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151
 
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36928315

"The current global trading system is not working as it should. Guardrails are clearly missing. On this point, Donald is right – there is a serious problem. But we strongly feel that the biggest challenges are not the trade between G7 partners," said the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen during a G7 meeting in Canada.

"The sources of the biggest collective problem [for the G7 countries] we have has its origins in the accession of China to the WTO in 2001," she added.

"China has largely shown [its] unwillingness to live within the constraints of the rules based international system. While other opened their market China focused undercutting intellectual property protections, massive subsidies with the aim to dominate global manufacturing and supply chains. This is not market competition – it is distortion with intent. And it undermines our manufacturing sectors."

Von der Leyen added that this is the problem the G7 must solve together, stressing that the G7 economies account for 45% of global GDP – and over 80% of intellectual property revenues.

[...]

According to to a report by Euronews, von der Leyen also said during one of the meeting's thematic sessions "China is using this quasi-monopoly [on rare earths] not only as a bargaining chip, but also weaponising it to undermine competitors in key industries."

"We all witnessed the cost and consequences of China's coercion through export restrictions," she added, referring to Beijing's recent decision to curb sales of seven types of rare earth minerals, a situation Brussels had described as "alarming".

[...]

Von der Leyen also blasted China for flooding global markets with "subsidised overcapacity that its market cannot absorb", name-checking the dispute over China-made electric vehicles that her Commission considers to be artificially cheaper.

[...]

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36925397

Archived

  • Brazilian and Chinese authorities — including Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Xi Jinping — recently discussed a proposed railway that would connect Brazil’s Atlantic coast to Peru’s new Pacific-facing Chancay Port, cutting through the Amazon.
  • From Lucas do Rio Verde, a major agricultural hub in the state of Mato Grosso, the railway would be built from scratch, advancing into the Amazon’s Arc of Deforestation.
  • Planners intend to build the Amazonian section of the railway alongside existing highways, a strategy aimed at minimizing environmental impacts and streamlining the licensing process.
  • However, environmental activists warn that the Bioceanic Corridor, together with newly planned roads, waterways and ports, could accelerate deforestation and degradation in the rainforest.

[...]

For China, the Bioceanic Corridor is a promising connection to the Chancay Port, one of many projects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, also known as the New Silk Road — a strategy aimed at expanding China’s trade capacity and global influence. In November, President Xi Jinping visited Peru to inaugurate the new port, located about 75 km (47 mi) from the capital, Lima. The $3.4 billion project is led by the Chinese state-owned company COSCO, which holds a 60% stake in the venture.

[...]

The Bioceanic Corridor does not yet have a fully defined route, but the Brazilian government’s proposal is already known. Starting from the Atlantic coast, the plan is to link the three sections of the West-East Integration Railway (FIOL) with two segments of the Central-West Integration Railway (FICO), both at different stages of construction at the moment. This route would pass through the Matopiba region, an expanding agricultural frontier for soy and cattle, which accounted for 75% of deforestation in the biodiverse Cerrado savanna in 2024.

[...]

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36864125

Archived

Despite public condemnations, the European Union’s response to Beijing’s repressive tactics against dissidents beyond China’s borders remains ineffective and lacks coordination, according to a survey of 10 EU governments conducted by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and its media partners, alongside interviews with European lawmakers.

Since 2023, the European Parliament has recognized transnational repression as a growing threat to human rights and the rule of law, and called on member states to facilitate reporting, investigate allegations and sanction the perpetrators.

But China Targets, an investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and 42 media partners, found that the Chinese government continues to target Chinese and Hong Kong dissidents as well as Uyghur and Tibetan advocates using surveillance, hacking and threats against them and their family members in an effort to quash any criticism of the regime.

[...]

"The EU must set clear red lines, backed by criminal investigations, sanctions, and diplomatic consequences, to show that fundamental rights are not negotiable," says Hannah Neumann, European Parliament member.

[...]

Most of the targets interviewed by ICIJ and its partners said they had not reported state-sponsored threats to the authorities in their adopted countries for fear of retaliation from China or because they didn’t have faith in local authorities’ ability to help. Of those who had filed a report — including Nurya Zyden, a Uyghur rights advocate who said she was followed by two Chinese men from Dublin, where she lives, to an activist gathering in Sarajevo, Bosnia, last year — most said police did not follow up on their case or told them that they couldn’t do anything because there was no evidence of a crime.

[...]

Despite having sent “important political signals” through pronouncements and public condemnations, the EU’s response remains “fragmented” and “urgently” needs strengthening, said Hannah Neumann, a European lawmaker who led a 2023 report for the European Parliament on authoritarian regimes’ threats against human rights defenders.

[...]

