China

Archived

Beneath the glossy façade of China’s economic rise lies a grim reality—one the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would rather the world ignore. Xinjiang, home to the Uyghur people, has become a sprawling open-air prison, where mass detentions, coercive assimilation, and relentless state surveillance have transformed an entire ethnic group into a community of silent sufferers.

Beijing’s official narrative presents its policies in Xinjiang as counter-terrorism measures, but the evidence tells a different story—one of cultural erasure, forced labour, and crimes against humanity. A Bloody History of Betrayal

China’s repression of the Uyghurs is neither new nor accidental. For centuries, the Uyghur homeland—historically known as East Turkestan—has been caught in the crosshairs of competing dynasties. The Qing Dynasty saw periods of both empowerment and oppression for the Uyghurs, but with the rise of Communist China in 1949, the noose tightened. Led by the ruthless Wang Zhen, the Chinese military crushed Uyghur resistance, dismantling local autonomy and imposing brutal land reforms that dispossessed Uyghur farmers. Residents watch a convoy of security personnel armed with batons and shields patrol through central Kashgar in western China's Xinjiang region, 2017. | AP

The CCP’s justification? National security. The reality? A calculated effort to bring Xinjiang under Beijing’s iron grip.

[...]

China’s crackdown intensified under Xi Jinping, who declared a “People’s War on Terror” in Xinjiang. The result was the creation of sprawling concentration camps—euphemistically branded vocational training centres—where over a million Uyghurs were detained without trial. Survivors’ testimonies paint a horrifying picture: brainwashing sessions, forced renunciations of Islam, physical abuse, and sexual violence.

Children were forcibly separated from their parents and placed in state-run orphanages to be indoctrinated with Communist Party ideology. The goal was clear—break the Uyghur spirit and erase their cultural identity, one generation at a time.

[...]

China’s assault on Uyghur culture extends far beyond mass incarceration. In an effort to Sinicize Xinjiang, the government has outlawed Islamic practices, demolished mosques, and criminalized fasting during Ramadan. Uyghur-language schools have been shut down, and replaced with Mandarin-only education designed to erase native identity.

[...]

China’s treatment of the Uyghurs also serves a strategic purpose. Xinjiang is a key node in Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, and the CCP views the Uyghur population as an inconvenient obstacle. By forcibly relocating Uyghurs and resettling Han Chinese in their place, Beijing aims to neutralize resistance while cementing its economic dominance in the region.

[...]

The forced labour industry in Xinjiang is another grotesque element of this oppression. Uyghur detainees are exploited in textile and agricultural sectors, supplying global brands with products tainted by modern-day slavery. Companies worldwide have been complicit, either through direct sourcing or willful ignorance.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/31330252

The anti-dumping duties range from 26.3% to 56.1% and will help re-establish fair competitive conditions on the EU market between glass fibre yarns imported from China and those produced domestically.

[...]

Investigations found strong evidence of WTO-incompatible Chinese subsidies offered to exporting producers both in China and abroad, via the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as efforts to circumvent EU measures through the setting up of production in third countries outside China.

[...]

Archived

Just one year after its passage, Hong Kong’s Article 23 law has further squeezed people’s freedoms and enabled authorities to intensify their crackdown on peaceful activism in the city and beyond, Amnesty International said.

“Over the past year, Article 23 has been used to entrench a ‘new normal’ of systematic repression of dissent, criminalizing peaceful acts in increasingly absurd ways,” said Amnesty International’s China Director Sarah Brooks.

“People have been targeted and harshly punished for the clothes they wear as well as the things they say and write, or for minor acts of protest, intensifying the climate of fear that already pervaded Hong Kong. Freedom of expression has never been under greater attack.”

People convicted and jailed for peaceful expression

The Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (known as Article 23) took effect on 23 March 2024. Amnesty International’s analysis shows that 16 people have since been arrested for sedition under Article 23. Five of them were officially charged under the law, and the other 11 were released without charge. None of those arrested is accused of engaging in violence, while the authorities have accused two of them of inciting violence without yet disclosing any details.

Three of the charged individuals – after facing around three months’ pre-trial detention – were convicted for, respectively, wearing a T-shirt and mask printed with protest slogans; criticizing the government online; and writing protest slogans on bus seats. They were sentenced to between 10 and 14 months in prison.

The remaining two charged people have been held in detention awaiting trial since November 2024 and January 2025, respectively. They are accused of publishing “seditious” posts on social media platforms.

[...]

• Beijing’s diplomatic rhetoric advocates upholding international rules and norms, but this diverges sharply from both its words to party officials at home and its actions abroad that undermine and violate international laws and institutions.
• Beijing benefits from an international order in which other powers are restrained by rules that it claims are biased and so chooses not to follow. This explains how Foreign Minister Wang Yi can both promise to “safeguard … the international system with the United Nations at its core” and reject inconvenient international rulings as “a political circus dressed up as a legal action.”
• Polls suggest Beijing’s rhetoric is resonating with other countries, as Beijing offers itself as a new partner of choice to provide stability in an uncertain world. Its actions instead suggest it intends to divide democracies and create more freedom of action for Beijing.

Archived article

“We are ready to work with the international community, including Australia, to safeguard the victory in the Second World War and the international system with the United Nations at its core,” said Wang Yi (王毅), foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong on February 21 [...] This is the latest statement over many years in which the PRC presents its foreign policy as reinforcing the international order that the United States and Europe claimed to uphold.

However, Beijing’s status quo language belies the fundamental changes to the international order that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been pursuing. Beijing has benefited enormously from the international system to date, but especially when other powers are restrained by rules it claims are biased and so chooses not to follow.

[...]

Since early 2017, Beijing has presented the PRC as a responsible power that upholds the status quo of the old international order. That message has often come from the very top. [...] For example, Xi Jinping told the World Economics Forum in January 2017 that “We should adhere to multilateralism to uphold the authority and efficacy of multilateral institutions. We should honor promises and abide by rules.”

[...]

Later, Wang Yi told the China-France Strategic Dialogue “China adheres to multilateralism and supports the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core” (FMPRC, January 24, 2019). The refrain has continued to the present day. Last fall, Xi criticized European tariffs on electric vehicles at the 19th G20 Summit, saying, “We should press ahead with reforming the World Trade Organization (WTO) [and] oppose unilateralism and protectionism … It is important to avoid politicizing economic issues, avoid fragmenting the global market, and avoid taking protectionist moves in the name of green and low-carbon development."

