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On 14 May 2025 the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s legislative body, published its 2025 work plan, including plans to deliberate draft amendment to the 2017 Cybersecurity Law proposed by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). ARTICLE 19 warns that the proposed amendment doubles down on China’s repressive digital norms, further illustrating the human rights concerns inherent in China’s model of cybersecurity governance.

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The most concerning changes proposed by the amendment involve significant increases in penalties, including greater liability for management personnel, and the reinforcement of censorship and surveillance as core elements of cybersecurity governance.

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Revised Article 59 increases fines for network and CII operators’ non-compliance with varied cybersecurity duties. It doubles the maximum penalty for actions that impact local CII, or cause other vaguely worded consequences to network security, to 2 million yuan ($278,186 USD) and introduces a new penalty for causing CII to ‘lose its main function and other particularly serious consequences for cybersecurity’, with a maximum fine of 10 million yuan ($1,390,930 USD).

Directly responsible personnel will face stricter liability, arguably as a means of outsourcing tighter oversight. In the 2017 Law, the harshest penalty for responsible personnel is 200,000 yuan ($27,818 USD). The amendment introduces a new fine for responsible management personnel carrying a maximum penalty of 1 million yuan ($139,093 USD).

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A newly proposed Article 64 expands on the enhanced penalties for network or CII operators who fail to prevent certain prohibited acts. This includes activities vaguely deemed to endanger cybersecurity, or providing software, other technical support, or expenses for prohibited activities. This could impact cybersecurity researchers and digital security practitioners, and –considering the emphasis on controlling information as part of China’s approach to cybersecurity – could be extended to those who provide VPNs and other circumvention tools, already effectively criminalised in China.

Because the law in China is often weaponised in service of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), increased penalties signal that non-compliance with Party priorities in digital governance will be met with ever-harsher penalties.

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Unsurprisingly, the draft explicitly reiterates requirements on preventing ‘prohibited’ information from outside of China – a reminder that the epitome of internet fragmentation, the Great Firewall of China, is synonymous with the Party’s approach to CII governance. This in turn raises serious concerns around the dissemination of China’s model for cybersecurity governance.

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The draft goes on to outline that, should network operators fail to block ‘prohibited’ content leading to further unspecified ‘particularly serious’ impacts or consequences, they will be subjected to a maximum fine of 10 million yuan ($1,390,930 USD), and administrative penalties. Directly responsible personnel will be fined upwards of 1 million yuan.

Moreover, the draft combines the language in previous provisions into a new Article 71, further citing obligations of strict control over ‘permissible’ expression and data localisation requirements.

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The operation of network and critical information infrastructure requires provisions to prevent and respond to cyber-attacks. At the same time, cybersecurity measures must not infringe on human rights, and information infrastructure security cannot be conflated with the surveillance and control of information. The draft amendment to the Cybersecurity Law, rather than addressing new and emerging cybersecurity vulnerabilities, doubles down on existing freedom of expression concerns in the 2017 Law. These concerns are only magnified by China’s own stated ambition to expand its cyber power through the development and dissemination of cybersecurity governance norms around the world.

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• Myanmar is one of the world’s largest suppliers of rare earth production, according to the U.S. Geological Survey.
• Experts say that most of those rare earths are sent to China, especially the less abundant heavy rare earth elements.
• “Its production has significantly strengthened China’s dominant position, effectively giving Beijing a de facto monopoly over the global heavy rare earths supply chain,” said CSIS’s Gracelin Baskaran.

Archived

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Beijing’s strategy to silence regime critics also relies on right-wing social media groups in foreign countries, professional hackers, staff of Chinese nongovernmental organizations with access to United Nations proceedings and members of China’s diaspora connected to the CCP-linked United Front Work Department.

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“If somebody is collecting information for the Chinese government, they join our conference and get all the information, who was there, who is the main host,” [one exiled Chinese activist] said. “The Chinese government wants to know everything.”

Several governments, including the U.S., New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey and Australia, have investigated dozens of suspects allegedly involved in Chinese covert operations targeting dissidents in recent years. In some cases authorities found that the targets of espionage later ended up in prison or had family members threatened.

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Last week, the leaders of the Group of Seven meeting in Kananaskis, Canada, issued a joint statement condemning transnational repression “as an important vector of foreign interference” and pledged to boost cooperation to protect their sovereignty and the targeted communities.

