Russia

[Op-ed by Denis Mikhailov, a lawyer who used to lead Alexei Navalny's St Petersburg campaign office. He was granted asylum in Poland.]

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There is evidence that Russia fully understands that it cannot completely ignore international legal norms without consequences. That is why the Kremlin officially demands the cancellation of reparations and war-related payments for Ukraine, as well as the lifting of all sanctions imposed on the country in connection with its war against Ukraine.

But still, Moscow continues its legal nihilism. This poses the challenge of how the international community should respond to a nuclear power that rejects any legal obligation that does not serve its interests. This question extends far beyond Ukraine or internal repression. It threatens the very foundations of the international order — a system based on obligations, accountability and universally accepted human rights principles.

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I personally know dozens of Russians — former political prisoners, activists and victims of police violence — whose cases were ruled on in Strasbourg, with Russia found guilty. These individuals have not had their names cleared, received compensation for their suffering, nor received official recognition of the injustice they endured. Russia has not only refused to implement these decisions but has also blocked any domestic path to legal rehabilitation.

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A path to achieving justice would be to funnel frozen Russian assets held abroad into a compensation fund from which victims can receive the restitution the ECHR says they are owed. Kremlin officials have already threatened a “severe” response if these assets are seized, which shows that the Kremlin views them as sufficiently important that they could be used to put pressure on the leadership.

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If the international community chooses to ignore Russia’s violations, it will send a dangerous signal that authoritarian regimes can break the rules with impunity.

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Making Russia pay does not necessarily mean the rapid democratization of the country. Smaller-scale achievements are more likely but no less essential: the release of political prisoners and easing of domestic repressions are more likely but no less essential. They could build up to an end to current military aggression and a return to the international legal fold.

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Exerting pressure on Russia today is not an act of hostility — it is an act of systemic defense: of rights, institutions, security and human dignity. This responsibility lies not only with politicians and diplomats, but also with human rights defenders, analysts, civil society activists and journalists. Their efforts are the building blocks of a future just world.

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Russian companies are facing a wave of unexplained account blockages at state-owned banking giant VTB and its Shanghai branch, complicating one of the few remaining channels for trade with China, the independent business outlet Vpost reported.

Employees at five importing firms reported that VTB blocked their accounts between mid-May and July, noting that these incidents have become significantly more frequent since early summer.

“There’s been a recent influx of clients seeking help, partly because of frequent and unexplained account freezes at VTB Shanghai,” the head of a payment agency that supports Russian importers with international transactions told Vpost.

The situation has strained foreign trade operations already hampered by Western sanctions and restricted access to international payment systems.

VTB’s Shanghai office represents Russia’s only direct banking presence in China, offering one of the cheapest and most straightforward ways to transfer funds between the two countries.

Now, with accounts frozen, many importers have been forced to reroute payments through other Russian banks.

“Firms must now process payments through other Russian banks, which charge a commission of 4.5 to 4.9% of the transfer amount,” one business owner told Vpost.

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Affected importers said that neither VTB’s Moscow headquarters nor its Shanghai branch could explain the blockages or assist in unfreezing accounts.

Several reported that even bank employees were unable to contact their own financial monitoring departments, making it impossible to resolve the issue.

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Sales of newly built homes in Russia tumbled in the first half of 2025 as the end of a popular mortgage subsidy program and high borrowing costs pushed many buyers out of the market.

According to a report published Tuesday by the state-owned financial institution Dom.RF, sales of new residential developments fell 26% year-on-year between January and June, totaling just 10.4 million square meters sold.

The downturn coincides with the July 2024 closure of Russia’s flagship state-supported mortgage program, which had allowed buyers to secure loans at 8%.

Analysts at Dom.RF also reported a staggering 66% drop in mortgage issuance in June compared to the same month last year, though they predicted that figure represented a low point, with the pace of decline expected to ease starting in July.

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Russia’s Central Bank reports that nearly nine out of 10 mortgages issued this spring were backed by government subsidy programs.

The "family mortgage" program offered to families with children accounted for 88% of subsidized loans issued in June.

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The Ministry of Digital Development of Russia and the country's mobile operators have been discussing the introduction of unified rules for mobile internet shutdowns. The pro-government publication Izvestia reported the fact of the talks, citing a federal official and a senior telecom executive.