“Currently, information on cross-border repression is scattered among local law enforcement authorities and is poorly coordinated,” says [Engin] Eroglu [who leads the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with China and was himself one of several politicians targeted by a sophisticated cyberattack allegedly linked to the Chinese government]. “Without cooperation between authorities, it is very difficult to determine the severity of cross-border repression measures, as these measures alone often do not violate local law.”

[...]

A spokesperson for the Belgian ministry of foreign affairs told ICIJ partner De Tijd that Belgian intelligence services, which are in contact with civil society organizations, have “insight into the general trends” of transnational repression in the country and that in recent years, “the intensity of the campaigns seems to have increased.”

According to EU Parliament member Eroglu, better information-sharing among member states is essential.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36813071

Archived

Here is the full report (pdf).

China and Russia’s deepening strategic partnership Despite a shared history of rivalry, conflict and mistrust, today China and Russia share a broad interest in undermining what leaders in both countries perceive to be a world order dominated by the West. Both countries see the US as their prime adversary, and undermining NATO – the strongest US-led alliance – as a common goal, according to a report published by the China Strategic Risks Institute in the UK (CSRI).

[...]

These shared interests are the backdrop to a deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China, in which the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are increasingly perceived by both actors as a unified security theatre.

TLDR:

  • Undersea cables underpin economic security and global prosperity in the digital age, carrying 99% of intercontinental data traffic. Undersea cables are vital for both civilian and defence infrastructure, including future AI-powered technologies.

  • A series of suspicious breakages in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait indicate that China and Russia may be using undersea sabotage as part of broader grey-zone operations against their adversaries – including NATO and its member states.

  • This paper examines 12 suspected undersea cable sabotage cases from January 2021 to April 2025. Of the 10 with identified vessels, 8 are linked to China or Russia by flag or ownership.

  • The involvement of Chinese vessels in cable breakages in Europe, and Russian vessels near Taiwan, suggests plausible China-Russia coordination amid deepening ties in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.

  • As a key hub in Euro-Atlantic cable infrastructure, the UK is a likely target for future Russian and Chinese grey-zone operations – posing a new and complex challenge for its maritime defence and surveillance systems.

The UK must be clear-eyed and proactive in addressing grey-zone threats to undersea infrastructure. Recommendations include:

  • Enhancing monitoring and surveillance: The UK should use NATO mechanisms to regularly share best practice and intelligence on undersea cable threats, including Russia and China’s shadow fleets, and extend cooperation to experienced partners like Taiwan and Japan.

  • Strengthening mechanisms for accountability: International law on undersea cables is outdated and insufficient. The UK should work with partners to strengthen accountability powers through utilising Port State Controls and publishing vessel blacklists. It must also tighten domestic laws and establish protocols for rapid pursuit, interdiction, and detention of suspect vessels.

  • Improving redundancy, repair and resilience: The UK government should work with private operators to ensure guaranteed access to cable repair vessels capabilities during crises or national emergencies, as well as strategic stockpiling of cable repair parts.

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Archived

f you had asked DeepSeek’s R1 open-source large language model just four months ago to list out China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea — a highly sensitive issue for the country’s Communist Party leadership — it would have responded in detail, even if its responses subtly tugged you towards a sanitized official view.

Ask the same question today of the latest update, DeepSeek-R1-0528, and you’ll find the model is more tight-lipped, and far more emphatic in its defense of China’s official position. “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea are well grounded in history and jurisprudence,” it begins before launching into fulsome praise of China’s peaceful and responsible approach.

[...]

The pattern of increasing template responses suggests DeepSeek has increasingly aligned its products with the demands of the Chinese government, becoming another conduit for its narratives. That much is clear.

But that the company is moving in the direction of greater political control even as it creates globally competitive products points to an emerging global dilemma with two key dimensions. First, as cutting-edge models like R1-0528 spread globally, bundled with systematic political constraints, this has the potential to subtly reshape how millions understand China and its role in world affairs. Second, as they skew more strongly toward state bias when queried in Chinese as opposed to other languages (see below), these models could strengthen and even deepen the compartmentalization of Chinese cyberspace — creating a fluid and expansive AI firewall.

[...]

In a recent comparative study (data here), SpeechMap.ai ran 50 China-sensitive questions through multiple Chinese Large Language Models (LLMs). It did this in three languages: English, Chinese and Finnish, this last being a third-party language designated as a control [...]

  • First, there seems to be a complete lack of subtlety in how the new model responds to sensitive queries. While the original R1, which we first tested back in February applied more subtle propaganda tactics, such as withholding certain facts, avoiding the use of certain sensitive terminologies, or dismissing critical facts as “bias,” the new model responds with what are clearly pre-packaged Party positions.