[...]

These words from the CCP leadership may be soothing to the outside world, but they diverge sharply from internally oriented words for the Party faithful that emphasize struggle and change [...]. Here and with select partners, Xi has been clear for years about his desire to change the international system. In his first international trip as CCP general secretary in 2013, Xi told a Russian audience about the need for a “New Type of International Relations” that amounts to a fundamental restructuring of the values embedded in international institutions and the application of the CCP’s so-called “consultative democracy” on a global scale [...]. More recently, Xi’s speech at a study session of the Central Committee in 2023—which was reprinted in the 2025 New Year’s issue of Qiushi, the Party’s theory journal—repeatedly noted the challenge that the PRC’s development constitutes to the Western-centric order.

[...]

This divergence in rhetoric suggests that the words of CCP leaders should not be taken at face value and that instead Beijing should be judged by its actions. However, there, too, it has consistently violated rules and norms that do not align with its preferences.

[...]

One notable example of Beijing’s claim to uphold international law is in the South China Sea. In 2002, Beijing entered into a non-binding agreement, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations. This committed the parties to “universally recognized principles of international law” and noted “their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea” per the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

[...]

Beijing’s behavior gives lie to these commitments. In 2016, a Tribunal [...] found unanimously in the Philippines favor that the PRC had breached its obligations under no fewer than 16 articles of the Convention, was often “aware of, tolerated, protected, and failed to prevent” harmful activities, and “has not cooperated or coordinated with the other States bordering the South China Sea” to attempt to resolve them.

[...]

In 2024, the spokesperson for the PRC Embassy in Manila responded to a question about the ruling, characterizing is as “essentially a political circus dressed up as a legal action … China does not accept or recognize it, and will never accept any claim or action thereon”.

[...]

Last year, the PRC Coast Guard escalated the confrontation with Philippine counterparts, leading to physical ship-to-ship altercations in which at least 8 sailors were injured powerful water cannons to damage Philippines supply ships [...] The PRC has claimed areas like the sea around Second Thomas Shoal where these clashes took place as its own territorial waters. As such, it argues that freedom of navigation does not apply and that the Coast Guard can engage in so-called domestic law enforcement operations. Such aggressive and dangerous operations have continued in 2025 and remain in violation of international law (YouTube/Associated Press, February 1).

Other examples also reveal Beijing’s commitment to international order and global governance as a cynical effort to exploit the rules. In reality, its policies have capitalized on the restraint of other countries in areas like trade and international law. For instance, Wang Yi’s discussion of international cooperation in the auto sector is undermined by the PRC’s predatory, brute-force economics that have long been antithetical to the trading order.

[...]

Additionally, the PRC has used the World Bank to legitimize its mass repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through vocational programs.

[...]

Beijing’s ostensible support for international rules and institutions that restrain the United States and European powers will continue to be a theme as long as the CCP leadership sees that the narrative has traction. Concerns about the Trump Administration’s inconsistency make the CCP’s status quo narrative seem soothing. However, American and European governments should not mistake these narratives for anything other than a wedge to divide democracies and create more freedom of action for Beijing.

[...]

The rise of Chinese private security companies in Myanmar will reshape conflict dynamics. This report to the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries highlights how such companies are proxies for the Chinese State, importing authoritarianism, intensifying militarisation, undermining human rights, and exploiting legal loopholes to operate with impunity.

[...]

Since Myanmar’s 2021 coup, widespread human rights abuses have underscored urgent concerns about the role of foreign private security companies (PSCs), most of which are from China. This report examines the human rights implications of Chinese PSCs operating in Myanmar, not merely as commercial actors but as State-connected forces blurring the line between private security and military intervention. This analysis focuses on how these actors undermine civil and political rights and how their unchecked power exacerbates the nation’s human rights crisis. We present our findings to inform the United Nations OHCHR Work Group on the Use of Mercenaries’ inquiry into the impact of mercenaries and private military and security companies.

[...]

The legal framework provides only vague guidelines on the use of force. While the Penal Code (1861) requires that any private use of force be proportionate (Art. 99), its provisions do not prevent excessive force in practice. The Private Security Service Law (2025) allows PSCs to detain offenders, but its only reference to the use of force is that PSCs may defend themselves under the Penal Code (Arts. 28.v-vi), leaving room for inconsistent practices and potential abuse in volatile settings.

[...]

Chinese economic interests are deeply entwined with Myanmar’s strategic landscape, notably through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key pillar of China’s global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). What began as a series of infrastructure projects has evolved into a broader effort to secure China’s supply chains, energy security, and regional influence. As Myanmar’s State capacity has collapsed, the security risks to these investments have surged, directly impacting the human rights of local populations.

Chinese interests have suffered collateral damage in conflict zones across Myanmar. At least 23 of 34 Chinese infrastructure projects are located in areas marked by instability, including Rakhine, northern Shan State, and the central lowlands.[8] Incidents, such as the seizure of a Chinese-owned nickel processing plant in Sagaing[9] and the occupation and subsequent burning of the Alpha Cement factory in Mandalay, underscore the vulnerability of these investments.

Moreover, public perceptions of China’s support for the military have provoked targeted attacks, with 32 factories allegedly damaged in the months following the coup, amounting to losses of US$37 million. Such violence not only endangers property but also directly threatens the right to a safe, secure environment.

In response to escalating security challenges, China has increasingly pressed all actors for greater protection of its assets. This pressure has led to disproportionate measures by the military, including the imposition of martial law, harsh crackdowns that have claimed at least 22 protesters’ lives, and punitive 20-year sentences for at least 28 campaigners. High-profile incidents, like the October 2024 bombing of the Chinese consulate in Mandalay, show that anti-China sentiment remains high. Consequently, China’s demand for robust security mechanisms has grown, prompting an expansion of Chinese PSCs in Myanmar.

[...]

When the military seized power in 2021, six of the nine registered foreign PSCs in Myanmar were Chinese. These companies, tasked with protecting CMEC projects and Chinese personnel, offer services from static guarding to surveillance and risk assessments, particularly in areas where Chinese assets face local resistance.

