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Latin American Publications!
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Government of Argentina Wants Social Leader Milagro Sala to Serve Sentence in Prison
(orinocotribune.com)
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Venezuela’s Acting President Calls for Breaking Oil Dependency With Communal Economy
(orinocotribune.com)
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China Labels Israeli-Occupied Lands as ‘High Risk Area,’ Bans All New Investments: Report
(orinocotribune.com)
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By Ana Maria Monjardino and John McEvoy – Feb 6, 2026
Declassified files expose how the UK has tried to control Venezuela’s oil for over a century, seeking to thwart nationalisation through political pressure, propaganda, and covert operations.
In October 2001, two years into his presidency, Hugo Chávez made a trip to London to meet with then UK prime minister Tony Blair and other high-level officials.
Official records detail how the Venezuelan president’s proposed Hydrocarbons Law, a major restructuring of Venezuela’s oil industry, was high on the British agenda.
The law aimed to assert sovereignty over Venezuela’s resources by mandating at least 50% state ownership in mixed enterprises and increasing royalties on foreign oil interests.
This was a serious cause for concern for Britain, whose main interests in Venezuela centred on Shell, BP, and BG Group’s investments in the oil and gas industry.
“British companies have over $4bn already invested” in Venezuela, noted one Foreign Office official, with new investments of another $3bn planned for the oil industry.
Blair was thus instructed by advisers to impress on Chávez that the UK government was “following your proposed hydrocarbons legislation very closely”.
In private, Blair’s adviser and future MI6 chief John Sawers wrote that “the only reason for seeing him is to benefit British oil and gas companies”.
Sawers’ note drove at the core issue which had been guiding Britain’s relations with Venezuela for over a century: oil.
Declassified has combed through dozens of files in the National Archives which expose how the UK government has repeatedly sought to thwart the nationalisation of oil in Venezuela since it was first discovered during the early twentieth century.
Working in partnership with Britain’s leading oil corporations, the Foreign Office has resorted to political pressure, propaganda activities, and covert operations to maintain control over Venezuela’s lucrative crude.
The origins of Britain’s interest in Venezuela’s oilIn 1912, Royal Dutch-Shell began operations in Venezuela and, two years later, the company – alongside US firm General Asphalt – discovered a petroleum field in the small town of Mene Grande.
George Bernard Reynolds, a geologist at Venezuelan Oil Concessions Limited (VOC), a Shell subsidiary, described the supplies as “enough to satisfy the most exacting”.
By 1920, the CIA reported that practically all of Venezuela’s oil production and its most promising concessions were held by Royal Dutch-Shell and two American companies, Jersey Standard (SOCNJ) and Gulf.
Indeed, Venezuelan oil controlled by Royal Dutch-Shell had increased by over 600% from 210,000 barrels in 1917 to 1,584,000 in 1921.
“Is there any other company more conclusively British than this”, asked Sir Marcus Samuel, chairman of the Shell Transport and Trading Company, in June 1915, “who have proved themselves more willing and able to serve the interests of the Empire?”
But foreign control over oil had serious consequences for Venezuela’s land and people.
In 1936, oil workers in Maracaibo called a general strike in response to low wages, poor living conditions and the association of oil firms with the late dictator, Juan Vicente Gómez. It lasted for 43 days, during which time oil production decreased by 39%.
In response, Venezuelan president General Eleazar López Contreras introduced a series of reforms to improve labour conditions.
This made him unpopular with the British and US oil executives, who were described by US ambassador Meredith Nicholson as belonging to “the old school of ‘imperialists’ who believed that might – in the business sense – was right”.
Venezuela’s oil nonetheless remained central to the British imperial project and, by the outbreak of World War Two, Venezuelan oil “took on particular significance within the British war effort as oil from the Middle East became less accessible following the closure of the Mediterranean in 1940”, according to research by academic Mark Seddon.
Officials therefore became increasingly worried about nationalisation in Latin America, particularly after foreign oil interests – including those of Shell – had been expropriated in Mexico in 1938.
That year, for instance, British diplomat John Balfourwrote: “We should do all we can to show that it is not in the interests of a Latin-American country like Mexico to eliminate British interests from participating in the exploitation of its oil resources”.