We were told outright in responses to our queries, for example, that “Tibet is an inalienable part of China” (西藏是中国不可分割的一部分), that the Chinese government is contributing to the “building of a community of shared destiny for mankind” (构建人类命运共同体) and that, through the leadership of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, China is “jointly realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (共同实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦).

Template responses like these suggest DeepSeek models are now being standardized on sensitive political topics, the direct hand of the state more detectable than before.

[...]

  • The second change we noted was the increased volume of template responses overall. Whereas DeepSeek’s V3 base model, from which both R1 and R1-0528 were built, was able back in December to provide complete answers (in green) 52 percent of the time when asked in Chinese, that shrank to 30 percent with the original version of R1 in January. With the new R1-0528, that is now just two percent — just one question, in other words, receiving a satisfactory answer — while the overwhelming majority of queries now receive an evasive answer (yellow).

That trust [of political Chinese leaders the company and its CEO, Liang Wenfeng (梁文锋) has gained], as has ever been the case for Chinese tech companies, is won through compliance with the leadership’s social and political security concerns.

[...]

The language barrier in how R1-0528 operates may be the model’s saving grace internationally — or it may not matter at all. SpeechMap.ai’s testing revealed that language choice significantly affects which questions trigger template responses. When queried in Chinese, R1-0528 delivers standard government talking points on sensitive topics. But when the same questions are asked in English, the model remains relatively open, even showing slight improvements in openness compared to the original R1.

This linguistic divide extends beyond China-specific topics. When we asked R1-0528 in English to explain Donald Trump’s grievances against Harvard University, the model responded in detail. But the same question in Chinese produced only a template response, closely following the line from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “China has always advocated mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit among countries, and does not comment on the domestic affairs of the United States.” Similar patterns emerged for questions.

[...]

Yet this language-based filtering has limits. Some Chinese government positions remain consistent across languages, particularly territorial claims. Both R1 versions give template responses in English about Arunachal Pradesh, claiming the Indian-administered territory “has been an integral part of China since ancient times.”

[...]

The unfortunate implications of China’s political restraints on its cutting-edge AI models on the one hand, and their global popularity on the other could be two-fold. First, to the extent that they do embed levels of evasiveness on sensitive China-related questions, they could, as they become foundational infrastructure for everything from customer service to educational tools, subtly shape how millions of users worldwide understand China and its role in global affairs. Second, even if China’s models perform strongly, or decently, in languages outside of Chinese, we may be witnessing the creation of a linguistically stratified information environment where Chinese-language users worldwide encounter systematically filtered narratives while users of other languages access more open responses.

[...]

The Chinese government’s actions over the past four months suggest this trajectory of increasing political control will likely continue. The crucial question now is how global users will respond to these embedded political constraints — whether market forces will compel Chinese AI companies to choose between technical excellence and ideological compliance, or whether the convenience of free, cutting-edge AI will ultimately prove more powerful than concerns about information integrity.

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Excellent concise reporting. Well worth a read.

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Archived

A Hong Kong group that advocated for workers rights for decades announced its shutdown abruptly on Thursday, citing financial difficulties and debt issues.

China Labor Bulletin planned to stop updating its website content and appeared to have deleted Facebook and Instagram social media accounts used by the nonprofit rights organization.

“The company can no longer maintain operations and has decided to dissolve and initiate the relevant procedures,” it said in a statement on an archived web page.

[...]

Founded in 1994, the organization maintained a database tracking workers’ strikes, protests, workplace accidents and other labor rights incidents in China.

As dozens of civil society groups disbanded or left Hong Kong in the wake of the 2020 Beijing-imposed national security law, China Labor Bulletin continued providing valuable resources for journalists and academics in the southern Chinese city.

[...]

China Labor Bulletin’s founder Han Dongfang, a former railway worker who participated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, did not immediately respond to a request for comment from The Associated Press. He told the Central News Agency of Taiwan that the shutdown was his decision and he would stay in Hong Kong.

Han’s decision appeared sudden to many Hong Kong civil society observers. Three weeks ago, he wrote on social media platform LinkedIn about his work anniversary and his team’s progress.

“Let’s keep our faith up at this abnormal time and continue our important work,” he said.

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Archived

There are no detention camps in Xinjiang, Chinese authorities said once the evidence and outcry became too much to deny completely – only vocational education and training centres. And those held there, they said, are not detainees at all but trainees who benefit greatly from their stay.

“The centres provide free education,” Chinese official Aierken Tuniyazi told a session of the UN Human Rights Council in June 2019 [...] The trainees’ personal dignity and freedoms are protected and they are allowed to go home on a regular basis, he said. Many had already “graduated” from the centres to live “a happy life with better quality”.

[...]