[...]

Chinese PSCs as proxies of the Chinese government

[...]

China remains fundamentally aligned with the Myanmar military, operating under the belief that a military victory will best serve its broader economic and strategic objectives. Even as the military loses territorial control, it continues to dominate key urban centres, infrastructure, and economic zones vital to Chinese business. Through arms shipments, infrastructure investments, and security cooperation, China backs the military, indirectly contributing to severe human rights abuses, including threats to life, liberty, and due process.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/31221791

A small number of Melbourne residents have received anonymous letters purporting to offer a police bounty of $203,000 if they inform on Kevin Yam, an Australian citizen and pro-democracy activist wanted for alleged national security crimes in Hong Kong, linking him to two nearby locations.

A spokesperson for the [Australian] foreign affairs minister, Penny Wong, [said] the letter was “deeply worrying” and that the matter would be raised directly with officials from China and Hong Kong.

The anonymous letter – mailed from Hong Kong and delivered to some Melbourne homes on Friday – contained a photograph of Yam with a headline alleging he was a “wanted person”. It then detailed a range of alleged “national security related offences” and offered HK$1m (A$203,000) from the Hong Kong police to anyone who provided information on his whereabouts or took him to Hong Kong or Australian police.

Yam is a lawyer who lived in Hong Kong for 20 years before returning to Australia in 2022. He is one of eight overseas-based activists, the subject of Hong Kong police arrest warrants, accused in July 2023 of breaching its controversial national security law that grants authorities sweeping extraterritorial powers to prosecute acts or comments made anywhere in the world that it deems criminal.

Yam has criticised the crackdown on dissent and erosion of judicial independence in the Chinese-controlled city and has been accused of encouraging foreign governments to impose sanctions against members of the judiciary, prosecutors and government officials.

[...]

Archived

Beginning in 1979, the Chinese government decided to implement the well-known—and highly controversial—one-child policy to try to confront, to the greatest extent possible, the problem of the country’s exponential population growth. The rule envisaged, as its name implies, the bearing of a single child with limited exceptions. In case of non-compliance, the consequences could range from loss of job or party membership to more extreme ones such as reproductive violence.

[...]

While the one-child policy was the universal law, there were some exceptions introduced that allowed families to have more than one child in very specific cases. These mostly concerned families that were part of an ethnic minority group or whose first child was born with a handicap. Other exceptions included allowing for more than one child if the family’s first kid was a daughter or they lived in rural areas.

It’s important to note that many of these exceptions conceded by the Communist Party were directly related to the difficulty in enforcing the policy in rural areas. In less developed and rural areas, families often relied on their children for labor power, meaning that implementing the one-child policy required a larger social change than needed in urban areas. Additionally, rural families were harder to monitor.

[...]

Although gender may seem to be a less obvious element of China’s one-child policy, it was a crucial component. Not only did this cultural gender preference cause a large demographic imbalance between boys and girls, but it also led to phenomena like mass adoptions and even infanticides of baby girls. The government has also occasionally contributed to unethical and extreme measures by carrying out forced abortions and sterilisations in order to make families comply with the policy.

[...]

The one-child policy, which reigned in the country for more than 30 years, has also resulted in the development of an entire generation of children—who are now also adults —that do not appear in Chinese state records. People who fall into this group are popularly called “Heihaizi“, China’s “black children” who could not obtain a hukou— an official household registration. Such children were primarily second-born or later children who, upon birth, had no recognized right to exist due to this family planning policy.

[...]

For the millions of Heihaizi, this administrative hole causes devastating consequences. They can’t access regular public services such as healthcare, get legally married, or even use public transportation. Moreover, they can’t go to school and get a formal education as normal citizens, and when they become adults, they can’t legally get a job.

[...]

Moreover, despite the promises of the Chinese Communist Party, a great number of people have not yet been able to obtain official registration. The fines to be paid by Heihaizi and their families are still very high, and acquiring the documents necessary for a life in the open still seems to be a utopia for many.

[This is a piece by Research Scholar of East Asia Studies in History Division, Lund University, Sweden.]

Unable to find a domestic spouse, some Chinese men have turned to “purchasing” foreign brides. The growing demand for these brides, particularly in rural areas, has fuelled a rise in illegal marriages. This includes marriages involving children and women who have been trafficked into China primarily from neighbouring countries in south-east Asia.

[...]

Determining the extent of illegal cross-border marriages in China is challenging due to the clandestine nature of these activities. But the most recent data from the UK’s Home Office suggests that 75% of Vietnamese human-trafficking victims were smuggled to China, with women and children making up 90% of cases.

[...]

The Woman from Myanmar, an award-winning documentary from 2022, follows the story of a trafficked Myanmar woman who was sold into marriage in China. The film exposes the harsh realities faced by many trafficked brides.

It captures not only the coercion and abuse many of these women endure, but also their struggle for autonomy and survival in a system that treats them as commodities. Larry, a trafficked woman who features in the documentary, explained that she saw her capacity to bear children as her pathway to survival.

[...]

Here is the article in Chinese.

"It is a long-standing tradition of the Chinese Communist Party to use foreigners to voice its propaganda for added credibility," said Mareike Ohlberg, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

Foreign influencers cooperate with the Chinese government, the media and third parties to create and boost content that supports government narratives, Ohlberg said. One of the most common topics that foreign influencers focus on is whitewashing human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The U.N. Human Rights Office and groups like Amnesty International estimate that more than 1 million people – mostly Uyghurs – have been confined in internment camps in Xinjiang.

One of the most recent and maybe most popular foreign characters in China is a French national, Marcus Detrez, who became a media sensation in 2024.

[...]

Last year, Detrez posted a series of historic photographs on the Chinese social media platform Douyin that depicted life under the Japanese occupation in the early 20th century. He claimed the images were taken by his grandfather and said he wanted to donate them to China.

Detrez enjoyed a few months of celebrity treatment from Chinese authorities, including touring across China, while state media outlets profiled him as a hero. In February, however, historians exposed Detrez as a fraud. The photographs he claimed were unique family heirlooms turned out to be publicly available online in various museums around the world.

[...]

