@_Riccardo_ @sposadelvento @simonestalfieri @tecnologia It's not surprising for Samsung to lock the rest of their devices instead of only many of them. They were already not providing any serious alternate OS support. They made it difficult to support their devices and prevented doing it securely. They were only enabling hobbyist tier support for their devices due to how they crippled them.
We don't expect any actual issues for GrapheneOS due to this radio-related regulation in the EU.
@_Riccardo_ @sposadelvento @simonestalfieri @tecnologia GrapheneOS does not cause any issues with respecting radio regulations. This directive applies equally to devices like desktops and laptops. It does not force blocking installing another operating systems. News media is reporting this inaccurately. Samsung never allowed installing GrapheneOS on their devices due to either fully locking them or crippling them when another OS is installed including not allowing using basic security features.
@sposadelvento @_Riccardo_ @tecnologia Practically, they're going to give an inherent advantage to devices licensing Google Mobile Services by permitting them as a default. It would still be possible to permit other devices and operating systems. They're choosing to do things in an extraordinarily anti-competitive way where alternatives are completely locked out of using the relevant apps rather than just a mildly anti-competitive approach where non-Google options need to deal with more.
@sposadelvento @_Riccardo_ @tecnologia It's a problem because apps adopting this are mainly doing things how Google documents it without even considering the existence of GrapheneOS. For their digital ID and age verification standards, the EU should be defining actual security requirements based on their needs and then only enforcing those with it open to any devices or operating systems. They really shouldn't give any special advantage to ones licensing Google Mobile Services.
@sposadelvento @_Riccardo_ @tecnologia Apps using the hardware attestation API can choose to trust more attestation roots than the Google ones and can also choose to support alternate operating systems via their verified boot key fingerprints. We document how to use it to support GrapheneOS when verifying device/OS/app integrity. This is more secure than the approach of using the Play Integrity API and there are no downsides for apps. The hard part is convincing them to do any extra work at all.
@_Riccardo_ @sposadelvento @tecnologia GrapheneOS is used with a locked bootloader. It not only has full support for verified boot and hardware-based attestation but significantly improves the security of these systems:
@lka1988 We focus our effort on the base OS and areas which are not already covered by high quality open source apps. We don't need to build our own domain-based filtering and blocklists for it because they already exist.
We have built-in content filtering in Vanadium based on EasyList + EasyPrivacy. That's more usable (per-site toggle) and much less limited than what domain-based filtering can do but it's still limited by needing to permit dual use functionality and is still easily bypassed.
> Plus, in the first comment, you suggested “RethinkDNS”, which depends on their own DNS servers.
You do not need to use their DNS servers. You can use local filtering and your choice of DNS servers including the network provided ones.
> I wouldn’t think a security and privacy-focused ROM should be recommending anything but a locally hosted option.
We're recommending using local filtering via RethinkDNS, not the RethinkDNS servers. They allow downloading the blocklists locally.
You can see from https://eylenburg.github.io/android/_comparison.htm that we have no limitations on call recording while others do. The fact that it's manual means users are taking responsibility for it each time. It's little different than recording a call with a tape recorder on speaker phone. If we did it automatically, then users would not be making a conscious decision to enable it case-by-case. That would be a problem, and not an acceptable way to do it without an extra explicit opt-in.
GrapheneOS does add call recording to our fork of AOSP Dialer. Unlike most alternate operating systems including LineageOS, we don't limit the regions where it's available. The fact that users are choosing to use it for specific calls means users are taking responsibility for the legality of recording that specific call and informing the other person of it. Automatic call recording would need more complexity to make it practical for people to comply with recording laws.
Why do you want to have a slow, legacy and hard to debug implementation of domain-based filtering instead of managing it with an app?
Domain-based filtering is also very limited in what it can since it's trivially bypassed by apps or web sites using IPs or doing their own DNS resolution, which is fairly widely adopted. For example, WhatsApp will still work with the domains blocked. In practice, you'll also only be filtering domains not used for useful functionality.
@_Riccardo_ @sposadelvento @tecnologia They don't want to define security standards and through that rule out using 50% of devices due to blatant security flaws. Instead, they want to provide the semblance of security through outsourcing everything to Apple and Google.