One of the reasons I used a throwaway email here.
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Had to clear my browser catch to log in, Jerboa still shows as not logged in even after logging out which you do by clicking the hamburger menu then click the top banner to change/log out of accounts. This post is a test to see if my account works again via browser lol.
Edit: clearing app data/cache for Jerboa fixed the login issue.
I just disabled whole "/admin" section on my instance and added nice message ๐
I would put a link to ๐๐ porn disguised as a "go to admin panel" link for them there
Updated it little bit, probably later add some "nice" links too ๐
Good thing we all use randomly generated passwords for every account and always remember to change them every few months.
Do we have any details on how Michelle's account was compromised? Right now in the GitHub issue about the vulnerability they're clueless about how the custom emoji exploit could be performed without first an already compromised admin account.
EDIT: yeah here's how: https://github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy-ui/issues/1895#issuecomment-1629326627
You do NOT need an admin account to do that. Any normal user could have done that.
Could admins sign announcements with a PGP key to mitigate false admin posts and the consequences this might have? Or is this no longer necessary?
What's the difference? JWT is already cryptographically signed, but tokens were stolen. That's the issue.
PGP private keys are harder to steal than JWTs, as they are not generally stored as a long-term cookie but briefly just to sign something. Through XSS (the vulnerability in this case), cookies are relatively easy to steal, but to steal a PGP key would require a more complex script able to steal the key at the time it is loaded in the browser (assuming the signing feature is implemented in the browser). It's a bit more sophisticated, but not totally bulletproof.
First of all, it's still possible, as you said. Second, we must always take humans into consideration. Let me explain.
Most people don't know what PGP is, thus you can sign your posts with any crap and most won't care.
Out of those who know what PGP is and how to use it, most won't be checking the posts as they will auto-assume that if it's signed - it's ok.
There will be a small minority of those who care, but they can be silenced easily through social engineering.
It is possible to integrate server side signature checks, but then again you're vulnerable when someone gains unrestricted access to your account.
The correct solution requires multiple features to be implemented.
- Lemmy web UI should move to an industry standard framework, which disables XSS and other attack vectors by default. For example, Angular.
- Official admin announcement, as well as important admin tasks, should require 2FA on each action. Like it's done on GitHub, for example.
- Cookies should not contain JWT tokens, they should only cotain session id for read only purposes. JWT token should be moved to sessionStorage instead. It's a lot more secure by design than cookies. You can still exploit it, but it's noticeably harder.
Agree with the points on PGP and other features. I almost made a lengthier reply mentioning the signing issues, which seems appropriate now. It would not be easy, but a successful implementation would definitely need clients to automatically detect and verify signed content, due to the human issues you mention. A problem is obtaining public keys from a trusted source. Maybe it could be attached to profile information with a 2FA requirement to modify it. Just an idea. In this way, verification is not dependent on the user to perform.
Is that why Liftoff wasn't loading?
Most likely. Have you tried re-adding your account to Liftoff?
Would I have to delete the app and redownload it?
Yes that would work. Or: Settings -> Accounts -> Hold down on account name -> Remove account
Would that compromise my account?
No, you just have to readd it again.
It worked for Liftoff, but now I can't log in on the desktop.
I also can't post in some communities in the app and have to go to the desktop for that.
That might be something introduced after the attack, might even be code changes. It should be fixed within a few days, I'm sure the admin team is working on bringing everything back to normal. If it's not fixed within a few days, clear cache and data in liftoff, readd your accounts.
Cleared cache and it worked.