One of the pioneers on Chinese social media is a Russian internet celebrity, Vladislav Kokolevskiy, known in China as Fulafu. He amassed 12.89 million followers on Douyin, where he posts short video clips praising life in China.

In November 2023, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute wrote that in China, Fulafu has “become a household name through his ostentatious displays of affection for China,” identifying him as a Chinese government propagandist.

[...]

Among them is [also] Gerald Kowal, known also as Jerry Guo, an American who has risen to popularity in China after an interview with state-owned CCTV in 2020. At the time, Kowal had been posting series of short videos critical of New York City authorities’ handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. He also repeated debunked conspiracy theories, claiming, for example, that the U.S. military brought the coronavirus to China. CCTV broadcasted his interview from New York live.

The China Newsweek magazine profiled Kowal in May 2020 as “one of the most influential internet celebrities,” calling him a “war correspondent” for his videos from pandemic-stricken New York.

[...]

The success of a large number of foreign influencers is closely tied to multichannel networks or MCNs, which are third-party organizations that promote the growth of certain content creators, operating behind the scenes.

One of the MCN industry leaders is YChina, founded in 2016 by Israeli businessman Amir Gal-Or and his Chinese partner and former classmate, Fang Yedun, as part of Gal-Or's “Crooked Nuts Research Institute,” which focuses on documenting the lives of foreigners in China.

[...]

Chinese democracy activists in exile have accused YChina of supporting Chinese government propaganda about Xinjiang and Hong Kong.

In July 2024, the China Public Diplomacy Association, which is under the supervision of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gathered more than 30 foreign influencers from 25 countries to participate in a training camp and visit various cities in China. The bloggers were asked to record their experiences on video and share them online.

[...]

China’s state-controlled media outlets [like Xinhua News Agency] boost such bloggers, presenting them to domestic audiences within the narrative of a prosperous nation under the Communist Party.

[...]

In using these foreign bloggers, the Chinese Communist Party wants to show that life in China is not what rights groups and China’s critics abroad say it is. The government exploits the idea that unless “you come and see, you have no right to judge,” the German Marshall Fund’s Ohlberg said.

The core of this idea is “very hypocritical,” Ohlberg added, because “the Communist Party allows these people to go only where it wants them to go and see only what it wants them to see. And if you're critical, you certainly won't get the opportunity to go on a field trip.”

Archived

The Maldives is grappling with a deepening debt crisis, with foreign exchange reserves at precarious levels and looming repayments threatening its economic stability, according to a report by an independent journalist and human rights activist.

[...]

The island nation’s total debt has surged from $3 billion in 2018 to $8.2 billion as of March 2024, with projections exceeding $11 billion by 2029. External debt stands at $3.4 billion, primarily owed to China and India.

In 2025 and 2026, the Maldives must repay $600 million and $1 billion, respectively, exacerbating its financial strain.

Despite a modest rise, usable foreign exchange reserves remain below $65 million as of December 2024, after briefly turning negative in mid-August.

...]

While bilateral trade stands at $700 million, Maldivian exports make up less than 3%, with China dominating imports.

Government revenue from import duties has plunged by 64%, worsening fiscal pressures.

In response, President Muizzu’s administration has raised taxes, cut government spending, and sought financial aid, including $300 million from GCC nations and $200 million from China, but has received little support.

A $750 million currency swap from India has provided temporary relief but falls short of covering the $1 billion Sukuk repayment due in 2026.

Without significant international intervention or debt restructuring, experts warn the Maldives risks following Sri Lanka into sovereign default, endangering its economic sovereignty and political stability.

The China-Maldives Free Trade Agreement (FTA), enacted in January 2025, has intensified economic vulnerabilities.

China is likely to face a supply shortage of rapeseed meal by the third quarter of this year as Beijing's tariffs on shipments from top exporter Canada disrupt trade and as alternative sources are unlikely to make up the deficit.

Rapeseed meal futures traded on the Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange have jumped more than 8% since Beijing announced on Saturday a 100% retaliatory tariff on imports of rapeseed meal and oil from Canada effective March 20.

[...]

Chinese tariffs on rapeseed meal and oil came as a surprise to the industry which had been expecting higher duties instead on the oilseed since Beijing started an anti-dumping investigation in September into shipments from Canada.

"Everybody was expecting authorities to announce duties on rapeseed but we were all taken by surprise when this announcement came on oil and meal," said one trader in Singapore. "It is going to hit feed processors hard as they were looking at importing larger volumes of Canadian meal instead of the oilseed."

[...]

Rapeseed is an oilseed crop which is processed into oil for cooking and a variety of other products, including renewable fuels, while the remaining rapeseed meal is used as high-protein animal feed and fertilizer.

China relies on top grower Canada for more than 70% of its rapeseed meal imports and nearly all of the oilseed imports. Rapeseed is also known as canola.

[...]

Chinese customs allows rapeseed meal imports from 11 countries, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Japan, Ethiopia, Australia, India and Belarus, providing options for alternative supplies.

But availability of the product is limited in the international market.

[...]

According to Karar Newspaper journalist Feyza Nur Çalıkoğlu, Istanbul’s 16th and 18th Administrative Courts approved the extradition of the two Uyghurs to China based on the claim that “there is no serious, concrete material evidence that they will be subjected to persecution if extradited to their country.” However, the lawyer representing the two Uyghurs has appealed to the Constitutional Court, arguing that this ruling is in direct contradiction to the Turkish government’s previous commitment that Uyghurs will “never be extradited to China” and that the decision violates international agreements.

[...]

Both Uyghurs, Mahemuti Anayeti and Aierken Abuduwaili, fled China’s genocidal policies in East Turkistan and arrived in Turkey at different times years ago. Speaking to Karar, the lawyer representing Anayeti and Abuduwaili, Abdullah Tıkıç, stated: “The approval of the extradition of Uyghur Turks to their country of origin is a violation of Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection, the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention Against Torture, and the Geneva Convention.”

[...]

The UN, EU, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly reported and documented China’s crackdown on Uyghurs. More than ten countries, including the United States and Canada, have officially recognized China’s policies against Uyghurs as genocide. Additionally, more than 40 countries, including Turkey, have condemned China for human rights violations against Uyghurs. In its official report, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded that China has committed crimes against humanity against Uyghurs.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/30998558

Taiwan’s President William Lai Ching-te says China is deepening its espionage and infiltration campaign against the island, and that his government will propose various measures to counter Beijing’s efforts to “absorb” Taiwan.

