A most recent State Council Decree by China that entered into force on September 1, 2023, formalizes the establishment of consular volunteer networks, seemingly undeclared to most host nations, the Human Rights Group Safeguarddefenders says.
The network runs through associations and individuals and shows the involvement of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), on which a January 2022 Federal Canadian Court decision upheld labeling as an entity that engages in espionage and acts contrary to Canada’s interests with concerns over “OCAO’s interactions with the overseas Chinese communities, the information gathered, and the intended use of the gathered information”.
Notices on appointments, trainings and commendation ceremonies throughout the years appear on embassy or consulate websites, such as in Sweden, Italy, Spain, Greece,, Portugal, or France.
The PRC embassy in Prague, Czech Republic, even published a call for applications (pending approval by the embassy), specifying “recruitment targets”: Overseas Chinese, international students, Chinese employees of Chinese-funded enterprises and other individuals in the Czech Republic, overseas Chinese groups, Chinese-funded enterprises and other organizations, institutions and groups.
Similar notices pop up all over the globe, as examples from Trinidad and Tobago, Botswana, Turkey, Malaysia, Johannesburg, Equatorial Guinea, Chile, Japan, or a most recent event - in cooperation with local authorities - in Mongolia show.
To an outside observer, the availability of a close-to-home consular liaison volunteer to assist in what are mundane activities in a democratic society – such as passport or other document renewals – may seem benign or even most convenient. More so even in circumstances where individuals are – rightfully – fearful of visiting official consular outposts as the PRC ramps up its transnational repression efforts.
However, the consolidation of overseas United Front networks as the legitimate providers of consular community assistance not only gives them potential broad access to individuals’ private data, home address and contact information, but may also dangerously enhance their function of control over overseas communities and dissenters. The fact that these functions are carried out under the guidance of local consulates and embassies does not diminish such risks, especially when considering how a series of reports by diaspora communities have pointed towards the PRC’s weaponization of such seemingly mundane services.
Unlike in a democratic society, in the PRC the issuance of passports and other documents such as entry visas are heavily politicized and frequently used as an instrument of control and leverage over residents overseas, for instance to ensure they conform to Party diktats, comply with requests to act as informants within the community, or coerce them into returning to China.