This was the narrative carefully propagated by Chinese government and state media, and armies of online commentators. None of it corresponded with the experiences of Uyghurs, Kazakhs and others caught up in the crackdown on Xinjiang’s Muslim minorities that a 2022 United Nations report found could constitute crimes against humanity, and the United States and other countries have described as genocide.

Only a tiny fraction of the estimated one million detained in camps and prisons managed to escape abroad. I spoke with a series of them in Turkey, Kazakhstan and the US while researching my book, Those Who Should Be Seized Should Be Seized, which investigates China’s oppression of its Muslim citizens. They had been held in different facilities across Xinjiang. All described systematic indoctrination, mistreatment and torture. Similar testimony has been gathered by rights groups and journalists and is supported by numerous leaked government documents.

People were taken to the camps for exhibiting what the Chinese government deemed signs of extremism – and that could be almost anything. Praying at the local mosque, wearing a headscarf or growing a beard. Quitting smoking, travelling to see family members abroad or just receiving a phone call from a foreign number. Saying “God bless you”

[...]

Arrests came in the form of summons to a local police station or armed squads pounding on doors late at night. Detainees were driven to massive facilities then stripped of their clothing, jewellery and phones and given uniforms. They were put in crowded cells that sometimes had beds but often did not, and watched over by ceiling-mounted CCTV cameras. The cells were unbearably warm in summer and when winter came the detainees pressed together for warmth. They were given only brief access to toilets [...]. Food was meagre. Several described only a thin soup for each meal, sometimes with a small piece of bread. Others talked of even less and a terrible, gnawing hunger.

There were classes most days that involved sitting in cramped and silent rows listening to lectures on Chinese language or the legal system. Guards would make them memorise patriotic songs and elements of Xi Jinping Thought, the president’s political doctrine. There would be videos too, detailing Xi’s foreign policy achievements or the power of China’s military.

Medical attention came only in an emergency and sometimes not even then. Most detainees said they were given regular pills or injections, however. None of them knew what they were given but it fogged their minds, made them lethargic and seemed to disrupt the women’s menstrual cycles.

[...]

There was violence. Beatings with fists, boots and shock batons for the slightest infraction and sometimes for no reason at all. Detainees spoke often of the device known as the tiger chair that guards strapped people into for hours or days at a time. The worst punishments often seemed to be reserved for Uyghurs.

Women described suffering and witnessing sexual violence. One told me men in medical masks took women from the cells at night and that when it happened to her, she was raped and beaten by several guards.

[...]

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Review of 'Daughters of the Bamboo Grove' (Barbara Demick) and 'Leftover Women' (10th Anniversary Edition)' (Leta Hong Fincher) from the Los Angeles Review of Books

In her new book, Daughters of the Bamboo Grove: From China to America, a True Story of Abduction, Adoption, and Separated Twins, Barbara Demick analyzes how the one-child policy was not just responsible for the gender imbalance in China but also contributed to tens of thousands of international adoptions, not all of which were conducted honorably or honestly.


With the easing of the one-child policy and the decreasing population rate, one could also presume that Chinese women and girls now enjoy more freedoms than in recent decades. Leta Hong Fincher shows this is not true. Just over a decade ago, she published Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China (2014), an astonishing book that revealed the dismal implications for young Chinese women in light of the campaign to push them into marriage before the age of 26. In 2023, Hong Fincher came out with a 10th anniversary updated edition of the book, which pairs nicely with Demick’s and provides a fuller picture of women in contemporary China.

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Archived

The launch of RSF.org in Mandarin is all the more crucial as access to independent information continues to shrink for Chinese-speaking audiences. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the regime has reinforced its censorship apparatus — symbolised by the "Great Firewall" — and ramped up efforts to spread propaganda globally. As a result, China now ranks near the bottom of the 2025 RSF World Press Freedom Index, placing 178th out of 180 countries and territories. With at least 123 journalists and media workers currently imprisoned, China remains the world’s largest jailer of media professionals.

[...]

With the addition of both simplified and traditional Mandarin, the RSF website is now available in an increasing number of languages for a global audience. The NGO also publishes regional content in Korean, Japanese, Mongolian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian. Internationally, RSF operates through 7 bureaus, 6 sections, and a network of 160 correspondents in over 140 countries.

[...]

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A new report traces how China’s targeting of protesters has evolved since the Tiananmen Square massacre into part of a sophisticated transnational repression campaign using harassment, violence and surveillance.

The report by ARTICLE 19 [opens pdf], an organization that defends freedom of expression worldwide, bolsters ICIJ’s findings in China Targets, a cross-border investigation exposing the sprawling scope and terrifying tactics of Beijing’s campaign to silence its critics living overseas.