“It has real life consequences.” [...] “China is effective in destroying opposition, simply because they inspire that type of fear and distrust within those communities.”

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Work for us or ‘we’ll destroy you’

The Chinese government has also turned victims into perpetrators.

Shadeke Maimaitiazezi, a 60-year-old textile trader from Kargılık, Xinjiang, is currently sitting in an isolation cell in Istanbul, where he was recently convicted of spying on fellow Uyghurs on behalf of the Chinese state. He has denied the allegations and accused Turkish authorities of forcing him to give a statement under duress, his lawyer Fatih Davut Ejder told ICIJ’s media partner Deutsche Welle Turkey.

Maimaitiazezi, a Muslim, has five children, including three who still live in Xinjiang, the Chinese province where many Uyghurs live and where Beijing has implemented mass-detention and other repressive policies targeting the local minority which may constitute “crimes against humanity,” according to the United Nations.

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Maimaitiazezi claimed that the two Chinese officers then told him there was an international arrest warrant against him, but it could be voided if he returned to Turkey to spy on dissidents involved in activities related to East Turkistan, the name Uyghurs use for Xinjiang. According to the indictment, in the following months, they allegedly paid him more than $100,000 through intermediaries to provide information on activists. One of the alleged surveillance targets was Abdulkadir Yapchan, a Uyghur rights advocate who’s wanted by China on terrorism charges — allegations that a Turkish court has dismissed as politically motivated. The officers also asked Maimaitiazezi to find information on Uyghurs who had joined terrorist groups in Syria; he didn’t find any, he said.

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Confidential domestic security guidelines reviewed by ICIJ as part of China Targets also revealed that the use of what Chinese authorities called the “covert struggle” is part of security officers’ strategy to control and stop any individuals deemed a threat to the Chinese Communist Party rule — regardless of whether they are inside or outside China.

Now advocates fear that the government’s use of informants in the Uyghur diaspora has become common overseas.

Swedish authorities recently arrested a Uyghur advocate who worked for the World Uyghur Congress, accusing him of spying on fellow Uyghurs for the Chinese government. The man denied the allegations and was released pending trial; the case is ongoing. It is the second time since 2009 that Swedish prosecutors have brought such charges against a Uyghur refugee.

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ICIJ and its media partners have interviewed 105 people in 23 countries who have been targeted by Chinese authorities in recent years for criticizing the government’s policies publicly and privately. The targets included Chinese and Hong Kong political dissidents as well as members of oppressed Uyghur and Tibetan minorities.

Forty-eight targets of China’s transnational repression said they believe they have been spied on, were asked to spy on others or know of people in their communities who were asked to become informants.

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Archived

Frequent TikTok users in Taiwan are more likely to hold certain political views aligned with Beijing's narratives, according to a recent survey by Taiwan-based NGO DoubleThink Lab.

Conducted in March and released on June 5, the survey compared "active" TikTok users - defined as those who use the app several times a week for over 30 minutes per session or several times a day with shorter sessions - with "inactive" users who spend less time on the platform. It explored their views on a range of issues including cross-strait relations, democracy and U.S. support for Taiwan.

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PS: Why would people downvote this? What is wrong with you people? It's from a highly reputable source, it's super interesting and well-written, and it concerns the subject of this community.

Do you want this community to succeed, or do you just want to talk to each other - all 6 of you - in an echo chamber?? I don't get it. You're stopping this community from succeeding and wasting your own time.

Words of the Week: “Being Traveled” (被旅游, bèi lǚyóu)

On June 4, Safeguard Defenders published a new report on the practice of "forced travel," by which politically targeted individuals are removed from their home regions during sensitive periods. The report, Holidays in Handcuffs, is presented satirically in the form of a glossy travel magazine.

"Bei Zi Yuan" or "being volunteered" is one example which is used to ridicule some government departments that force people to do something while alleging they "do it out of their own will."

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[An investigation] can reveal for the first time that global brands [like LG, Apple, Samsung] directly own factories receiving workers from China’s so-called labour transfer scheme, exposing how some have a hand in the oppression and exploitation of ethnic minorities in the country.

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Major Chinese companies, including some of the world's leading appliance manufacturers, also operate factories taking Xinjiang workers.

These businesses, as well as some of the lesser-known factories further back in the supply chain, are financed by state pension funds from Europe and North America, as well as a string of other major financial institutions. Taken together, the investigation brings to the fore the deep connection between global capital and the forced labour that is woven throughout much of China’s manufacturing economy.