A dangerous opponent of capitalConcerns around nationalisation arose once again during the Rómulo Betancourt administration in the 1940s.
He was described by the Foreign Office in 1945 as “by far the most dangerous opponent of capital in Venezuela”, while the oil companies worried about his past support for communism.
These concerns proved overblown as Betancourt developed into a staunch anti-communist. According to a CIA file dated March 1948, Betancourt and his predecessor, Rómulo Gallegos, met to discuss “the proposed outlawing of the Communist Party in Venezuela.”
The first step, according to the document, “was the dismissal from the [oil workers union] Fedepetrol of all Communist Party petroleum syndicate delegates”.
Shell’s directors nonetheless responded positively to the military coup which toppled Betancourt in 1948.
They believed, as UK ambassador John H. Magowan noted in February 1949, that the new administration would “reverse the Betancourt tendency to hostility towards the ‘capitalists’ and ‘colonial’ powers”.
While US-owned SOCNJ had emerged as Venezuela’s main oil producer by this time, Shell remained the second most important player and, by 1950, the company had centralized its operations, building a modernist headquarters in northern Caracas.
The propaganda campaignDuring the 1960s, as the shadow of the Cold War cast over Latin America, a propaganda unit within the Foreign Office secretly worked to protect Britain’s oil interests in Venezuela.
That unit, named the Information Research Department (IRD), had been set up in 1948 to collect information about communism and distribute it to contacts worldwide.
The goal was to build resilience against communist and other national liberation movements while cultivating foreign agents of influence such as journalists, politicians, military officers, and businessmen.
By 1961, the IRD viewed Venezuela as the third most important country in Latin America in light of the risk of left-wing “subversion” and Britain’s strategic stake in the country’s oil industry.
That year, the IRD worked with Britain’s intelligence services to promote a boycott of El Nacional, the largest newspaper in Venezuela, with the goal of forcing it “to abandon its campaign in favor of expropriating foreign companies and promoting communist agitation”.
The campaign not only had the backing of powerful conservative and anti-communist groups in Venezuela but also the foreign oil companies, who agreed to suspend their advertising in the newspaper.
By 1962, IRD officer Leslie Boas was able to boast that El Nacional had “changed its tone in a great way”, with the newspaper’s circulation also dropping from 70,000 to 45,000 per day.
Reactionary networks in Venezuela were also being covertly funded by Shell in this period, according to recently declassified files.
In April 1962, Boas wrote to IRD chief Donald Hopson about the Latin American Information Committee (LAIC) which was “now doing quite active work… in Venezuela”.
The first director of LAIC was Enno Hobbing, who divided his work between Time/Life magazine and the CIA and later played a role in Chile’s 1973 coup d’état.
Boas explained that he “had a long talk with Hobbing […] and there do seem to be one or two ways in which we can be of mutual help without either of us burning our fingers”.
A 1962 letter sent from Information Research Department officer Leslie Boas to his boss at the Foreign Office (National Archives)
Such help would include “an unattributable supply of IRD material to contacts” of LAIC in return for LAIC supplying Boas with access to and information about local anti-communist networks.
Remarkably, Boas disclosed that Shell was “contributing financially to” LAIC alongside US retailer Sears Roebuck and other “International Business Machines”.
He added that “none of the local branches of these companies such as Shell de Venezuela are cooperating either financially or overtly in any way, it is being done through their head offices and LAIC who have their own offices in New York”.
It was during this period that Shell and BP were also providing direct, “handsome” subsidies to the IRD to promote their oil interests across Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.
Network of ‘Influencers’ Conspire to Threaten Venezuela’s Attorney General Saab
Nationalisation rekindledThe IRD continued to promote Britain’s oil interests in Venezuela through the 1960s and 1970s, until the unit was closed down in 1977.
In a country assessment sheet for Venezuela, dated 1969, an IRD official noted how “we have considerable investments in the country, particularly those of Shell, whose fixed installations alone have been conservatively valued at £300 million”.