As part of the investigation, ICIJ outlined a pattern of activist detentions by local police and governments ahead of visits by President Xi Jinping. During at least seven of Xi’s 31 international trips between 2019 and 2024, local law enforcement infringed on dozens of protesters’ rights in order to shield the Chinese president from dissent, detaining or arresting activists, often for spurious reasons.

The ARTICLE 19 report goes further, interviewing 29 members of diaspora communities, including some also identified by ICIJ, to describe incidents at protests dating as far back as 2011 involving activists from mainland China, including ethnic minorities from the northwest Xinjiang region and Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Inner Mongolia.

“This report points to a campaign of international harassment and intimidation designed with one purpose: to systematically stifle global protest movements that seek to defend human rights in China,” ARTICLE 19 said in the report.

[...]

The report also highlighted the psychological toll that acts of transnational repression can take on dissidents, many of whom are already isolated as members of diaspora communities. Beyond immediate verbal and physical attacks, the protracted threat of surveillance can lead to self-censorship and burnout, the report said.

“Overseas Chinese dissidents, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, and other diaspora activists know all too well the cost of protesting against human rights violations in China: its repression knows no borders,” Michael Caster, who runs ARTICLE 19’s Global China Programme, said in a statement. “And still, authorities in host countries have yet to fully grasp the dangers of transnational repression — and so support to those targeted is often severely lacking.”

[...]

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A Keeta delivery worker group on Facebook uses the mainland Chinese term “involution” (內捲) to describe the “K Go” scheme as it forces workers to self-exploit for their survival in a shrinking market. Keeta's parent company, Meituan, has been widely criticised for its algorithmic exploitation.

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Archived

[...]

While the harmful impacts of Chinese development projects are increasingly covered by African press and international watchdogs, they are nearly invisible in Chinese domestic media. State-run outlets like People’s Daily, Xinhua, and CCTV instead push positive messaging about economic partnerships and “South-South cooperation.” If there are local faces, they are often African presenters and reporters hired by Chinese state media at higher-than-local pay rates, who are tasked with presenting upbeat narratives that reinforce official talking points.

Commercial Chinese media — often perceived as more independent — largely follow suit. If stories touch on environmental issues at all, they do so in vague, sanitized terms that avoid direct attribution of harm to Chinese companies or projects.

Chinese investment and the presence of Chinese companies in Africa, in addition to their visible infrastructure and economic impact, are rarely scrutinized in terms of environmental harm within Chinese media. When environmental damage is addressed at all within Chinese media, it is either omitted or framed as incidental, often blamed on African mismanagement or natural challenges. Local community members are rarely quoted, interviewed, or centered in the storytelling. Instead, they remain nameless, stripped of agency, and disconnected from the audience.

And yet, the consequences of mega-development projects are real. In many countries in Africa where China has implemented projects, environmental problems have been repeatedly denounced. Deforestation, displacement of populations, loss of biodiversity in the construction of dams has damaged Sudan, Ghana, and the DRC; water pollution, and resulting negative health impacts due to mining are impacting Guinea, the DRC, and Mozambique; expropriations and violence in the context of a hydrocarbon project have destabalazed Uganda and Tanzania; and more.

[...]

In Kenya, for example, the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) — one of the flagship projects in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), its mega global infrastructure project — has cut through wildlife migration routes and alarmed conservationists. Some environmentalists have alleged “the railway has disrupted wildlife migration routes.” Yet despite its scale and promise, many Kenyans say they have seen little benefit from the railway, pointing to a deep disconnect between grand development narratives and realities on the ground.

In Nigeria, Chinese-run mining operations have been linked to water contamination and community displacement. In Rwanda, locals affected by Chinese-financed hydropower initiatives report land loss and inadequate compensation.

[...]

The few mentions of corporate responsibility rarely, if ever, include Chinese firms operating on the continent. This silence is not accidental. It is structural, political, and strategic.

[...]

China’s domestic media environment has undergone a dramatic transformation under Xi Jinping, whose administration emphasizes tightly controlled narratives that advance national pride and global ambition. Criticism of Chinese companies abroad, particularly on environmental issues, is seen as undermining these goals.

Meanwhile, China has aggressively expanded its media footprint in Africa — stationing more Chinese journalists across the continent and recruiting local African reporters to appear in state media broadcasts to provide “African faces” for Chinese narratives. These reports rarely diverge from official messaging. As one recent state-owned Global Times article framed it, “Environmental cooperation is not only a development priority but a symbol of the strong friendship and mutual trust between China and Africa.”

[...]

Environmental lawyer Zhang Jingjing, who has spent over a decade handling environmental rights cases involving Chinese enterprises in Africa, sees this erasure as both intentional and systemic. “Chinese-language and foreign-language reporting are like two entirely different worlds — Chinese reports are few, often absent, and when they exist, they’re pure praise,” she said in an interview with Global Voices.