Speaking to reporters after a meeting with security officials on Thursday, Lai said Beijing is trying to cultivate relationships with members of Taiwanese society, including organised crime groups, media personalities and police officers.

“They [China] are carrying out activities such as division, destruction and subversion from within us,” Lai said.

He added that tougher measures are needed to counter Chinese efforts to weaken the island’s defences, citing recent incidents that fall into a “grey area” of psychological warfare, short of open-armed conflict.

Lai said that according to government data, 64 people were charged for Chinese espionage last year, three times more than in 2021. He said the majority were current or former military officials.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/30997192

Archived

[...]

Experts pointed out that Chinese cybercrime has evolved significantly over the decades. Hacking activities surged in the early 2000s, driven by nationalism and political incidents. Groups such as the Honker Union of China (HUC) and China Eagle Union targeted foreign entities, but later disbanded as patriotic fervour declined.

Modern Chinese cybercrime operates like structured firms, with hierarchies resembling legitimate companies. Platforms such as Tencent QQ and Baidu Tieba facilitate illicit trade while Southeast Asian “scam compounds” house multiple cybercrime operations with dormitories and amenities.

Additionally, traditional organised crime groups have embraced cyberspace for activities such as money laundering. Despite its scale and complexity, systematic analysis of Chinese cybercrime remains limited, leaving gaps in understanding its industrialisation and global impact, as reported in the web portal Nature (nature.com).

Experts believe Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) poses a global threat, encompassing activities such as drugs and human trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime. Chinese Triads, one of the oldest and most notorious TOC groups, operate extensively in Southeast Asia, exploiting weak law enforcement.

They run drug trafficking from the Golden Triangle and have shifted to online scams post-Covid-19, generating billions annually.

[...]

Cybercrime sponsored by Chinese gangs in the Asian region is a significant issue, involving various forms of cyberattacks and scams. There have been reports of state-sponsored Chinese hackers targeting government and private organisations across Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia. These attacks often involve custom malware and align with China’s political and economic interests.

[...]

These operations also involve human trafficking. Victims are lured under false promises of high-paying jobs [in other countries like Thailand, Camdodia, and other Asian countries] but are instead trapped and exploited.

[...]

The Indian government has established the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) to combat cybercrimes. Authorities have rescued many citizens and made multiple arrests related to illegal recruitment activities. They are also working to coordinate with international law enforcement and provide witness protection. They have also signed agreements with the Myanmar and Cambodian governments on curbing human trafficking.

[...]

Initially driven by patriotic hacking, Chinese cybercrime has evolved into profit-driven enterprises using advanced technology. Combating this transnational threat requires international collaboration, stricter law enforcement and victim protection to dismantle these networks and address the significant economic and social damage caused.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/30940295

Chinese tech giant Huawei is at the centre of a new corruption case in Europe’s capital. On Thursday, Belgian police raided the homes of its lobbyists, Follow the Money and its media partners Le Soir and Knack can reveal.

Archived

Authorities suspect that Huawei lobbyists have paid bribes to MEPs in return for backing their cause in the European Union. Around 15 former and current MEPs are “on the radar” of the investigators.

In the early hours, Belgium’s federal police raided Huawei’s EU office and the homes of lobbyists for the Chinese tech company on suspicions of bribery, forgery, money laundering and criminal organisation, people close to the investigation told Follow the Money and Belgian outlets Le Soir and Knack.

Twenty-one addresses were searched in total, in Brussels, Flanders, Wallonia and in Portugal, as part of the sweeping corruption probe. Several documents and objects have been seized. No searches have taken place at the European Parliament.

“Around fifteen (former) MEPs are on the radar of the investigation”

Police were looking for evidence that representatives of the Chinese company broke the law when lobbying members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the sources said. The dawn raids were part of a covert police investigation that started about two years ago after a tip-off from the Belgian secret service.

According to one source close to the case, “around fifteen (former) MEPs are on the radar” of the investigators. For current lawmakers, Belgian prosecutors would have to ask the European Parliament to waive their immunity in order to investigate further. No such request has been made yet, sources said.

The Belgian federal prosecutors’ office confirmed that “several people were questioned. They will be heard about their alleged involvement in practices of bribery in the European Parliament and in forgery and use of forged documents. The facts are supposed to have been committed in a criminal organisation.” The state security service declined to comment.

[...]

Investigators suspect that Huawei lobbyists may have committed similar crimes by bribing MEPs with items including expensive football tickets, lavish gifts, luxurious trips to China and even cash to secure their support of the company while it faced pushback in Europe. Payments to one or several lawmakers have allegedly passed through a Portuguese company, a source said.

Several EU nations have taken action in recent years to restrict or ban “high-risk” vendors such as Huawei from their 5G networks, following warnings from the United States and the European Commission that the company’s equipment could be exploited for espionage by Beijing. Huawei has strongly denied claims of interference from the Chinese government.

[...]

The possible involvement of Huawei will also be part of the probe, the people familiar said. Authorities are investigating suspected offences including criminal organisation and money laundering [...]

The probe comes at a critical moment for the EU’s relations with China, its second biggest trading partner. US President Donald Trump’s recent threats and tariffs have been framed as an opportunity for a rapprochement between the EU and Beijing after years of escalating tensions.

“We could even expand our trade and investment ties [with China],” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told EU ambassadors last month.

The Belgian police’s investigation therefore risks having major geopolitical repercussions, especially if authorities charge Huawei along with any individual suspects.

Huawei’s links with the Chinese government

While Huawei has consistently maintained its independence from the Chinese government, researchers have found that the tech giant is 99 per cent owned by a union committee, and argued that independent unions don’t exist in China. Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei served in the Chinese military for 14 years before setting up the company, according to the recent book House of Huawei by journalist Eva Dou of the Washington Post.

Former Huawei employees who were granted anonymity to talk freely about sensitive issues told Follow the Money how the company over the past five years has grown increasingly close to the Chinese government – and increasingly hostile towards the West.