The official continued: “Shell’s operations in Venezuela play an important role in the company’s very substantial contribution in invisibles [earnings through intangible assets] to our balance of payments”, noting that Britain’s key objective was therefore “to protect our investments”.
Two years later, IRD field officer Ian Knight Smith wrote to London with concerns about how “the emotional issue of economic nationalism, always a potent force in a country whose main natural resources are largely in the hands of foreign companies, was [being] rekindled”.
Worse still, the Venezuelan president, Rafael Caldera, had “made his own contribution to the new nationalism – in the shape of a law nationalising all natural gas deposits”.
The IRD consequently prepared briefings “on communist instigation of charges against the international oil companies” to be shared with contacts across Venezuela.
In addition, the propaganda unit “cast around for material with which to brief IRD contacts who are in a position to influence government policy or legislation affecting foreign investments in Venezuela”.
Officials were particularly interested in commissioning a “well-researched paper on the positive aspects of foreign investment in developing countries, helping to counter the growing assumption, carefully fostered by the extreme left, that all foreign investment is basically suspect”.
It was within this context that the Foreign Office privately advised that “we should protect as far as we are able Shell’s continued access to Venezuelan oil”.
Share of the gravyFor all its efforts, the IRD was not able to turn the tide of nationalisation in Venezuela, with plans developed during the 1970s for the early reversion of foreign oil interests to the state.
Venezuelan oil was officially nationalised in 1976, with foreign companies including Shell being replaced by the state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).
In 1976, President Carlos Andres Pérez and well-wishers celebrate as Venezuela’s oil industry is nationalised (Photo: Alamy)
But this was by no means the end of the road for Britain’s oil interests in Venezuela.
In a background briefing for a visit by Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés Pérez, dated November 1977, the Foreign Office observed that “Shell is still our largest single interest”.
The official added: “It should not be forgotten that despite nationalisation our largest commercial stake in this country is still Shell, and although they no longer, since nationalisation, produce oil here, they earn millions of dollars from their service and marketing contracts with their former company”.
The company also continued “to off-take very large volumes of Venezuelan oil for sale mostly in the US and Canada”.
Another official remarked upon the “furious activity of all European countries, including ourselves, in trying to get our share of Venezuela’s economic gravy”.
By 1978, the New York Times went so far as to say that Shell was “busier in Venezuela than before the oil industry was nationalized”.
Venezuela: The Fable of ‘Political Prisoners’ and Complicit Silence in the Face of Kidnapping
**‘Shell has been active‘**Even still, Britain’s oil firms wished to return to Venezuela’s oilfields.
Those hopes were stoked in the early 1990s by the “Oil Opening” of President Carlos Andrés Péres, whose austerity measures led to an explosion of poverty and street protests, but dashed once again by Chávez’ proposed Hydrocarbons Law in 2001.
In the lead-up to Chávez’ visit that year to London, Britain’s leading oil companies were once again in the prime minister’s ear about the projected impact on their interests.
Blair’s briefing noted unambiguously that UK and US companies were “concerned” about the oil reforms and wanted them watered down.
Days before the visit, Shell’s chairman Philip Watts offered suggestions on how Blair might handle Chávez.
Letter sent in 2001 from Shell chairman Philip Watts to the Foreign Office (National Archives)
“As you may have appreciated, Shell has been active in helping in the preparations for the visit through the Foreign Office”, Watts wrote.
“Considering the importance of the energy sector for both the Venezuelan and UK economies, I thought the PM may appreciate a small briefing on our… plans in Venezuela”, he added.
Those plans involved ameliorating the “uncertain investment climate” and softening the “fiscal and legal framework” in the country.
As part of the charm offensive, Watts also hosted a “farewell” banquet for Chávez, to which foreign secretary Jack Straw and other senior ministers were invited.
BP and BG Group also “registered their interest with No.10 about the visit”, with BP preparing “to put their case… forcefully” in favour of a meeting between the two leaders.
**‘The Americans are concerned‘**The US government also weighed in on the matter.
On 18 October, an official in the British embassy in Washington wrote to London that “the Americans are concerned about the impact that the Hydrocarbons Law will have on investment in the energy sector”.
