this post was submitted on 04 Sep 2025
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Hmm. Maybe the certificate validation process should be changed to require that two CAs sign off on a certificate chain, to eliminate that single point of failure. Or maybe software should require that just for certain security-sensitive identities, and there be a decision to designate certain TLDs or IP ranges or whatever as requiring an additional root. That obviously doesn't magically resolve all potential certificate issues, but it does mean that a single error can't create the potential to open the floodgates like this.
Nah. A CA that issues fraudulent certificates will have its signing certs revoked by the root CA.
But that requires actual fraud. This sounds like someone used 1.1.1.1 for testing, when they should have used 192.0.2.0/24 or something. That subnet is specifically reserved.