The arrest of Ren’s daughter and Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in Canada, China’s crackdown on tech firms seen as too independent from the state and Russia’s war in Ukraine were among the events that accelerated this shift, the former Huawei staffers said.

[...]

One of the main suspects in the corruption probe is 41-year-old Valerio Ottati. The Belgian-Italian lobbyist joined Huawei in 2019, when the company was ramping up its lobbying in the face of US pressure on European countries to stop buying its 5G equipment.

Before becoming Huawei’s EU Public Affairs Director, Ottati worked for a decade as an assistant to two Italian MEPs – from the centre-right and centre-left – who were both members of a European Parliament group dealing with China policy.

Ottati was not immediately available for comment. The investigation is still in an early stage and it remains to be seen whether Ottati or the other suspects in the case will be charged with criminal offences.

[...]

Archived

The statement was delivered during an Interactive Dialogue with Ben Saul, UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, and it highlighted the increasing misuse of counter-terrorism and national security legislation to persecute writers, journalists and others for exercising their right to freedom of expression.

In Hong Kong, the ongoing national security trial of journalist, writer and pro-democracy activist Jimmy Lai is emblematic of the NSL’s devastating impact on freedom of expression and is a stark illustration of the Chinese and Hong Kong authorities’ unrelenting efforts to silence critical voices. If convicted, Jimmy Lai faces a potential life sentence.

[...]

Archived

In the past 50 years, China has built around 500 new cities. The country’s sprawling new urban areas have been instrumental to its economic surge, but it’s not all rosy. In fact, a lot of these new buildings are empty.

By 2021, over 17% of the urban homes built in China since 2001 remained unoccupied. Although official data is lacking, that figure has undoubtedly only grown since 2021. By some estimates, there are between 20 million and 65 million empty houses in China, enough to house entire countries. This is a big problem, both economically and environmentally

A new study published in Nature Communications estimates that these unused homes collectively release 55.81 million tons of carbon dioxide annually — a staggering 6.9% of all emissions from China’s residential sector, or more than countries like Portugal or Mongolia.

[...]

This also led to a boom in real estate investment which in turn, has had a predictable (but problematic) side effect: people started to see housing more as an asset than a place to live.

We’ve seen this story before. In countries like the United States before the 2008 financial crisis or Japan in the 1980s, speculative real estate investment created massive bubbles that eventually collapsed, leaving economic turmoil in their wake.

However, in the new study, researchers didn’t look at this. Instead, Hefan Zheng and colleagues from Tsinghua University, Beijing, looked at the environmental impact of these houses.

[...]

Unused homes are not just an economic inefficiency — they are a major environmental liability.

The carbon footprint of these empty homes stems from two main sources.

• The production of cement, steel, and other materials used in these buildings accounts for much of their environmental impact. Each square meter of newly built housing emits hundreds of kilograms of CO₂.

• The other source is heat. Even when unoccupied, many of these homes consume energy. In northern China, where central heating systems operate city-wide, many empty homes still receive heating, wasting vast amounts of energy. In 2020, these unused homes produced about as much CO₂ as a mid-sized country.

[...]

The scale of unused housing in China results from a mix of policy incentives, economic speculation, and urban planning misalignment. In particular, some of the investments seem to have been misguided.

[...]

In addition to the economic ticking bomb that empty houses pose, the houses also pose an environmental conundrum. If China is serious about decarbonizing its residential sector, reducing unused housing should be a priority.

The most straightforward approach could be a tax. Introducing taxes on empty properties would discourage speculative holding and push owners to rent or sell unoccupied homes, making the entire system more efficient. Some cities could offer incentives to convert unused apartments into affordable housing or public rental units.

[...]

However, if inaction prevails, these ghost homes will continue haunting China’s real estate market and its climate ambitions.

[...]

[The experiences of many young Chinese job seekers] reveal a deeper employment crisis confronting China’s youth - a mismatch of jobseekers’ expectations and available vacancies.

“One of the big issues right now is the distance and expectations between … the hard work (they) put in as students, and the job waiting for (them) on the other side,” said Zak Dychtwald, who is founder of the Young China Group, a think tank based in Shanghai.

With a record 12.22 million university graduates expected this year - up from about 9 million in 2021 - the Chinese government has acknowledged the urgency to address structural challenges facing the job market.

“The mismatch between the supply and demand of human resources has become more pronounced,” said China’s Minister of Human Resources and Social Security Wang Xiaoping at a press conference on Sunday (Mar 9) at the sidelines of the annual Two Sessions.

[...]

Zhou Yun, assistant professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan, observed that while graduates “from elite schools with very in-demand college majors and skills such as automation or AI” are much sought after, many others find themselves struggling to secure relevant roles in an increasingly competitive job market.

[...]

China's youth unemployment has far-reaching implications, affecting not only the economic landscape but also the social fabric of the nation, say analysts.

The term "rotten-tail kids" has emerged to describe young graduates who, unable to secure jobs commensurate with their education, find themselves in low-paying positions or reliant on parental support. This term draws a parallel to "rotten-tail buildings" - unfinished homes that have plagued China's economy since 2021.

Terming this issue as the "good enough job problem", Dychtwald further noted underemployment - where graduates take jobs that underutilise their skills - as a major concern.

“There’s a growing gap between graduate expectations and the jobs available.”

This discrepancy doesn't just affect income - it alters the young people's worldview, dampening their morale and ambition.

“Unemployment is obviously what is the biggest threat to political stability," Dychtwald said. "But I don't believe that underemployment is less severe when you're thinking about the morale and ambition of a generation.”

[...]

The psychological blow has been particularly acute since the pandemic.

“The COVID moment, which was a longer moment in China than elsewhere, totally sent an economic shock through the spine of this generation. And they haven't recovered from that,” Dychtwald added.

“What they're looking for is a sense of hopefulness.”

Eli Friedman, professor of Global Labor and Work at Cornell University, pointed to a cultural shift underlying youth attitudes toward employment.

Unlike their parents’ generation, today’s young graduates are more resistant to accepting lower-quality or unstable positions, even under economic pressure.

[...]

Meanwhile, Friedman underscored another policy area requiring attention: improving geographic labour mobility. He noted persistent hurdles from China's hukou residency system, which still restricts young graduates' ability to move freely to job-rich regions.