Despite working in multiple African countries, she has never been approached by a Chinese journalist about her work. “Not a single Chinese journalist has interviewed me to understand what impact Chinese companies are having on local communities,” Zhang said.

[...]

"The state’s slogan about ‘telling China’s story well’ has already set the tone. A lot of these projects clearly have problems, but if they’re not ‘good stories,’ they simply won’t get reported," [Zhang said].

[...]

Chinese reporters who cross political red lines risk severe consequences, including censorship, job loss, surveillance, detention, or imprisonment under vague charges like “picking quarrels” or “subverting state power.” Some have faced public shaming, forced confessions, and threats to their families. When media organizations in China cross political red lines, their articles are swiftly deleted, and entire websites can be shut down. Editors and responsible officials are often removed from their positions. In the most severe cases, the media outlet itself may be permanently closed.

[...]

In Kenya, local authorities echo the rhetoric, eager to preserve investment and diplomatic warmth. But it comes at a cost: several Kenyan journalists describe growing difficulty in reporting critically on Chinese projects without editorial pushback or quiet blacklisting.

For Chinese media, the logic is simple: these are not stories that sell, politically or commercially. They are far removed from the interests of most domestic readers, and they risk undermining the carefully polished international image Beijing wants to present.

This one-sided narrative has profound implications for climate justice. It denies African communities the dignity of visibility and Chinese citizens the chance to understand the consequences of their country’s outward expansion. Real sustainability cannot rely on curated image-making. It demands transparency, access, and the courage to confront harm — not bury it.

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Archived

Tainan District Court on Thursday sentenced the Chinese captain of a Togolese-registered freighter that snapped an undersea cable linking Taiwan and Penghu in February to three years in prison for intentionally damaging the cable.

The captain of Hong Tai 58, a Togolese-registered ship flying under a flag of convenience, surnamed Wang (王), was handed the sentence for undersea cable sabotage in contravention of the Telecommunications Management Act, the court said in a statement Thursday.

The court decision is subject to appeal.

The freighter was boarded and its Chinese crew detained by Taiwanese authorities on Feb. 25 after Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) received a report from Chunghwa Telecom that its Taiwan-Penghu No. 3 submarine fiber optic cable had been severed, according to court documents.

[...]

The submarine cable, used for both telephone and broadband communication, is located in a government-designated no-anchor zone where vessels are prohibited from anchoring, according to the court.

[...]

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An international rights group says several global brands are among dozens of companies at risk of using forced labor through their Chinese supply chains.

Archived

Here you can download the report (pdf).

Over the past decade, the Chinese government has expanded exploration, mining, processing, and manufacturing of critical minerals in the China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The emergence of the Region as an extractive hub relies, in part, on state-imposed forced labour transfer programmes, targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic ethnic groups. This model not only subsidises operational costs for Chinese producers but also fuels systemic repression, through family separation, forced “re-education,” land dispossession, and the destruction of communities.

This research connects the Region’s system of state-imposed forced labour to major Chinese producers of four key minerals: titanium, lithium, beryllium, and magnesium. The report then traces the supply chains of XUAR-made minerals to global brands, including leading paint companies, thermos producers, aerospace applications, and defence and nuclear tools and components.

In addition to the human cost of exposure to the Region, environmental and trade concerns are also at stake. The use of coal as the main energy source and the lack of environmental standards, paired with opaque distribution networks, allow tainted goods to enter global markets at artificially low prices, creating an unfair playing field for responsible businesses.

Key findings:

  • 11,6% of the world’s titanium sponge (the critical input in titanium metal) is produced in the Uyghur Region.

  • Lithium exploration, mining, processing, and especially downstream battery production are increasing rapidly in the XUAR.

  • The region is the top source of beryllium in China, accounting for over 50% of domestic supply.

  • The PRC produces 92% of the world’s raw magnesium. The XUAR is one of only five province-level jurisdictions that produces raw magnesium – and its output is growing significantly.

  • For each of the four minerals studied, major mining and processing companies are participating in the state labour transfer programs, which scholars and legal experts identify as forced labour.

  • 77 companies in the critical minerals and downstream manufacturing sectors are operating in the XUAR and are at risk of participating in forced labour programmes in the titanium, lithium, beryllium, and magnesium industries.

  • 15 companies have sourced directly from XUAR-based entities in the past two years.

  • 68 downstream customers have connections to Chinese suppliers with operations in the XUAR.

  • 18 parent companies may be sourcing inputs from their subsidiaries in the XUAR.