They continued: “The major oil companies, including BP, had all made clear that its tax and restrictive joint venture productions would hinder their operations”.
The US state department “thought it would be particularly useful for Chavez to hear these concerns in London, given his tendency to discount messages from the US”.
To this end, the George Bush administration hoped Blair would “talk sense into [Chávez] on the Hydrocarbons Law, where BP are among those who stand to lose”.
Blair hosts Chávez at Downing Street in October 2001 (Photo: Gerry Penny / Alamy)
Further pressure was applied by Gustavo Cisneros, a Venezuelan billionaire and media mogul who was introduced to Blair in 2000 by Daily Telegraph owner Conrad Black.
Sawers, Blair’s adviser, noted that Cisneros’ “sole message” for Blair “was that Chávez was a real danger to stability and free markets (and, of course, rich Venezuelans like himself)”.
A briefing document prepared by Cisneros, for instance, warned that “Chavez will likely react” to oil prices dropping “by lashing out at the private sector”.
Sawers viewed Cisneros with suspicion but broadly agreed that Chávez was objectionable. There was, he wrote, “a chance that the picture [with Chávez] at the front door [of Downing Street] would come back to haunt us”.
He continued: “This is one of the World’s tyrants whose hand I won’t have to shake”.
The coup against ChávezA coup against Chávez broke out in April 2002, orchestrated by dissident military and political figures with support from Washington.
Pedro Carmona, an economist who was unconstitutionally appointed Venezuela’s president, quickly set about dismantling the country’s democracy and reversing Chávez’s oil reforms.
He happened to be in the offices of Cisneros, the mega mogul who had taken the opportunity to “pour poison” into Blair’s ears about Chávez, when the coup broke out.
The declassified files show how Britain quietly hoped the Carmona regime would be more accommodating to foreign interests while noting the unconstitutional nature of the coup.
“The Cabinet is strong on experience and business” and “hopefully its management capability will be much higher”, wrote the British embassy in Caracas.
The embassy was also informed by UK business leaders in Venezuela that “their operations should be back to normal by 15 April”, while Shell’s “production of oil was unaffected”.
At the same time, however, the Foreign Office was disturbed by the fact that “no one” had “ever elected” the Carmona regime.
“Venezuela may or may not have wanted to get rid of Chavez, but not necessarily to lose the other parts of their democratic system”, one official wrote. “The right-wing businessmen seem to have shot themselves in the foot”.
Notably, the UK government seemed to have some knowledge of Washington’s role in the events.
On 14 April, with Chávez imprisoned in a military barracks, the British embassy in Caracas cabled to London that the US ambassador had been spending “some hours in the Presidential Palace”.
“Please protect [the information]”, they instructed.
The oppositionThe coup was short-lived.
Chávez was reinstated within 47 hours following a wave of popular mobilisations across Caracas.
With Chávez back at the helm, the Foreign Office quietly hoped that “the events of the last few days” would be seen as “a serious warning to change his ways”.
But the situation remained tense, with UK foreign secretary Jack Straw noting in July 2002 that Chávez’s position “remain[ed] shaky”.
The political opposition in Venezuela was seen by Whitehall as particularly intransigent, with Straw declaring that Chávez looks “positively resplendent compared with [them]”.
The Venezuelan opposition, Straw continued, “appear to be united, indeed motivated, by sheer indignation that someone like Chávez (not one of them and above all not white) should be in charge and have such a popular power base”.
An official in Britain’s embassy in Caracas similarly noted in 2002 that the Venezuela opposition “looks like a train that tried to breach a wall on one track in April and are now seeking to do the same on a slightly different track and at a slightly different angle”.
They added: “The opposition’s self-delusion is growing worse by the day: they claim alternately they are living in either a fascist or communist dictatorship”.
One of the key opposition figures in this period was María Corina Machado, with whom the UK government is currently in talks amid a renewed regime change campaign in Venezuela.
From Orinoco Tribune – News and opinion pieces about Venezuela and beyond via This RSS Feed.