“China's economic geography continues to be very unequal,” Friedman explained.

“Wealth creation and job creation are all still highly concentrated, especially in the super large first-tier cities … there are still these kinds of labour market imperfections obstructing a free flow of labour.”

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/30867694

Here you can download the report, Cybersecurity with Chinese Characteristics (pdf)

Archived

Through its Digital Silk Road, China is not only developing digital infrastructure, but also aggressively promoting its own norms for governing these technologies. One area where this is most pronounced is in the promotion of cybersecurity norms, says the NGO Article19 in a new report.

"The success of China’s digital norms-setting in this critical realm of internet governance risks supercharging digital authoritarianism regionally – and normalising Beijing’s model internationally – at the expense of human rights, internet freedom, and democracy," the organization finds.

Cybersecurity with Chinese Characteristics establishes a baseline understanding of China’s repressive cybersecurity norms and reveals how it is smuggling them, via the Trojan Horse of digital development, into 3 Indo-Pacific countries: Indonesia, Pakistan, and Vietnam. It also presents a compelling alternative model of cybersecurity governance: Taiwan’s transparent, rights-based, multi-stakeholder approach.

Michael Caster, Head of the Global China Programme at ARTICLE 19, said:

China’s aggressive promotion of authoritarian cybersecurity norms in the Indo-Pacific is a canary in the coalmine for the international community. Because make no mistake: Xi Jinping’s ambitions do not end there. We have it in their own words: China’s ambition is to lead the world in digital infrastructure, and with it, to set the rules for a new digital authoritarian future of its own design.

Few countries are as well-versed in responding to China’s cyberattacks and resisting its cyber norms as Taiwan. As our report argues, if the international community is serious about resisting China’s repressive global ambitions, it must urgently increase its engagement with Taiwan.

Through in-depth case studies, the report examines how countries in the Indo-Pacific region have adopted China’s norms in law, policy, and practice – from Indonesia’s embrace of ‘cyber sovereignty’ to Pakistan’s China-style firewall to Vietnam’s repressive content moderation – with catastrophic consequences for people’s right to free expression and access to information.

Faced with these threats, alternative norms for digital governance are urgently needed. As the report shows, Taiwan’s alternative, which seeks to balance the threats emanating from Beijing with efforts to avoid infringing on people’s human rights and fundamental freedoms, has much to offer global advocates engaged in developing these norms.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/2144668

After an investigation revealed alleged violations against workers at the Chinese company BYD’s factory in Bahia, northeastern Brazil, the company installed cameras in the administration and the construction areas and put up posters prohibiting photographs in these spaces.

According to the research, a computer program that creates a digital watermark with each employee's name was also installed to identify from which machine information was shared externally.

BYD sent an email on December 18, 2024, informing employees of the changes.

In the message, the company explained that the installation was implemented by the ”Department of Information Technology of China,” and that ”this watermark registers the name of the user logged into the device, device name, and the current date,” adding that ”this measure aims to prevent possible information leaks.”

[...]

All these changes began to be implemented shortly [after the investigation] revealed [that Chinese] workers [...] were being subjected to poor working conditions and living in dirty, crowded, and poorly lit accommodations.

According to information gathered [...] Brazilian workers were not affected. The Brazilians explained that Chinese workers have great difficulty filing any complaints since they do not understand Portuguese, just as the Brazilians cannot speak in Mandarin, Cantonese, or any other languages spoken by the Chinese workers.

Based on personal accounts, images, and videos, the story published [...] showed that many Chinese employees were working without personal protective equipment, subjected to shifts of 12 hours per day, and suffering physical violence if they did not follow orders or meet deadlines.

[...]

In the note, BYD did not explain why it only began to adopt such ”industrial protection measures” [installed by Department of Information Technology of China] shortly after the complaints about mistreatment of Chinese workers, given that the company began operating in Bahia in March 2024.

[...]

BYD's measures to monitor employees in an attempt to prevent further leaks of possible wrongdoing stands in direct contrast to the company's public messaging since the allegations of labour comparable to slavery were made public.

[...]

Archived

China scored 9 out of 100 and was rated “not free” in the Freedom in the World 2025 report by Freedom House, which ranked 195 countries and 13 territories on political rights and civil liberties for 2024.

"China’s authoritarian regime has become increasingly repressive in recent years. The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to tighten control over all aspects of life and governance, including the state bureaucracy, the media, online speech, religious practice, universities, businesses, and civil society associations," the report reads.

In Freedom House’s transnational repression report released in mid-February, China was named a major perpetrator of transnational repression in 2024. The Chinese regime has also been the “most prolific perpetrator” of transnational repression over the past decade, according to the NGO.

Chinese regime-controlled Hong Kong scored 40 points and was listed as a “partly free” territory. Taiwan continued to be rated “free,” with 94 points.

Hong Kong earned 9 points in political rights and 31 points in civil liberties, for a total score of 40 points. It dropped a point from last year to reach a new low of 40, down from 61 in 2017.

[...]

“The territory’s most prominent prodemocracy figures have been arrested under its provisions, and NSL charges or the threat of charges have resulted in the closure of political parties, major independent news outlets, peaceful nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and unions,” the summary reads.

Tibet under the CCP’s rule scored 0 points and continued to be listed as a “not free” territory. Specifically, Tibet received minus 2 points for “political rights” and 2 points for “civil liberties.”

Freedom House noted that “Tibet is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government based in Beijing, with local decision-making power concentrated in the hands of Chinese party officials. Residents of both Han Chinese and Tibetan ethnicity are denied fundamental rights, and authorities are especially rigorous in suppressing any signs of dissent among Tibetans.”

The report did not separately assess freedom in the Xinjiang region, the Uyghur region ruled by the CCP.

[...]

Sun Kuo-Hsiang, professor of international affairs and business at Nanhua University in Taiwan, told The Epoch Times on Feb. 27 that Freedom House’s report is credible, as “it truthfully reflects the control model of China’s current political system, legal environment, and social system.”

He said the main reason for the lack of freedom is the political system in mainland China, which is a totalitarian model.

“From the perspective of democratic standards, there are no elections, no multiparty competition, and citizens have no real right to participate in politics,” Sun said.

In the short term, the situation in China will get worse, he said.