According to the outlet’s sources, orders to shut down mobile networks are currently issued by local authorities, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, or security agencies. As a result, operators often get duplicate or discoordinated requests. One of the interviewees noted that such shutdowns had previously been ordered by Russia's communications regulator, Roskomnadzor, and security services — mainly ahead of mass events. However, with the rise in drone attacks, the number of entities authorized to demand internet restrictions has increased significantly.

The idea of centralizing the authority for declaring shutdowns was supported by Karen Kazaryan, director of the Internet Research Institute, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Digital Development and previously took part in drafting the “sovereign Runet” law. According to Kazaryan, a unified shutdown mechanism would “spare users from unnecessary disruptions” and reduce operators' workload. Kazaryan also proposed appointing a specialized directive body and establishing an alert system for telecom providers.

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In his article, The Impact of the Special Military Operation on Crime in Russia, law professor Villiy Maslov analyzes conviction statistics from 2019 to 2023, drawing on data from the Supreme Court’s Judicial Department, Russia’s Federal Statistics Service, and the Federal Penitentiary Service. He writes: “It can be confidently stated that the ‘special military operation’ has already impacted every Russian citizen. […] Its continuation is already influencing the country’s criminal landscape and will inevitably exacerbate crime problems in the future.”

Maslov writes that repeat offenses by former inmates pose one of the biggest risks to public safety. The exact number of convicts pardoned for participating in the war is unknown. Maslov estimates their number ranges from several thousand to several tens of thousands — a “substantial number,” he says, that includes men convicted of grave and violent crimes. Maslov describes the release of convicted murderers as particularly troubling.

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Russia’s crime rates may also increase because, after returning from the front, some soldiers are unwilling to take jobs where they would earn significantly less than in the army. Not everyone will turn to crime in pursuit of “easy money,” but a number of veterans have already been convicted of robbery and theft.

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Another factor that could contribute to rising crime rates, says Maslov, is that veterans acquire skills in war that are “not especially in demand by the state in peacetime, but may be valued in the criminal world.” He specifically highlights the risk of more crimes involving the use of guns:

Given [soldiers’] acquired experience, the availability of weapons, escalating illicit firearms trafficking, and the transformation of moral-psychological frameworks among individuals subjected to combat stress conditions (including PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder), we cannot rule out a rise in mass shootings and other mass killings using firearms.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38593555

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China is stepping up its scientific and technological partnership with Russia. In June 2025, a delegation of highly qualified Chinese experts of Luzhou North Chemical Industries Co., Ltd. (carries out a full cycle of development, production, testing and adaption of explosive materials) visited powder plant in Perm, Russian Federation. This plant is one of the most important elements of Russian Military Industrial Complex producing powder for the Russian Army.

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The Chinese delegation was comprised of five senior engineers from Luzhou North Chemical Industries Co., Ltd.: Dai Jiushuang, Guo Xiaobing, Qi Chenyong, Chen Shimin, and Xu Hai. Russian side expressed considerable interest in the practical experience of some members of the delegation.

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Moscow attempts to use Beijing’s scientific and industrial potential for the development of the Russian defense industry capabilities.

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Such a “cooperation” contradicts official position of the PRC regarding its neutrality and diplomatic attempts to end the unjust war of Russia against Ukraine.

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China has been supplying:Tooling machines, special chemicals, gunpowder, and defense components to 20 Russian military production.

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Although China denies involvement, multiple credible sources—from Ukrainian intelligence to US officials and historical customs records—indicate that Chinese-origin gunpowder and related components have flowed into Russian defense factories. This has likely helped sustain Russian munitions output.

These dual-use exports align closely with Russia’s military strategy and enable Putin’s war machine to circumvent Western sanctions.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38587355

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A third major fire in less than a week broke out in Poland on Monday, prompting the authorities to suspect that the incidents may be linked to hybrid operations by Russian intelligence services.

The latest fire broke out in a warehouse in Siemianowice Ślaskie in southern Poland. This follows a fire in a residential building in Ząbki, near Warsaw, on 1 July, and a fire in a production hall in Mińsk Mazowiecki, around 35 km from the capital, on Sunday.

Interior Minister Tomasz Siemoniak said on Monay that in light of Russia’s hybrid tactics, the government is treating all major fires with increased scrutiny.

"Since January 2024, we have seen several attempted acts of sabotage. Every significant incident, fire, or attempted arson is being assessed as a potential act of sabotage," he said during a press conference.