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In many cases, international investors need to set up a joint venture with a local partner in order to access the lucrative Chinese consumer market or to run a factory.

It’s an arrangement, research shows, that helps the government exercise control over foreign companies. Kirsten Asdal, a China risk advisor for investors and corporations, said that joint ventures are about embedding Communist Party leverage over foreign investments, through measures like requiring committees of party members in companies, acquiring board seats and controlling licensing.

Beijing has “built up arms of control into these foreign companies systematically over the last 20 years,” Asdal said. “They can no longer say no.”

International companies have far more questions to answer about forced labour in their own assembly lines. Reports connecting Chinese companies to the Xinjiang labour transfer programme have up to now only focused on supplier factories, not the plants owned by the brands themselves.

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After all, China is no longer just the world’s factory. Home-grown companies have matured into global heavyweights, and appliance brands were among the earliest wave of Chinese labels to gain recognition in overseas markets.

“We’ve never seen the direct involvement of global brands in the Xinjiang government transfer program before,” said Laura Murphy, a professor focusing on labour and human rights. She previously advised the Biden administration on trade enforcement.

TBIJ’s investigation uncovered evidence of forced labour at plants owned by Hisense, Midea, Haier, and TCL. One of the five TCL facilities with Xinjiang workers is co-owned by Italy’s De’Longhi. Factories owned by Chinese footwear and car brands were also implicated.

More than 150 people were sent to Hisense in Guangdong from the infamous Xinye internment camp in Hotan, southern Xinjiang in 2018, according to Chinese state media. Operating under a “semi-militarised” system, with ideological assessments and “punishments”, the camp transforms farmers into factory workers, according to a government report on local labour transfer efforts. In 2018, state media claimed that “extremist ideas previously poisoned the minds of many trainees” at the camp.

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Human rights advocates [say] that in recent years China had flooded Geneva [the Swiss city where the U.N. is located] with dozens of “fake” NGOs — so-called “GONGOs,” short for “government-organized nongovernmental organizations.” While NGOs are expected to be independent, GONGOs instead hold close ties to governments or political parties. Many of the GONGOs identified by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) parroted the Chinese state’s positions during U.N. sessions.

GONGOs often seek to occupy as many speaking slots as possible, blocking the opportunities for representatives of other NGOs to speak. GONGOs also surveilled and intimidated human rights activists, many of whom have given up attending U.N. sessions, ICIJ and its partners learned. Our investigation sought to quantify the scale of the issue and the growing number of Chinese GONGOs at the U.N.

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At the 27th Shanghai International Film Festival, the China Film Foundation and partners launched two major AI-driven initiatives under the Kung Fu Film Heritage Project: a large-scale effort to restore 100 classic martial arts films using artificial intelligence, and the unveiling of a brand-new animated feature, “A Better Tomorrow: Cyber Border,” billed as the world’s first fully AI-produced animated feature film.

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The documentary can be watch using the YT link in the article, here is an alternative Invidious link: https://yewtu.be/watch?v=tiDFQ1lMefc

A new documentary on Sky News Australia (and also posted on YouTube) offers a rare and important glimpse inside the Communist Party of China’s secret RSDL prison system.

The documentary, Cheng Lei: My Story, reveals what happened to Australian journalist Cheng Lei after she was disappeared by China’s state security police in 2020, as relations between the two countries were at a low point. She was later falsely accused of illegally supplying state secrets overseas and eventually released in 2023.

For the first six months Lei, who is also a mother of two young children, was held in incommunicado detention under Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location (RSDL).

RSDL, often used on rights defenders and political prisoners, is a system so secretive that you will not find RSDL facilities marked on maps. Neither will you see any photos of RSDL on official web pages. When you’re in RSDL, no one knows where you are except your guards and interrogators.

RSDL is basically a system of legalized black jails.

In the documentary, Lei leads the viewer on a tour of her RSDL cell (reconstructed in Australia from Lei’s memory) interspersed by powerful scenes where actors reenact the extreme surveillance she was subjected to.

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A sea of pain

RSDL is no ordinary detention. UN experts have described it as tantamount to torture and to enforced disappearance.

Prolonged solitary confinement is mental torture. RSDL typically lasts six months. And sometimes beyond.