“With China’s expanding of its influence, especially in the global south [developing countries], those countries are facing the same situation,” Sun said.

[...]

The CCP’s attitude toward overseas dissidents will not change either, he noted.

“It will only intensify overseas surveillance, cyberattacks, espionage, and other transnational repression activities to suppress them,” he said.

In the long run, the CCP’s transnational repression may backfire on China’s global influence. According to Sun, it may “weaken China’s soft power, and cause more countries to take precautionary measures against China.”

[...]

He suggested that Western countries strengthen their precautions against the CCP’s export of its totalitarianism and transnational repression by “restricting the CCP setting up institutions in their countries … paying special attention to the institutions established by the CCP, providing political asylum to Chinese people, and legislating to protect dissidents.”

Lai said everyone who has lived in China can relate to the political life reflected in the freedom index.

[...]

Here you can download the study, The Chinese Communist Party’s influence over businesses (pdf).

[There is no summary on the website https://www.ui.se/english.]

The study on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) influence over businesses analyses, first, how changes in Chinese laws, intra-Party regulations, and policies have created new means for the Party to exercise its influence. Secondly, the study examines CCP influence in practice by analysing three dimensions: ownership, party organisation presence, and political signalling.

Summary:

• Over the past 15 years, regulatory changes that initially focused on stateowned enterprises (SOEs) have also increasingly affected privateowned enterprises (POEs). Key reforms emphasise mixed ownership and reinforcing Party leadership in corporate governance, blurring the lines between state and private ownership.
• There are still important differences in Party influence between SOEs and POEs; for example, SOEs have embedded political governance, where the Party organisation is represented on the board, while no such rules exist for POEs. However, SOE policies often serve as models for regulating POEs.
• Ownership: The mixed ownership reform has resulted in a large number of SOEs acquiring stakes in POEs. This indirectly gives the party more influence over POEs, also sometimes when it is a minority post. The most obvious cases are government “golden shares” in hightech companies such as ByteDance, Weibo, and Tencent. Some of the interviewees also highlighted golden shares as one more direct aspect of the CCP’s influence over businesses.
• Party organisation presence: By law, all private companies with CCP members must establish party organisations. The extent to which this law has been implemented is not entirely clear, although most large private companies have party organisations. While many observers claim that Party organisation activities are limited to social activities and have little influence over corporate governance, there is also abundant research showing that Party organisation presence in POEs on an aggregate level affects corporate governance.
• CCP membership among company managers is another possible way for the CCP to influence POEs. Many entrepreneurs actively seek to become party members in order to gain political influence that can help their businesses thrive. However, as the Party continuously tightens ideological and political control of Party members, they might become more incentivised to adapt companies’ activities to be more in line with the intentions of the CCP.
• Political signalling: The overall influence that the Party exercises over POEs through political signalling is substantial. Chinese as well as foreign companies have to be constantly aware of changes in the political environment. Through new legislation and the publication of Party documents and speeches by leaders, the CCP leadership signals that **private entrepreneurs must follow the leadership of the Party. **This message has become ever more clear and strong during Xi Jinping’s reign.
• Swedish company representatives emphasised that the fact that the CCP completely dominates politics and society is something that is a starting point when doing business in China and was seldom raised as a problem. However, they acknowledged that the political changes in recent years, including political centralisation and increasing nationalism, were the political factors most affecting businesses.
• The consequences of political influence over Chinese companies are in some ways more dramatic for Chinese companies outside China than for those within China. As Chinese companies have expanded their presence far beyond China’s borders, the CCP’s obsession with political control increasingly clashes with Western ideals of businesses operating independently from political influence, at least of the CCP variety.

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/2137462

Archived

[...]

According to a [Chinese] government memo [...], a high-ranking Chinese official instructed national security units at a closed-door meeting late last month to implement Beijing's 22 guidelines on punishing Taiwan independence activists in countries friendly to China.

[Taiwan says] China is attempting to use these guidelines to “shackle” Taiwan’s democracy and freedom. [Taiwan] has instructed its overseas offices to monitor and evaluate related risks and will strengthen public awareness campaigns on travel safety.

[...]

The senior Taiwanese official said that countries considered higher risk include Cambodia, Laos, and certain African nations. The official said Taiwanese in these countries could be detained and investigated on suspicion of supporting Taiwanese independence.

[...]

The official added that Taiwan’s government assessment indicates that some countries, including certain Southeast Asian nations, have refused to cooperate with China’s requests.

[...]

The memo, citing Taiwanese intelligence analysis, indicated that this directive was introduced during a two-day CCP meeting on Taiwan that started on Feb. 25. According to the memo, the meeting was headed by Wang Huning (王滬寧), a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and chair of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

During the meeting, Beijing reportedly ordered diplomatic missions and overseas police stations in countries with “a high level of trust” in China to enforce the guidelines on Taiwanese tourists, students, and residents.

[...]

Today, March 10, 2025, Tibetans worldwide commemorate the 1959 uprising in Tibet.

After nearly 70 years of repressive Chinese state rule, government policies that seek to forcibly assimilate non-Han peoples in China under President Xi Jinping represent an alarming turn for the worse for Tibetans.

While the Chinese government’s crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang received global attention, the slow drip of news about its intensifying repression against Tibetans has garnered less notice due to ever more intrusive and watertight policing, surveillance, and censorship in Tibetan areas.

In Tibet, there is no independent civil society, freedom of expression, association, assembly, or religion. Under the pretext of national policing campaigns such as “the anti-gang crime crackdown” and the “anti-fraud” crackdown, the Chinese government has decimated what little Tibetan civil society remained, shut down Tibetan websites that promote Tibetan language and culture, and closed privately funded schools; even those that followed the government-approved curriculum.

Tibetans are told how to live their lives: use Mandarin Chinese as the medium of instruction in schools, relocate en masse from their long-established villages to new government-built and managed settlements, silently witness their rivers being dammed to generate electricity for large-scale mining or to power regions far away in China. Any questioning of government policies, however mild, can result in arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, and long-term imprisonment.

[...]

Governments that profess support for the human rights of Tibetans should step up their assistance to Tibetan groups worldwide that document rights and report on abuses in Tibet, advocate in international forums, and seek to preserve Tibetan identity and culture.