The suspicion of Russian involvement intensified after a massive shopping center in Marywilska, Warsaw, burned down in May. The government later said it had evidence linking Russian intelligence to the incident. In response, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski ordered the closure of Russia’s consulate in Kraków.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38525431

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Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on Tuesday claimed that Russia has already more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025.

Mishustin credited the ramped-up manufacturing to greater state financial support for producers and innovators, including civilian companies.

Analysts from the Washington-based think tank, Institute for the Study of War, assessed that increased Russian long-range drone production is enabling Russia’s growing nightly strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine. It has also enabled Russian forces to integrate Shahed-like drones into strikes against frontline Ukrainian positions, ISW reported.

The think tank specified that Russian forces are “continuing to integrate drones into frontline combat operations to strike frontline and rear Ukrainian positions, and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in tandem with Russian MLRS and artillery systems.”

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Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight said on Tuesday that Russian forces have launched 28,743 total Shahed variant drones (Shahed-136/131 and Geran 2) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that Russian forces launched 10 percent of this total (2,736 drones) in June 2025 alone.

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One electronic and radio warfare expert cited by ISW, Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on Tuesday that Ukrainian forces had observed a new type of Chinese wi-fi router on radio modems installed on Russian “Gerber” drones.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38491622

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Many [Ukrainian] children were moved to Russian territories under the guise of vacation, education, or medical care. Some were placed in camps posing as integration programs, others were adopted into Russian families, stripped of their identities, and reissued new documents. In Russian schools, they’re banned from speaking Ukrainian, exposed to propaganda, and often recruited into the Youth Army.

This policy dates back to 2014, after Russia occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but has intensified. Many of the children taken were not orphans, despite Russian claims. Most had living parents or relatives. Some were institutionalized, others were seized after parents were detained or separated.

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Anatolii’s [not his real name] story is one of many such stories that fortunately ended with Save Ukraine being able to bring him back.

At 17, he was taken straight from school by Russian forces. A week before his 18th birthday, Anatolii was handed a conscription notice from the Russian army—with no real choice but to serve [...] Anatolii stayed behind in a southern Ukrainian town after his brother fled.

He became a target after he and his brother found two boxes of ammunition in a forest and threw them away. FSB agents later detained and beat him, demanding the weapons and names of Ukrainian soldiers. One day, they dragged him from the principal’s office, tied him up, put a bag over his head, and took him to be tortured.

“They broke my rib and shoulder joint, smashed my face, gave me lots of bruises… They said: ‘If we find anything on your phone—you won’t live.'”

At school, Anatolii was taught to shoot and handle explosives. Russians offered him trips to military camps, but he kept refusing.

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In Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, the Kremlin is waging a long-term campaign to erase Ukrainian identity and reshape the next generation into loyal subjects of the Russian state. Central to this effort is the militarization of children through schools, propaganda, and paramilitary training.

In classrooms, Ukrainian curricula are being replaced with Russian textbooks. The language, culture, and history of Ukraine are banned or distorted. Weekly indoctrination sessions known as “Conversations About the Important” push pro-Kremlin narratives and glorify military service. Children are taught to view Ukraine and the West as enemies.

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Recruitment into these programs doesn’t focus on academic performance or discipline. Instead, students with aggressive behavior, bullying records, or emotional instability are often targeted, pointing to a disturbing strategy to raise a generation predisposed to violence and deeply indoctrinated with hostility toward NATO and the United States.

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In 2016, Russia’s Defense Ministry launched a youth “military-patriotic” organization called Yunarmiya, or in English, Young Army. In reality, it’s a militarized movement that instills the ideology of Russian aggression and grooms future soldiers for the occupying regime.

Children as young as eight are enrolled. They’re made to swear an oath of loyalty to Russia, promise to “defend its interests,” and embrace “great patriotism.” After that, they undergo firearms and tactical training, learn to operate drones, and more.

Ashley Jordana, Hala Systems’ Director of Law, Policy and Human Rights, said Hala’s assessment, based on geolocation data from mobile phones traced to Yunarmiya bases and testimonies from survivors, suggests cadets are roused daily at 6 am. After a canteen breakfast of eggs and oatmeal, they attend classes in firearms assembly, mine clearance, and military tactics.

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In Crimea, occupied since 2014, Russian authorities dismantled Ukrainian education and launched programs like The Train of Hope to assimilate children. The programme is a Russian state-run initiative launched in occupied Crimea that facilitates the adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families. Monuments to Russian weapons designers were erected on school grounds, and a 2014 doctrine officially linked education to military preparation.