All companies mentioned in the report were invited to respond to our findings. Their responses can be found in the Corporate Response Annex.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36600461

Human Rights Watch, in a May 15 submission to the EU, reiterated its regret that the EU continues to hold a human rights dialogue with China. Along with other rights organizations, Human Rights Watch has repeatedly criticized the box-ticking nature of the exercise, in which criticism behind closed doors yields no concrete improvements.

For example, despite raising their cases for years, the EU has been unable to obtain the release of Gui Minhai, a Swedish bookseller whom Beijing arbitrarily arrested and sentenced to 10 years in prison, or to receive a sign of life from Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur scholar and Sakharov Prize laureate who was sentenced to life in prison for his peaceful activism and has been denied family visits since 2017.

These cases are emblematic of the EU’s failure to meaningfully address Beijing’s repression, which has reached new peaks under Xi Jinping’s rule, including in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong.

Notably, a landmark 2022 report on Xinjiang by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights found Beijing’s abusive policies against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims may amount to “international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.” The EU and its member states should press the Chinese government to allow unrestricted access to the UN human rights office for a follow-up visit.

[...]

EU leaders should more forcefully raise human rights concerns during the upcoming summit and strategic dialogue, and lay out concrete consequences should Beijing fail to rein in its repression. Not doing so will be at the expense of all people in China.

[...]

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As of Thursday morning, Aftermath was not able to access the game on the US Google Play Store; according to Bloomberg, it was removed from the Google Play Store in May for issues unrelated to the current ban. We’ve reached out to Google for comment.

I cannot find it in the Google Play Store here in Mexico.

But it is available as an .APK (861MB) from the game homepage:

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The genius Trump gifts another victory to Zhongnanhai.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36508552

  • Beijing-backed UWSA [United Wa State Army] protecting new rare earth mines in Shan state, sources say
  • Mines being run by Chinese-speaking operators
  • China relies on Myanmar for rare earth imports but had recently faced some supply challenges

A Chinese-backed militia is protecting new rare earth mines in eastern Myanmar, according to four people familiar with the matter, as Beijing moves to secure control of the minerals it is wielding as a bargaining chip in its trade war with Washington.

China has a near-monopoly over the processing of heavy rare earths into magnets that power critical goods like wind turbines, medical devices and electric vehicles. But Beijing is heavily reliant on Myanmar for the rare earth metals and oxides needed to produce them: the war-torn country was the source of nearly half those imports in the first four months of this year, Chinese customs data show.

[...]

The mines operate under the protection of the United Wa State Army, according to four sources, two of whom were able to identify the uniforms of the militia members.

The UWSA, which is among the biggest armed groups in Shan state, also controls one of the world's largest tin mines. It has long-standing commercial and military links with China.

[...]

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China has outlined a string of reforms to accelerate the development of hi-tech emerging industries in the city of Shenzhen, as the tech hub in southern China grapples with a barrage of US trade restrictions.

The plan focuses on boosting Shenzhen’s ability to create scalable business models in industries such as artificial intelligence and aviation that can be replicated across China, by helping the city cultivate a larger talent pool, expand local companies’ access to financing, and speed up the deployment of cutting-edge technologies

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Hong Kong (AFP) – Hong Kong police have warned downloading a mobile game in which players can attempt to overthrow a stand-in for China's Communist Party could constitute a national security crime, as it vanished from Apple's local App Store Wednesday.

Beijing is extremely sensitive to even subtle hints of dissent, and in 2020 imposed a national security law in Hong Kong that has effectively quashed any political opposition.

In "Reversed Front: Bonfire", developed by a Taiwan-based company, users can "pledge allegiance" to entities including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet and "Uyghur" to "overthrow the communist regime".

Although the game takes place in a historically different universe, the description reads: "This game is a work of NON-FICTION. Any similarity to actual agencies, policies or ethnic groups of the PRC (People's Republic of China) in this game is INTENTIONAL."

On Tuesday police in Hong Kong said "Reversed Front" was "advocating armed revolution" and promoting Taiwan and Hong Kong independence "under the guise of a game".

Downloading the game could see players charged with possessing seditious material, while making in-app purchases could be viewed as providing funding to the developer "for the commission of secession or subversion", police warned.

Recommending the game could constitute the offence of "incitement to secession".

Although players can choose to "lead the Communists to defeat all enemies", the game description makes clear they are meant to be the villains.

The Communists are described as "heavy-handed, reckless and inept" and accused of "widespread corruption, embezzlement, exploitation, slaughter and defilement".

Many of the other playing roles correspond to flashpoint issues for Beijing -- including self-ruled Taiwan, which China claims as its territory, and Xinjiang, where it has denied accusations of human rights abuses against the minority Muslim Uyghurs.

Hong Kong's vibrant civil society and political opposition have all but vanished since the imposition of the national security law, which was brought in after huge and sometimes violent pro-democracy protests in 2019.