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Colombia and Ecuador Begin Bilateral Talks Amid Diplomatic and Trade Tensions
(orinocotribune.com)
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Venezuela’s Acting President Calls for ‘Healing From Intolerance Brought by Fascists’
(orinocotribune.com)
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Our weekly roundup of stories in the English and Spanish language press on Mexico and Mexican politics.
Raúl Antonio Capote, Washington’s strategy to recolonize America Resumen. The new NSS explicitly revives the Monroe Doctrine, adding a “Trump Corollary” that seeks to restore US preeminence in the hemisphere and deny China and Russia control of any strategic assets.
Alejandro I. López, Las claves de la reforma para reducir la jornada laboral a 40 horas El País. La iniciativa, lista para discutirse en el Senado de México, plantea la disminución gradual de la jornada lectiva hasta 2030 y evita incluir de forma explícita los dos días de descanso semanales.
María del Pilar Martínez, Sitrabics logra acuerdo histórico en transporte transfronterizo bajo el T-MEC El Economista. Tras un prolongado conflicto laboral que inició en 2021, el Sindicato de Transportistas alcanzó un acuerdo de implementación con la empresa Kamu, marcando un precedente en la resolución de controversias mediante el Mecanismo Laboral de Respuesta Rápida del T-MEC.
Sandra Dibble, Cross-Border Truckers Win Fight to Unionize Voice of San Diego. A union hoping to represent long-haul truckers who transport goods between Mexico and the United States announced a deal on Tuesday.
Nora Gaspar Reséndiz, Fobaproa, corrupción poblana y opacidad abollan el auto de Mier… antes de arrancar Sin Embargo. Ignacio Mier es un expriista cuya trayectoria ha tenido varias polémicas, entre ellas destaca su voto a favor del Fobaproa, una deuda que los mexicanos pagarán hasta 2050.
Ivan Evair Saldaña, Mexico City protest demands Mexico continue sending oil to Cuba MR Online. “Mexican oil for the Cubans!” they chanted.
Dahlia de la Cerda, Claudia Sheinbaum no es ‘presirvienta’, es tu patrona El País. Los ataques machistas contra la presidenta de México nos recuerdan que no todos los insultos son equivalentes: algunos humillan, otros ordenan el mundo.
Ana Isabel Martinez and Raul Cortes, Mexico’s Pemex supplied $496 million of oil to Cuba in 2025 Reuters. And it must not stop.
Carlos Carabaña, Andrés Lajous: “Con el Tren Maya y El Insurgente estamos recuperando una industria que dejó de existir” El País. El político, que lleva ya más de un año como jefe de los ferrocarriles de México, lidera una ambiciosa expansión de los trenes de pasajeros en un momento complejo tras el primer accidente mortal de esta nueva era.
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Clicks
February 7, 2026February 7, 2026
Our weekly roundup of stories in the English and Spanish language press including Washington’s strategy to recolonize America, public rail, cross-border unionization, FOBAPROA’s legacy, and the dubious 40 hour workweek reform.
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New Challenges for the China-Mexico Trade Relationship in 2026
February 6, 2026February 6, 2026
The lack of high-level dialogue between China and Mexico has eroded the possibility of effective coordination in multiple bilateral areas, particularly in foreign trade.
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People’s Mañanera February 6
February 6, 2026
President Sheinbaum’s daily press conference, with comments on Michoacán homicides reduction, humanitarian aid for Cuba by Monday, Sheinbaum vs New York Times, and 1944 Water Treaty with US.
The post Clicks appeared first on Mexico Solidarity Media.
From Mexico Solidarity Media via This RSS Feed.
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Venezuela: Jorge Rodríguez Calls on Deputies to Listen to the People (+Orlando Figuera)
(orinocotribune.com)
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This article by Enrique Dussel Peters originally appeared in the February 5, 2026 edition of China Hoy.
Mexico and the People’s Republic of China enjoy a deep, extensive, complex, and mature contemporary socioeconomic relationship. Diplomatic relations with China date back to 1899, and with the People’s Republic of China since 1972. In the second half of the 20th century, the relationship was based on bilateral political and strategic interests within the complex international environment of the Cold War. Since the 21st century, however, the bilateral relationship has shifted toward increasingly pragmatic aspects, centered on its growing economic exchange, particularly trade. The recent debates surrounding the tariff package imposed by Mexico at the end of 2025 are therefore particularly relevant.