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Some of the children indoctrinated after 2014 are now dying on the battlefield, celebrated as heroes in Russian propaganda. One such case is 16-year-old Illia Moskvitin, a Youth Army member from occupied Donetsk, who was killed by a landmine in 2022. Others, like Ivan Shifman and Dmytro Kotov, joined Russian forces after years of ideological grooming.

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• Dmytro Kotov: In 2015, he graduated from Gymnasium №6 in Dzhankoi, temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia later sent him to Yunarmiya, according to open-source data. After completing his studies at the Sevastopol State Technical University, Kotov signed a contract with the Russian military and served aboard the large landing ship Novocherkassk, part of the 197th Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet. Dmytro died on March 24, 2022, while participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

• Illia Moskvitin was also a member of the Yunarmiya unit operating in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region. Illia died on April 14, 2022, before even reaching the age of 16, after stepping on a Lepestok anti-personnel mine, according to materials published by the Yunarmiya organization.

• Ivan Shifman, a student at School №1 in the city of Kalmiuske in the Donetsk region, joined Yunarmiya in 2019. After turning 18, he enlisted in the so-called “People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic” and began serving in Russia’s 1st Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ivan took part in combat operations in several towns across the Donetsk region, including Starohnativka, Hranitne, Malyi Yanisol, Zaitseve, and Rozivka. Ivan was killed in action near the village of Novobakhmutivka along the front line in Donetsk on April 14, 2022—the same day as Illia.

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** What needs to be done to prevent it**

The evidence gathered in this article barely touches the surface of this issue, but it shows how Russia’s child abductions are a systemic state policy.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in March 2023 for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for their roles in the deportations, an act that constitutes a war crime under international law.

Both are suspected of committing the war crime of unlawfully deporting children from occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia—an operation the court says has been underway since at least February 24, 2022.

A historic moment in international law unfolded in Strasbourg on June 25, 2025, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset formally launched the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine, established in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38483748

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Can propagandists be held accountable for war crimes? People sometimes point to cases like Nuremberg or Rwanda, where media figures were prosecuted for inciting atrocities. But those are the outliers. Legal accountability for propagandists remains incredibly rare, and proving they intended their words to lead to war crimes is a steep legal climb.

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Almost every Russian war crime in Ukraine that has captured international attention comes with a pre-planned, carefully planted excuse. A lie, seeded days in advance through a wide network of actors, is designed to shift blame onto Ukraine and mislead journalists, politicians and the general public by sowing doubt.

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As soon as an attack happens, they point back to the story they planted, using it as evidence of Ukraine’s involvement. Its purpose? To obstruct accountability. Those doing it? They know an attack is imminent because they’re preparing the justification in advance.

And it’s precisely this foreknowledge and orchestration that could help build a legal case.

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An example of information alibis is:

When Russians want to bomb a place, for example, Kremenchuk Railway Station, . . . they (will say in advance that) Ukraine was going to do it, and then they do it.

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(Information alibi is a strategy that) consists of proactively accusing the other party of actions that will actually be committed by the accusers themselves.

This forces journalists to report Russian lies alongside reality, confusing, deceiving, and seeding doubt within the information space, while disrupting and delaying thorough investigations into the attack.

“This tactic…represents a cynical weaponisation of rhetoric as part of Russia’s broader military strategy,” the report states.

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A Russian March 22 airstrike devastated Ukraine’s Mariupol’s Maternity Hospital No. 3, killing at least three individuals and injuring at least 17 more. Before the attack, Russia’s information alibi had already flooded the information space.

Kremlin officials and pro-Russian media were falsely accusing Ukrainian forces of using their civilians as human shields in Mariupol and of interrupting civilians’ evacuation efforts starting the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion [...]

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I received threats that they would come and find me, that I would be killed, that my child would be cut into pieces. -- Marianna Vyshemirskaya, a pregnant woman injured in an attack, with blood on her face. Her photo provoked international condemnation. The Russian Embassy in the UK and pro-Kremlin media smeared her as an actress staging the scene.

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Russia treats information warfare as a central tool of state power, mobilising a complex network of Kremlin officials, members of the state security services, private entities and individuals unaffiliated with but tangentially connected to the Russian state, among others, to spread disinformation. Understanding the structure and hierarchy of Russian information operations is key to identifying those responsible for disseminating harmful narratives.