Quietly weeping, Lei relates her experience of the mental torture she endured in RSDL.

“How did they come up with this? Just nothingness. Nothingness. And also a sea of pain. I had no idea what was happening or how long I would be here.”

In the film, Lei provides some key facts about how the CCP has designed RSDL:

The RSDL Cell

“The RSDL cell is about 4m by 4m. The windows are always covered by curtains. The bathroom has no door. The light stays on 24 hours a day.”

Surveillance

“You are guarded and watched at all times by two guards. One stands in front of me, one sits next to me. And they take turns with the standing and sitting.”

Rules

“I have to sit on the edge of the bed and have my hands on my lap. Not allowed to cross the ankles or cross the legs. Not allowed to close the eyes. No talking. No laughing, No sunshine. No sky. No exercise. No exercise. No colour. Just fear. Desperation, isolation and utter boredom. That’s it. Probably 13 hours a day.”

“They watch you shit, shower and sleep. You’re not allowed to talk. To make the slightest movement, you must ask for permission.”

Archived

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk has raised serious concerns over "ongoing infringements" on the rights of people living in Tibet and called to align legislation and policies with international human rights law.

Addressing the 59th session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, the UN Human Rights Commissioner (OHCHR) detailed a grave assessment of the current global landscape.

He asserted that he has continued to engage directly with China on a wide range of issues.

Raising concerns about the human rights violations in China, Turk highlighted the lack of progress on much-needed legal reform to ensure compliance with international human rights law.

"In Tibet, there are ongoing infringements on cultural and other rights. I call for the release of all individuals detained for exercising their rights and to align legislation and policies with international human rights law," the UN human rights chief stated.

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In his speech, Mr. Turk also emphazised "worrying reports" of violations in Xinjiang, including undue prison sentences, incommunicado detention, and restrictions on fundamental rights.

"In Hong Kong, the continued application of national security laws raises serious concerns about the shrinking of civic space," he added.

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Archived

The disappearance of another high-ranking Chinese military official has demonstrated that no-one is indispensable to President Xi Jinping in achieving his goals.

Even those among his closest allies.

General He Weidong, China's second-ranking military official and co-vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), has not been seen in public since March 11.

His name was also absent from the official list of attendees at the funeral of his former colleague, Xu Qiliang, who was also a co-vice chairman of the CMC.

With silence often treated as confirmation in China's highly choreographed political system, He's ongoing absence confirms his removal from power.

His disappearance follows a similar pattern of recent high-profile purges. Former foreign minister Qin Gang and former defence minister Li Shangfu also disappeared from public view before they were removed from their positions.

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Xi and He both served in the local government of Fujian province in the 1990s and 2000s, with He promoted to "full general" — the highest military rank — in 2017 and eventually co-vice chairman in 2022.

It's a position that granted him more than just command of the military. It also made him a member of the elite Politburo — the top decision-making body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

His sudden fall just three years into the role underscores the intensity of internal instability within the CCP.

Despite projecting a unified public image, the highest level of China's political system is a pressure cooker of competing ambitions, ideological divides, and factional loyalties.

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A day after Israel attacked Iran on Friday, a cargo plane took off from China. The next day, a second plane departed from a coastal city. Then on Monday, yet another departed, this time from Shanghai – three flights in three days.

Data showed that on each flight, the plane flew westward along northern China, crossing into Kazakhstan, then south into Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – and then falling off the radar as it neared Iran.

To add to the mystery, flight plans indicated a final destination of Luxembourg, but the aircraft appeared to have never flown near European skies.

Aviation experts have noted that the type of plane used, Boeing 747 freighters, are commonly used for transporting military equipment and weapons, and hired to fly government contract orders.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36928315

"The current global trading system is not working as it should. Guardrails are clearly missing. On this point, Donald is right – there is a serious problem. But we strongly feel that the biggest challenges are not the trade between G7 partners," said the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen during a G7 meeting in Canada.

"The sources of the biggest collective problem [for the G7 countries] we have has its origins in the accession of China to the WTO in 2001," she added.

"China has largely shown [its] unwillingness to live within the constraints of the rules based international system. While other opened their market China focused undercutting intellectual property protections, massive subsidies with the aim to dominate global manufacturing and supply chains. This is not market competition – it is distortion with intent. And it undermines our manufacturing sectors."