Over 20 years of research by the China-Mexico Studies Center (Cechimex) at the Faculty of Economics of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), we have examined in detail specific topics such as foreign trade, financing, foreign direct investment, infrastructure projects, and migration, among others. The issue of tariffs falls within the broader topic of foreign trade between Mexico and China.
Foreign trade between Mexico and China has probably been the most dynamic area in the bilateral relationship in the 21st century, and China has become Mexico’s second largest trading partner since 2003. Several aspects are significant in this regard.
A Strategic Relationship
First, one of the main structural changes in Mexico’s foreign trade in the 21st century concerns the growing participation of Asia, and particularly China. Mexico’s foreign trade with China increased from less than 1% in 2000 to 11.16% in 2024. The United States remains Mexico’s main trading partner, although its share fell sharply, from 81.17% in 1999 to 60.68% in 2024.
Secondly, while China is Mexico’s third-largest export market, it accounted for only 1.47% of total exports in 2024. For Mexico’s foreign trade, the United States remains the primary benchmark, and although Mexico has achieved significant import diversification (in 2024, the US share reached 40.29%, the lowest in the 21st century), in recent decades approximately 80% of Mexican exports have been destined for the United States. In 2024, the United States was the main destination for Mexican exports (83.06%), followed by the European Union (4.28%), Canada (3.06%), and China (1.61%). For Mexican imports in 2024, the United States was the main source (40.12%), followed by China (20.76%) and the European Union (11.24%).
Third, China has become an increasingly leading technology supplier to Mexico. In 1990, for example, only 11.78% of Mexican imports from China were of medium and high technology, rising to 54.39% in 2024. Similarly, the vast majority of Mexican imports from China were intermediate and capital goods (in 2024, capital goods accounted for 30.35% of imports, a share well above that of US imports at 12.90%). China has become a significant supplier of capital and high-technology goods to Mexico.
Fourth, Mexican imports from China have not only significantly increased their presence in Mexico, but have also increasingly displaced imports from the United States. The top five categories of goods imported from China accounted for 75.05% of total imports in 2024 (concentrated primarily in electronics, auto parts, and increasingly in the automotive sector). Historically, the U.S. presence in these categories was significant and by far the most relevant in Mexican imports: in 1995, for example, Mexican imports of electronics and auto parts from the United States represented 79.20% and 35.55%, respectively, of total Mexican imports in these categories; the Chinese share was secondary (which also indicates the presence of other European Union and Asian countries, among others). This structure of Mexican imports, however, has changed radically in recent decades: in 2024, for example, in the electronics sector, a critical input for a large part of Mexican exports, Chinese imports accounted for 33.61% of total Mexican electronics imports, displacing US imports since 2006 (US imports represented only 21.71%). Similar competitive trends are observed in auto parts and particularly in the automotive sector; in the latter, for the first time, Mexican imports from China reached 21.65% in 2024 (still far from the US share, which has been declining since 2000, at 45.88% in 2024).
It is in this context, and given the systemic confrontation between the United States and China that has persisted for at least the last decade, the aggressive measures implemented since Donald Trump’s second presidency in 2015, the pressure exerted by the United States on third countries like Mexico, and the upcoming USMCA negotiations in 2026, that the Mexican government proposed a tariff package on September 9, 2025, for imports from countries with which Mexico does not have trade agreements, including all the BRICS countries and particularly China. The tariff package included 1,463 tariff lines (representing thousands of products) and tariff increases ranging from 5% to 50%. The Chamber of Deputies passed the initiative to the Senate for approval on December 10, 2025.
In summary, we believe it is necessary to reactivate bilateral institutions between Mexico and China. The highest bilateral institution, the Mexico-China Permanent Binational Commission, held its last meeting in 2014, and others, such as the High-Level Investment Group (HLIG), in 2015. This lack of high-level dialogue between the two parties has eroded the possibility of effective coordination in multiple bilateral areas, particularly in foreign trade. Without seeking to justify Mexico’s unilateral measures through the tariff package that came into effect on January 1, 2026, it is also important to understand that its overall impact on trade with China is minor, as estimated above.
