partners, at times also conducting joint exercises with Russian armed forces. Even US regional allies had evoked the possibility of acquiring Russian weapons systems, such as the S-400 air-defence system. Russian military trainers and private military companies, including the Wagner Group, have operated in several countries in the region, including Libya, Syria and Sudan. However, Russian prestige and credibility diminished in 2022, in comparison with a high point in 2015–16, when Moscow successfully intervened in the Syrian civil war. Russia’s operational and military setbacks in Ukraine and the relatively poor performance of its weapons systems have damaged its reputation across the region. It is widely considered that Russia will struggle to innovate in the technological domain and to maintain its export capability given its internal demands and shortages. Concerns about incurring Western sanctions were also thought to be a deterrent for most countries. Importantly, the rapid growth of Russian–Iraniandefence relations has caused significant unease, particularly among Gulf governments. In recent years, Iran had hoped that Russia would help it recapitalise its armed forces. But Moscow, then seen as the senior partner, was reluctant and unwilling to upset Israel and Gulf countries and risk Western disapproval. The Ukraine conflict has made Russia more dependent on Iranian goodwill: Moscow has acquired Iranian UAVs and deployed them in Ukraine. Tehran has supplied the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 direct- attack munitions and the Mohajer-6 UAV to Russia as Moscow has attempted to fill gaps in its inventory resulting from the invasion. As of November 2022, the initial batch of the Shahed systems appeared to have almost been exhausted in Russia’s attacks. They have been used to supplement Moscow’s inventory of land-attack cruise missiles, which has depleted considerably since it launched its 2022 invasion on 24 February. Russia has also sought Iranian assistance to circumvent Western sanctions.
Lybia
Both the GNA and the LAAF (Lybia) continue to be supported by foreign military forces, private military contractors and mercenaries. There are also reports of Syrian combatants paid to fight for both sides and of continued activity by Russia’s Wagner Group. LAAF troops have combat experience from fighting ISIS in the eastern coastal region and have allegedly received training and combat support fromexternal actors in the region. Equipment is mainly of Russian or Soviet origin, including items from the former Libyan armed forces, and suffers from varying degrees of obsolescence. The country has no domestic defence-industrial capability.
FOREIGN FORCES
Wagner Group 2,000
West Africa
...There is continuing jihadist activity in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and the Lake Chad Basin area. Niger’s armed forces are receiving additional equipment. Airlift capacity has been increased with the delivery of a second (of three) C-130H medium transport aircraft from the US, while reconnaissance and attack capabilities will be boosted by the arrival of Turkish-produced Hurkus light-attack aircraft. Reports currently point to only two airframes, while there are also reports indicating that protected patrol vehicles may also be procured. The situation is worse in Mali and Burkina Faso, where the armed forces seized power in2021 and 2022 respectively. Tensions between France and Mali worsened when the new regime in Bamako failed to implement plans for elections in early 2022, postponing them to 2024. The Malian government’s decision to contract Russia’s Wagner Group has seen ties deteriorate further. This decision came in the context of allegations of apparent information operations designed to foment local opposition to particularly French assistance. Wagner personnel were subsequently accused by observers of committing war crimes. Reliance on Russia may create difficulties for Malian forces, as weapons contracts may be affected by sanctions, and there may be other problems if Wagner personnel – or Russian maintenance personnel – are recalled to serve in Ukraine. France’s military mission in Mali was wound down and redeployed to Niger, and other European states such as the United Kingdom curtailed their military support in the country. Mali’s armed forces have, in recent years, received a range of military equipment, from armoured vehicles and helicopters to C295 light transport aircraft, and in 2022 Bamako received some Russian ground-attack aircraft and attack helicopters. Nonetheless, with the departure of international support missions and a change in military assistance policy by the new government, any progress made in the last decade towards professionalisation is at risk if the focus of military authorities on force-health issues wanes, such as on counter-corruption initiatives. In Nigeria and Cameroon, the break-up into factions of the former Boko Haram terrorist group has complicated the challenge for the armed forces, and analysts fear an escalation in Nigeria as presidential elections approach in 2023. Abuja continues to pursue military modernisation efforts, and the government’s bid to acquire 12 AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters was approved in April by the US State Department (with this then sent to Congress for approval). If acquired, these could be assigned to the army’s planned new light aviation formation. Although the country maintains equipment of diverse origin, and French firms have supplied many of the navy’s recent procurements, in recent years China has also emerged as a significant arms supplier with CS/VP3 protected patrol vehicles and ZSD-89 tracked armoured personnel carrier among the equipment delivered.
Burkina Faso
The effect that these coups, and continuing instability, will have on Burkina Faso’s defence cooperation with France remains unclear. ECOWAS missions have continued to work on processes for a transition to constitutional democracy with the new leadership. In early October, US sources reported assur- ances that Burkina Faso would not extend an invitation to Russia’s Wagner Group, but later in the same month authorities in Ouaga- dougou reportedly indicated that they could review relations with Russia. In recent years, the US donated armoured vehicles and other equipment. Aviation capacity is slowly improving with the arrival of additional helicopters and more modern PPVs. Financial challenges and political instability might hinder broader capabil- ity developments. Without external support, deployment capacity is limited to neighbouring countries. While there are maintenance facilities, there is no defence-manufacturing sector.Mali
The two military coups in August 2020 and May 2021 and the policies of Mali’s new rulers have accelerated the dete- rioration of security relationships with Mali’s external partners and with neighbouring states. At the same time, the authorities’ political and security partnership with Russia has deepened. In May 2022, Mali left the G5 Sahel security partnership. The Russian private military company, Wagner Group, has been present in the country since December 2021 and has been accused of committing war crimes. Following the recent changes in govern- ment, France in 2021 suspended joint military operations and in early 2022 accelerated the withdrawal of its forces; authorities in Bamako revoked the 2014 defence cooperation agreement and the 2013 Status of Force Agreement with France. France’s Opera- tion Barkhane officially withdrew from Mali in August 2022. The EUTM Mali also decided to reduce its training activities. MINUSMA remains, though some contingents left or have reduced in size. The armed forces still suffer from operational deficiencies as well as broader institutional weakness though there were defence- reform plans, including under the 2015–19 military-programming law