OpenAI last week said it had detected and banned a number of "likely China-origin" accounts targeting "Reversed Front" with negative comments.

"The network generated dozens of critical comments in Chinese about the game, followed by a long-form article claiming it had received widespread backlash," said OpenAI.

On Wednesday Apple appeared to have removed the game from the Hong Kong version of the App Store, after it had been available the day before, an AFP reporter saw.

It was not available on Hong Kong's Google Play on Tuesday, local media reported.

But the game's developer said it had seen a surge in searches since Tuesday's police announcement, jokingly implying it was thankful to authorities for the visibility boost.

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Police in northwestern China are cracking down on writers of online erotic fiction across the country, including many college students, according to RFA sources and media reports, amid concern that officers are punishing people outside their jurisdiction.

Police in Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu province, have been summoning writers who don’t even live there. A report from Caixin media group said some have been referred to police for prosecution, and anecdotal evidence indicates writers are facing substantial fines.

A source who spoke to Radio Free Asia on condition of anonymity for safety reasons said the crackdown could involve 200-300 writers.

Their cases have also sparked a legal debate over the definition of “obscene materials” and renewed public discussion on the boundaries of creative freedom. Known as “Danmei,” the genre features romantic relationships between male characters. It originated in Japan and has become popular in China.

Amid tightened restrictions in China, many writers have turned to Haitang Culture, a Taiwanese-based adult fiction website established in 2015 to publish their work. The website on the democratic island doesn’t force censorship and allows explicit written content. Most readers are females.

Authorities in China have reacted. Last year, two China-based distributors affiliated with Haitang Culture were arrested for “assisting in information network criminal activities,” according to Shuiping Jiyuan, a news portal on the WeChat social media platform.

The recent police crackdown in Lanzhou followed similar moves in the eastern province of Anhui in June 2024, where authorities began arresting writers of online erotic fiction under the charge of “producing and distributing obscene materials for profit,” resulting in heavy fines and even prison sentences.

Police are seeking out writers even when they leave outside their jurisdiction - a practice that critics call “offshore fishing,” implying the motive of police is financial or political, rather than strictly legal.

“I don’t understand what they’re trying to do—are they pushing political correctness, or are they just desperate for money?” said Liu Yang, a veteran media professional in Lanzhou, told Radio Free Asia. “The police are short on funds, and now even arrests have become a way to make money.”

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Archived

[...]

While China touts its ecological civilisation – a new system of development that stresses the harmonious coexistence of humanity and nature – at home, its voracious appetite for imported soy, beef, palm oil, and tropical timber has caused damage across some of the world’s most critical ecosystems. According to a recent Forest Trends report, China’s tropical deforestation footprint, linked to imports of high-risk agricultural and timber commodities, accounted for as much as five per cent of carbon emissions from tropical and subtropical deforestation during 2013–22.

The environmental consequences of these imports don’t stop at deforestation. They also carry a massive carbon price tag. China’s imported deforestation, led by trade with Brazil, Indonesia, and Malaysia, is responsible for as much as 200 million metric tons of CO2 per year. That’s equivalent to 20–30 per cent of China’s domestic agricultural emissions. Worse still, these embedded emissions are invisible in its nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, creating a glaring climate credibility gap.

[...]

China’s role in driving deforestation in Brazil’s Amazon Basin is increasingly alarming. The region loses about 133 square kilometres of forest each year, equivalent to over 400 football fields daily, primarily due to agricultural expansion for beef and soybean production. These commodities feed global markets, with China being a dominant consumer. In 2022, 96 per cent of China’s soy imports originated from soy-producing regions linked to deforestation, compared to only 55 per cent for the European Union.

[China’s rising demand] threatens to reverse environmental progress in Brazil.

[...]

Indonesia offers a stark, immediate example of ecological damage tied directly to China’s regional trade ambitions. While China boasts investments in clean energy and infrastructure through its Belt and Road Initiative, it is simultaneously driving forest destruction via its voracious demand for palm oil, pulpwood, and mining materials. A Traise Earth analysis found palm oil deforestation on Sumatra surged 3.7 times between 2020 and 2022, a spike fuelled in part by soaring Chinese demand and domestic consumption. The study also revealed China has overtaken the EU and India as Indonesia’s top palm oil buyer, snatching a growing share of exports.

[...]

Moreover, the China strategy’s moral hazard sets a chilling precedent. If a country with the rich capacities and strong political influence of China can pursue a two-track environmental policy – green at home, grey abroad – why shouldn’t others follow suit? In an already stressed world, this dishonesty has the potential to lock us in a vicious cycle of hollow commitments and permanent ecological tipping points. It is greenwashing at a national level.

[...]

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