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At the top [of Russia's information warfare progamme] are Vladimir Putin and key advisors like Sergey Kiriyenko, Alexey Gromov and Sofia Zakharova—so-called “curators” of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine. Gromov oversees traditional media; Kiriyenko manages digital operations, with his son Vladimir heading VK, Russia’s largest social platform. Zakharova was sanctioned by the US for her role in the Doppelganger disinfo campaign.

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Russia’s information ecosystem includes TV propagandists, media outlets and administrators of pro-war Telegram channels—some state-linked, others semi-independent. Various Russian Telegram channels like WarGonzo, Operation Z, Smotri, Khersonskiy Vestnik, and Kremlevskaya prachka played key roles in disseminating false information about Ukraine. Outlets like Readovka, Pul №3, ANNA-NEWS, and War on Fakes consistently echoed Kremlin messaging with lies and conspiracy theories.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38481725

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Describing the campaign to subjugate Ukraine as a “personal obsession” for Putin, [Ukraine’s former defence minister] Oleksii Reznikov said the conflict would continue in some form or another as long as he remained in the Kremlin.

Even if a ceasefire were declared and buffer zones established, Russia would continue to fight a hybrid war as it did in the years leading up to the full-scale invasion of 2022.

Members of Putin’s inner circle who may succeed him are unlikely to choose to continue the conflict, he said, because of the debilitating effect that sanctions have had on the country’s economy.

“[Putin] is afraid of Ukraine, because we are a threat to his regime,” Reznikov, who served as defence minister from the start of the invasion until September 2023, said in an interview with The Times. “If the Russian population sees that the democratic, liberal, European way is better than tyranny, then for the regime it becomes a question of survival."

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Andriy Zagorodnyuk, who served as defence minister between 2019 and 2020, said that Ukraine should look to make itself into a “steel porcupine” capable of withstanding Russian aggression for years to come.

“Rather than assuming the war can be ended through a comprehensive battlefield victory or a negotiated compromise, Ukraine and its allies must plan to build a viable, sovereign and secure state under constant military pressure,” he wrote in an article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank.

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The rate of advancement [of Russia on the battlefield], remains glacially slow, with Russia having captured less than 1 per cent of Ukrainian land since the fall of Avdiivka in February 2024.

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Asked what he believes Putin’s military objectives are, Reznikov invoked a scene from Yes, Prime Minister, the British television comedy of the 1980s, in which an adviser explains the Soviets’ use of “salami tactics”. The strategy involves a series of small gains, akin to thinly slicing a salami, that ultimately results in a significant advance.

Reznikov said this was an accurate description of Russian tactics to this day. “They started with Crimea — slices of salami. Then Luhansk — slices of salami. Then Donetsk — slices of salami. Today they occupy part of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. They will advance as long as you allow them to advance, taking as much land as they can.”

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In June Russia surpassed the milestone of one million soldiers killed or wounded in action. But the state is enlisting an estimated 30,000 recruits a month, enticed by a generous salary and signing-on fee, so there is little prospect of any abatement to the rate of attrition.

“They have a huge manpower resources because the country has a population of 130 million,” said Reznikov. “So, for them it’s nothing to use these soldiers as cannon fodder. They place no value on human life.”

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38480665

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At the weekly briefing on Friday, [head of the Estonian Defense Forces' Intelligence Center Col. Ants] Kiviselg highlighted this year's successful non-conventional attacks on Russia's shadow fleet. These have taken place in both the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, near the coasts of Libya, Italy, and Turkey, and most recently on July 6 near the port of Ust-Luga in the Gulf of Finland.

"The exact method of the attacks is still unclear, but experts believe the most likely scenario is the use of time-delayed underwater mines that are attached to the hull of the ship. Such mines typically do not cause the ship to sink in most cases, but depending on the vessel's cargo and the placement of the mine, a complete sinking cannot be ruled out," said the head of military intelligence.

The colonel said the direct impact of the attacks on combat operations is indirect and rather minor, as Russia's fleet is believed to be between 700 and 900 vessels.

However, they have highlighted Moscow's vulnerability.

"If these attacks continue, they could in the long term negatively impact the use of the shadow fleet in circumventing sanctions and thereby also the financing of the Russian Federation's war machine," Kiviselg noted.

He added that no one has claimed responsibility for these attacks so far.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38382028

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Truckers in Moscow and the Moscow region have begun to check trucks en masse amid the threat of new drone attacks. According to the Telegram channel "VChK-OGPU," a heightened alert has been introduced in the Russian capital, and all defense equipment and shelters have been put on full alert.