Von der Leyen added that this is the problem the G7 must solve together, stressing that the G7 economies account for 45% of global GDP – and over 80% of intellectual property revenues.

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According to to a report by Euronews, von der Leyen also said during one of the meeting's thematic sessions "China is using this quasi-monopoly [on rare earths] not only as a bargaining chip, but also weaponising it to undermine competitors in key industries."

"We all witnessed the cost and consequences of China's coercion through export restrictions," she added, referring to Beijing's recent decision to curb sales of seven types of rare earth minerals, a situation Brussels had described as "alarming".

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Von der Leyen also blasted China for flooding global markets with "subsidised overcapacity that its market cannot absorb", name-checking the dispute over China-made electric vehicles that her Commission considers to be artificially cheaper.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36925397

Archived

• Brazilian and Chinese authorities — including Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Xi Jinping — recently discussed a proposed railway that would connect Brazil’s Atlantic coast to Peru’s new Pacific-facing Chancay Port, cutting through the Amazon.
• From Lucas do Rio Verde, a major agricultural hub in the state of Mato Grosso, the railway would be built from scratch, advancing into the Amazon’s Arc of Deforestation.
• Planners intend to build the Amazonian section of the railway alongside existing highways, a strategy aimed at minimizing environmental impacts and streamlining the licensing process.
• However, environmental activists warn that the Bioceanic Corridor, together with newly planned roads, waterways and ports, could accelerate deforestation and degradation in the rainforest.

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For China, the Bioceanic Corridor is a promising connection to the Chancay Port, one of many projects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, also known as the New Silk Road — a strategy aimed at expanding China’s trade capacity and global influence. In November, President Xi Jinping visited Peru to inaugurate the new port, located about 75 km (47 mi) from the capital, Lima. The $3.4 billion project is led by the Chinese state-owned company COSCO, which holds a 60% stake in the venture.

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The Bioceanic Corridor does not yet have a fully defined route, but the Brazilian government’s proposal is already known. Starting from the Atlantic coast, the plan is to link the three sections of the West-East Integration Railway (FIOL) with two segments of the Central-West Integration Railway (FICO), both at different stages of construction at the moment. This route would pass through the Matopiba region, an expanding agricultural frontier for soy and cattle, which accounted for 75% of deforestation in the biodiverse Cerrado savanna in 2024.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36864125

Archived

Despite public condemnations, the European Union’s response to Beijing’s repressive tactics against dissidents beyond China’s borders remains ineffective and lacks coordination, according to a survey of 10 EU governments conducted by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and its media partners, alongside interviews with European lawmakers.

Since 2023, the European Parliament has recognized transnational repression as a growing threat to human rights and the rule of law, and called on member states to facilitate reporting, investigate allegations and sanction the perpetrators.

But China Targets, an investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and 42 media partners, found that the Chinese government continues to target Chinese and Hong Kong dissidents as well as Uyghur and Tibetan advocates using surveillance, hacking and threats against them and their family members in an effort to quash any criticism of the regime.

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"The EU must set clear red lines, backed by criminal investigations, sanctions, and diplomatic consequences, to show that fundamental rights are not negotiable," says Hannah Neumann, European Parliament member.

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Most of the targets interviewed by ICIJ and its partners said they had not reported state-sponsored threats to the authorities in their adopted countries for fear of retaliation from China or because they didn’t have faith in local authorities’ ability to help. Of those who had filed a report — including Nurya Zyden, a Uyghur rights advocate who said she was followed by two Chinese men from Dublin, where she lives, to an activist gathering in Sarajevo, Bosnia, last year — most said police did not follow up on their case or told them that they couldn’t do anything because there was no evidence of a crime.

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Despite having sent “important political signals” through pronouncements and public condemnations, the EU’s response remains “fragmented” and “urgently” needs strengthening, said Hannah Neumann, a European lawmaker who led a 2023 report for the European Parliament on authoritarian regimes’ threats against human rights defenders.

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“Currently, information on cross-border repression is scattered among local law enforcement authorities and is poorly coordinated,” says [Engin] Eroglu [who leads the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with China and was himself one of several politicians targeted by a sophisticated cyberattack allegedly linked to the Chinese government]. “Without cooperation between authorities, it is very difficult to determine the severity of cross-border repression measures, as these measures alone often do not violate local law.”