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New Challenges for the China-Mexico Trade Relationship in 2026
February 6, 2026February 6, 2026
The lack of high-level dialogue between China and Mexico has eroded the possibility of effective coordination in multiple bilateral areas, particularly in foreign trade.
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People’s Mañanera February 6
February 6, 2026
President Sheinbaum’s daily press conference, with comments on Michoacán homicides reduction, humanitarian aid for Cuba by Monday, Sheinbaum vs New York Times, and 1944 Water Treaty with US.
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Can I Borrow You For A Minute? Brendan James & Noah Kulwin of Blowback
February 6, 2026
Speaking on the sidelines of the Progressive International’s Nuestra América summit about the new, more brazen phase of U.S. intervention in Latin America.
The post New Challenges for the China-Mexico Trade Relationship in 2026 appeared first on Mexico Solidarity Media.
From Mexico Solidarity Media via This RSS Feed.
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Every day, President Claudia Sheinbaum gives a morning presidential press conference and Mexico Solidarity Media posts English language summaries, translated by Mexico Solidarity’s Pedro Gellert Frank. Previous press conference summaries are available here.
Intentional Homicides Drop 30% in Michoacán
Thanks to the National Security Strategy and the Michoacán Plan for Peace and Justice, intentional homicides dropped 30% between October and December 2025, making 2025 the year with the fewest homicides since 2016.
President Claudia Sheinbaum noted that the results come from addressing the root causes and ensuring zero impunity, a strategy reflected in a national 40% reduction in intentional homicides.
Education, Wellbeing, and Investment Advance in Michoacán
In Michoacán, the Gertrudis Bocanegra scholarship/stipend program was launched, with over 44,000 young people enrolled, who will receive their first financial support this month, alongside expansions of high schools, openings of new campuses, and investment in universities.
The Wellbeing Development Hub in Zinapécuaro also was launched, with public and private work projects that will boost investment, jobs, and regional growth.
Mexico to Send Humanitarian Aid to Cuba by Monday at Latest
Sheinbaum announced that humanitarian aid, mainly food and basic supplies, will be sent to Cuba by Monday at the latest. The President noted ongoing diplomatic efforts to resume oil shipments to Cuba without Mexico facing sanctions, but made clear that solidarity doesn’t stop and humanitarian aid comes first.
Mexico Doesn’t Accept Slanders: Sheinbaum Debunks The New York Times
The President refuted The New York Times with facts. Results in public security wouldn’t be possible if there were pacts with organized crime. She compared data from previous presidential administrations. Under Calderón, intentional homicides rose from a daily average of 28.6 to 70.9; under Peña Nieto, from 63.2 to 100; now they have dropped from 91.7 to 64. Sheinbaum reaffirmed that accusations without proof are not valid, and that the strategy remains firm, namely to address root causes of crime and zero impunity.
1944 Water Treaty: Mexico Fulfills Commitments
Mexico is complying with the Water Treaty with the United States. The President noted that the country has already fulfilled its part in cleaning up the Tijuana River, while the U.S. has pending tasks in San Diego. Water delivery will be gradual, prioritizing human consumption and irrigation modernization in Mexico’s northern states.
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People’s Mañanera February 6
February 6, 2026
President Sheinbaum’s daily press conference, with comments on Michoacán homicides reduction, humanitarian aid for Cuba by Monday, Sheinbaum vs New York Times, and 1944 Water Treaty with US.
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Can I Borrow You For A Minute? Brendan James & Noah Kulwin of Blowback
February 6, 2026
Speaking on the sidelines of the Progressive International’s Nuestra América summit about the new, more brazen phase of U.S. intervention in Latin America.
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WTF: The Donroe Doctrine Vs Mexico
February 6, 2026February 6, 2026
Saturday, February 7 morning broadcast of WTF is Going on in Latin America & the Caribbean with José Luis Granados Ceja and Kurt Hackbarth from Soberanía: The Mexican Politics Podcast.
The post People’s Mañanera February 6 appeared first on Mexico Solidarity Media.
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