Virtually all personnel of the Federal Security Service (FSO) have been summoned to duty. According to sources, the security forces fear a repeat of the scenario that took place in early June in Irkutsk Oblast and other Russian regions.

Then the Ukrainian SBU conducted a successful operation called "Spider's Web," in which attack drones launched directly from trucks attacked Russian military airfields, causing massive damage.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38380588

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A court in the Netherlands has sentenced a Russian national to three years in prison for violating EU sanctions by transferring sensitive semiconductor technology to Russian intelligence.

German Aksenov, 43, had worked as an engineer in the Dutch semiconductor industry from 2015-2024, including for ASML, a leading manufacturer of microchip equipment, and NXP Semiconductors, a supplier of semiconductor components.

Prosecutors said Aksenov downloaded files containing technical specifications for microchip production from ASML and NXP servers onto a USB drive and external hard disk, which he was expected to hand over to an agent of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) in Moscow, Bloomberg reported.

According to the court, the information he transferred “can contribute to strengthening [Russia's] military and strategic capabilities. That has consequences for Ukraine and indirectly for international security and stability.”

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cross-posted from: https://sh.itjust.works/post/41958899

cross-posted from: https://sh.itjust.works/post/41958890

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38367381

This is an op-ed by Amalendu Misra, Professor of International Politics, Lancaster University.

The Brics group of nations has just concluded its 17th annual summit in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro. But, despite member states adopting a long list of commitments covering global governance, finance, health, AI and climate change, the summit was a lacklustre affair.

The two most prominent leaders from the group’s founding members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – were conspicuously absent. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, only attended virtually due to an outstanding arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court over his role in the war in Ukraine.

China’s Xi Jinping avoided the summit altogether for unknown reasons, sending his prime minister, Li Qiang, instead. This was Xi’s first no-show at a Brics summit, with the snub prompting suggestions that Beijing’s enthusiasm for the group as part of an emerging new world order is in decline.

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The Brics group is a behemoth. Its full 11 members account for 40% of the world’s population and economy. But the bloc is desperately short of providing any cohesive alternative global leadership.

While Brazil used its position as host to highlight Brics as a truly multilateral forum capable of providing leadership in a new world order, such ambitions are thwarted by the many contradictions plaguing this bloc.

Among these are tensions between founding members China and India, which have been running high for decades.

There are other contradictions, too. In their joint Rio declaration, the group’s members decried the recent Israeli and US attacks on Iran. Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, also used his position as summit host to criticise the Israeli offensive in Gaza.

But this moral high ground appears hollow when you consider that the Russian Federation, a key member of Brics, is on a mission to destroy Ukraine. And rather than condemning Russia, Brics leaders used the Rio summit to criticise recent Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s railway infrastructure.

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Brics declared intention to address the issue of climate change is also problematic. The Rio declaration conveyed the group’s support for multilateralism and unity to achieve the goals of the Paris agreement. But, despite China making significant advances in its green energy sector, Brics contains some of the world’s biggest emitters of greenhouse gases as well as several of the largest oil and gas producers.

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Lieutenant General Sukhrab Akhmedov was awarded the title Hero of Russia. Lt. Gen. Akhmedov, a native of the republic [of Dagestan], is known for commanding units that suffered heavy — and largely avoidable — losses over the course of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine.

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Opponents of Putin say that he has built an increasingly repressive political system that relies heavily on the FSB. Supporters of Putin say that Russia is under hybrid-attack from major Western powers and needs the FSB to ensure security and to preserve the sovereignty of Russia.

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Russia’s spending on military personnel reached a record 2 trillion rubles ($25.68 billion) in the first half of 2025, according to new estimates from Re: Russia, an analytical platform run by exiled Russian academics.

The surge in spending — driven by enlistment bonuses, salaries and compensation for wounded soldiers and bereaved families — reflects the Kremlin’s determination to keep waging its war in Ukraine at any cost.

Between January and June, federal and regional budgets allocated an estimated 400 billion rubles ($5.14 billion) for enlistment bonuses, 865 billion rubles ($11.11 billion) for military salaries and 765 billion rubles ($9.82 billion) in payments to families of the dead and wounded.

If the current pace of spending continues, total personnel costs are projected to exceed 4 trillion rubles ($51.36 billion) by year’s end.

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