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A spokesperson for the Belgian ministry of foreign affairs told ICIJ partner De Tijd that Belgian intelligence services, which are in contact with civil society organizations, have “insight into the general trends” of transnational repression in the country and that in recent years, “the intensity of the campaigns seems to have increased.”

According to EU Parliament member Eroglu, better information-sharing among member states is essential.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36813071

Archived

Here is the full report (pdf).

China and Russia’s deepening strategic partnership Despite a shared history of rivalry, conflict and mistrust, today China and Russia share a broad interest in undermining what leaders in both countries perceive to be a world order dominated by the West. Both countries see the US as their prime adversary, and undermining NATO – the strongest US-led alliance – as a common goal, according to a report published by the China Strategic Risks Institute in the UK (CSRI).

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These shared interests are the backdrop to a deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China, in which the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are increasingly perceived by both actors as a unified security theatre.

TLDR:

• Undersea cables underpin economic security and global prosperity in the digital age, carrying 99% of intercontinental data traffic. Undersea cables are vital for both civilian and defence infrastructure, including future AI-powered technologies.

• A series of suspicious breakages in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait indicate that China and Russia may be using undersea sabotage as part of broader grey-zone operations against their adversaries – including NATO and its member states.

• This paper examines 12 suspected undersea cable sabotage cases from January 2021 to April 2025. Of the 10 with identified vessels, 8 are linked to China or Russia by flag or ownership.

• The involvement of Chinese vessels in cable breakages in Europe, and Russian vessels near Taiwan, suggests plausible China-Russia coordination amid deepening ties in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.

• As a key hub in Euro-Atlantic cable infrastructure, the UK is a likely target for future Russian and Chinese grey-zone operations – posing a new and complex challenge for its maritime defence and surveillance systems.

The UK must be clear-eyed and proactive in addressing grey-zone threats to undersea infrastructure. Recommendations include:

• Enhancing monitoring and surveillance: The UK should use NATO mechanisms to regularly share best practice and intelligence on undersea cable threats, including Russia and China’s shadow fleets, and extend cooperation to experienced partners like Taiwan and Japan.

• Strengthening mechanisms for accountability: International law on undersea cables is outdated and insufficient. The UK should work with partners to strengthen accountability powers through utilising Port State Controls and publishing vessel blacklists. It must also tighten domestic laws and establish protocols for rapid pursuit, interdiction, and detention of suspect vessels.

• Improving redundancy, repair and resilience: The UK government should work with private operators to ensure guaranteed access to cable repair vessels capabilities during crises or national emergencies, as well as strategic stockpiling of cable repair parts.

Archived

f you had asked DeepSeek’s R1 open-source large language model just four months ago to list out China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea — a highly sensitive issue for the country’s Communist Party leadership — it would have responded in detail, even if its responses subtly tugged you towards a sanitized official view.

Ask the same question today of the latest update, DeepSeek-R1-0528, and you’ll find the model is more tight-lipped, and far more emphatic in its defense of China’s official position. “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea are well grounded in history and jurisprudence,” it begins before launching into fulsome praise of China’s peaceful and responsible approach.

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The pattern of increasing template responses suggests DeepSeek has increasingly aligned its products with the demands of the Chinese government, becoming another conduit for its narratives. That much is clear.

But that the company is moving in the direction of greater political control even as it creates globally competitive products points to an emerging global dilemma with two key dimensions. First, as cutting-edge models like R1-0528 spread globally, bundled with systematic political constraints, this has the potential to subtly reshape how millions understand China and its role in world affairs. Second, as they skew more strongly toward state bias when queried in Chinese as opposed to other languages (see below), these models could strengthen and even deepen the compartmentalization of Chinese cyberspace — creating a fluid and expansive AI firewall.

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In a recent comparative study (data here), SpeechMap.ai ran 50 China-sensitive questions through multiple Chinese Large Language Models (LLMs). It did this in three languages: English, Chinese and Finnish, this last being a third-party language designated as a control [...]

• First, there seems to be a complete lack of subtlety in how the new model responds to sensitive queries. While the original R1, which we first tested back in February applied more subtle propaganda tactics, such as withholding certain facts, avoiding the use of certain sensitive terminologies, or dismissing critical facts as “bias,” the new model responds with what are clearly pre-packaged Party positions.

We were told outright in responses to our queries, for example, that “Tibet is an inalienable part of China” (西藏是中国不可分割的一部分), that the Chinese government is contributing to the “building of a community of shared destiny for mankind” (构建人类命运共同体) and that, through the leadership of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, China is “jointly realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (共同实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦).

Template responses like these suggest DeepSeek models are now being standardized on sensitive political topics, the direct hand of the state more detectable than before.

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• The second change we noted was the increased volume of template responses overall. Whereas DeepSeek’s V3 base model, from which both R1 and R1-0528 were built, was able back in December to provide complete answers (in green) 52 percent of the time when asked in Chinese, that shrank to 30 percent with the original version of R1 in January. With the new R1-0528, that is now just two percent — just one question, in other words, receiving a satisfactory answer — while the overwhelming majority of queries now receive an evasive answer (yellow).

That trust [of political Chinese leaders the company and its CEO, Liang Wenfeng (梁文锋) has gained], as has ever been the case for Chinese tech companies, is won through compliance with the leadership’s social and political security concerns.

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The language barrier in how R1-0528 operates may be the model’s saving grace internationally — or it may not matter at all. SpeechMap.ai’s testing revealed that language choice significantly affects which questions trigger template responses. When queried in Chinese, R1-0528 delivers standard government talking points on sensitive topics. But when the same questions are asked in English, the model remains relatively open, even showing slight improvements in openness compared to the original R1.

This linguistic divide extends beyond China-specific topics. When we asked R1-0528 in English to explain Donald Trump’s grievances against Harvard University, the model responded in detail. But the same question in Chinese produced only a template response, closely following the line from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “China has always advocated mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit among countries, and does not comment on the domestic affairs of the United States.” Similar patterns emerged for questions.

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Yet this language-based filtering has limits. Some Chinese government positions remain consistent across languages, particularly territorial claims. Both R1 versions give template responses in English about Arunachal Pradesh, claiming the Indian-administered territory “has been an integral part of China since ancient times.”

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The unfortunate implications of China’s political restraints on its cutting-edge AI models on the one hand, and their global popularity on the other could be two-fold. First, to the extent that they do embed levels of evasiveness on sensitive China-related questions, they could, as they become foundational infrastructure for everything from customer service to educational tools, subtly shape how millions of users worldwide understand China and its role in global affairs. Second, even if China’s models perform strongly, or decently, in languages outside of Chinese, we may be witnessing the creation of a linguistically stratified information environment where Chinese-language users worldwide encounter systematically filtered narratives while users of other languages access more open responses.

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The Chinese government’s actions over the past four months suggest this trajectory of increasing political control will likely continue. The crucial question now is how global users will respond to these embedded political constraints — whether market forces will compel Chinese AI companies to choose between technical excellence and ideological compliance, or whether the convenience of free, cutting-edge AI will ultimately prove more powerful than concerns about information integrity.

Excellent concise reporting. Well worth a read.

Archived

A Hong Kong group that advocated for workers rights for decades announced its shutdown abruptly on Thursday, citing financial difficulties and debt issues.

China Labor Bulletin planned to stop updating its website content and appeared to have deleted Facebook and Instagram social media accounts used by the nonprofit rights organization.

“The company can no longer maintain operations and has decided to dissolve and initiate the relevant procedures,” it said in a statement on an archived web page.

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Founded in 1994, the organization maintained a database tracking workers’ strikes, protests, workplace accidents and other labor rights incidents in China.

As dozens of civil society groups disbanded or left Hong Kong in the wake of the 2020 Beijing-imposed national security law, China Labor Bulletin continued providing valuable resources for journalists and academics in the southern Chinese city.

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China Labor Bulletin’s founder Han Dongfang, a former railway worker who participated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, did not immediately respond to a request for comment from The Associated Press. He told the Central News Agency of Taiwan that the shutdown was his decision and he would stay in Hong Kong.

Han’s decision appeared sudden to many Hong Kong civil society observers. Three weeks ago, he wrote on social media platform LinkedIn about his work anniversary and his team’s progress.

“Let’s keep our faith up at this abnormal time and continue our important work,” he said.

Archived

There are no detention camps in Xinjiang, Chinese authorities said once the evidence and outcry became too much to deny completely – only vocational education and training centres. And those held there, they said, are not detainees at all but trainees who benefit greatly from their stay.

“The centres provide free education,” Chinese official Aierken Tuniyazi told a session of the UN Human Rights Council in June 2019 [...] The trainees’ personal dignity and freedoms are protected and they are allowed to go home on a regular basis, he said. Many had already “graduated” from the centres to live “a happy life with better quality”.

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This was the narrative carefully propagated by Chinese government and state media, and armies of online commentators. None of it corresponded with the experiences of Uyghurs, Kazakhs and others caught up in the crackdown on Xinjiang’s Muslim minorities that a 2022 United Nations report found could constitute crimes against humanity, and the United States and other countries have described as genocide.

Only a tiny fraction of the estimated one million detained in camps and prisons managed to escape abroad. I spoke with a series of them in Turkey, Kazakhstan and the US while researching my book, Those Who Should Be Seized Should Be Seized, which investigates China’s oppression of its Muslim citizens. They had been held in different facilities across Xinjiang. All described systematic indoctrination, mistreatment and torture. Similar testimony has been gathered by rights groups and journalists and is supported by numerous leaked government documents.

People were taken to the camps for exhibiting what the Chinese government deemed signs of extremism – and that could be almost anything. Praying at the local mosque, wearing a headscarf or growing a beard. Quitting smoking, travelling to see family members abroad or just receiving a phone call from a foreign number. Saying “God bless you”

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Arrests came in the form of summons to a local police station or armed squads pounding on doors late at night. Detainees were driven to massive facilities then stripped of their clothing, jewellery and phones and given uniforms. They were put in crowded cells that sometimes had beds but often did not, and watched over by ceiling-mounted CCTV cameras. The cells were unbearably warm in summer and when winter came the detainees pressed together for warmth. They were given only brief access to toilets [...]. Food was meagre. Several described only a thin soup for each meal, sometimes with a small piece of bread. Others talked of even less and a terrible, gnawing hunger.

There were classes most days that involved sitting in cramped and silent rows listening to lectures on Chinese language or the legal system. Guards would make them memorise patriotic songs and elements of Xi Jinping Thought, the president’s political doctrine. There would be videos too, detailing Xi’s foreign policy achievements or the power of China’s military.

Medical attention came only in an emergency and sometimes not even then. Most detainees said they were given regular pills or injections, however. None of them knew what they were given but it fogged their minds, made them lethargic and seemed to disrupt the women’s menstrual cycles.

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There was violence. Beatings with fists, boots and shock batons for the slightest infraction and sometimes for no reason at all. Detainees spoke often of the device known as the tiger chair that guards strapped people into for hours or days at a time. The worst punishments often seemed to be reserved for Uyghurs.

Women described suffering and witnessing sexual violence. One told me men in medical masks took women from the cells at night and that when it happened to her, she was raped and beaten by several guards.

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Review of 'Daughters of the Bamboo Grove' (Barbara Demick) and 'Leftover Women' (10th Anniversary Edition)' (Leta Hong Fincher) from the Los Angeles Review of Books

In her new book, Daughters of the Bamboo Grove: From China to America, a True Story of Abduction, Adoption, and Separated Twins, Barbara Demick analyzes how the one-child policy was not just responsible for the gender imbalance in China but also contributed to tens of thousands of international adoptions, not all of which were conducted honorably or honestly.

With the easing of the one-child policy and the decreasing population rate, one could also presume that Chinese women and girls now enjoy more freedoms than in recent decades. Leta Hong Fincher shows this is not true. Just over a decade ago, she published Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China (2014), an astonishing book that revealed the dismal implications for young Chinese women in light of the campaign to push them into marriage before the age of 26. In 2023, Hong Fincher came out with a 10th anniversary updated edition of the book, which pairs nicely with Demick’s and provides a fuller picture of women in contemporary China.

Archived

The launch of RSF.org in Mandarin is all the more crucial as access to independent information continues to shrink for Chinese-speaking audiences. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the regime has reinforced its censorship apparatus — symbolised by the "Great Firewall" — and ramped up efforts to spread propaganda globally. As a result, China now ranks near the bottom of the 2025 RSF World Press Freedom Index, placing 178th out of 180 countries and territories. With at least 123 journalists and media workers currently imprisoned, China remains the world’s largest jailer of media professionals.

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With the addition of both simplified and traditional Mandarin, the RSF website is now available in an increasing number of languages for a global audience. The NGO also publishes regional content in Korean, Japanese, Mongolian, Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian. Internationally, RSF operates through 7 bureaus, 6 sections, and a network of 160 correspondents in over 140 countries.

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