Donald Trump first got involved with the Russian mafia during the ten-billion dollar Bank of New York money laundering scandal, from 1998-1999, when Russian organized crime used accounts at one of America’s oldest banks to move money out of Russia. Federal investigators linked the accounts (specifically those under the company name Benex) to Semion Mogilevich.
It was described as one of the largest money laundering operations in U.S. history at the time. It involved Bank of New York executives- notably Natasha Kagalovsky and Lucy Edwards- who were married to Russian businessmen.
Trump’s properties were frequent targets for the investment of funds by Mogilevich's top lieutenants during the 1980s and 90s.
Real estate remains a premier vehicle for laundering illicit funds because it offers a unique combination of high value, complexity, and physical permanence.
Here is why the property market is so frequently targeted:
- Large Volume Placement
Most money laundering involves moving small bills into the formal financial system. Real estate allows for "bulk" laundering. Instead of trying to deposit $500,000 in cash at a bank (which triggers every alarm bell in the building), an individual can buy a single luxury condo and move a massive amount of "dirty" value into a "clean" asset in one transaction.
- Price Manipulation (The "Under-the-Table" Gap)
This is a common tactic where the buyer and seller conspire to manipulate the reported price:
Under-valuation: The buyer pays the seller the official "market price" via clean funds, but pays a significant balance "under the table" in dirty cash. When the buyer sells the property later at the true market price, the profit looks like a legitimate capital gain.
Over-valuation: Buying a property at an inflated price to move a larger sum of money into the legal system quickly.
- Layering through Shell Companies
Real estate provides a thick veil of anonymity. Criminals often don't buy property in their own names; they use:
Offshore Shell Companies: Entities registered in jurisdictions with strict secrecy laws.
Front Purchases: Using a "straw buyer" (a friend, relative, or associate with a clean record) to put their name on the deed.
This makes it incredibly difficult for law enforcement to find the Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO).
- The "Refurbishment" Loop
Property allows for secondary laundering through renovations. A criminal buys a "fixer-upper" with clean money, then pays contractors, suppliers, and laborers in illicit cash for upgrades. When the house is sold for a much higher price due to the "renovations," the dirty cash used for the labor has been converted into clean equity.
- Stability and Appreciation
Unlike crypto (volatile) or luxury cars (depreciating), real estate is a stable store of value. It usually appreciates over time. Not only is the money being "washed," but it’s often growing, effectively providing a return on investment for the crime committed.
David Bogatin: In 1984, Bogatin—a known associate of Mogilevich—purchased five luxury condos in Trump Tower for $6 million. Trump reportedly attended the closing personally. These apartments were later seized by the government, which alleged they were purchased with money from a massive gasoline tax-fraud scheme.
Vyacheslav "Yaponchik" Ivankov: A Mogilevich-linked mob boss, Ivankov was a resident of Trump Tower in the 1990s. When the FBI finally arrested him in 1995, they found his personal phone book contained the private numbers for the Trump Organization.
The "Lax Regulation" Argument: Critics and investigative journalists (like Craig Unger and Wayne Barrett) have argued that Trump’s willingness to accept all-cash purchases through anonymous shell companies made his buildings a "magnet" for Russian money laundering.
References:
The New York Times (1999): Activity at Bank of New York Linked to Russian Mob Boss
FBI Most Wanted Profile: Semion Mogilevich - FBI "Boss of Bosses"
Just Security: Understanding Trump’s Ties to Semion Mogilevich
The Guardian: Detectives trace Russian mafia's laundered millions
Now, ask yourself whether the following story sounds familiar:
In the 2024–2025 election cycles, Moldova was a primary target of what international observers call "hybrid warfare" from Russia. They launched a massive, multi-layered operation to tilt the scales through financial bribery, cyber warfare, and a deep-seated social media presence.
- The Kremlin and its proxies targeted the election infrastructure:
DDoS Attacks: On election days, government websites and the Central Electoral Commission were hit with Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to sow panic and slow down the reporting of results.
Logistical Sabotage: Coordinated hoax bomb threats were called into polling stations in the West (like Italy, Romania, and the UK) to disrupt the Moldovan diaspora vote, which is traditionally pro-European.
- The "Vote-Buying" Scheme
The most significant interference was financial rather than technical. Moldovan authorities uncovered a massive scheme where roughly $39 million was funneled into the country to bribe over 130,000 citizens (about 10% of the electorate).
The Mechanism: Payments were distributed via Promsvyazbank (a sanctioned Russian bank) using virtual accounts.
The Tasks: Voters were given specific instructions on Telegram bots on how to vote "No" in the EU referendum and which pro-Russian candidates to support in exchange for cash.
- Massive Social Media Presence
Russia and its local proxies (specifically those tied to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor) built a "fake news" infrastructure that was operational months, if not years, before the vote.
AI-Generated Disinformation: They used AI to create deepfake videos of President Maia Sandu. One viral video falsely showed her banning the harvest of rosehips, a culturally significant plant, to trigger an emotional backlash among rural voters.
TikTok & Facebook Networks: Researchers identified over 500 fake TikTok accounts and hundreds of "mirror" Facebook pages that used automated bots to flood comment sections and manipulate platform algorithms. These networks reached millions of views within days.
Narrative Strategy: The content focused on "fear-mongering," claiming that joining the EU would drag Moldova into the war in Ukraine or destroy "traditional family values."
- Key Figures
The central figure in this effort was Ilan Shor, an oligarch convicted of a $1 billion bank fraud who now resides in Moscow. He allegedly coordinated the "Victory" (Pobeda) bloc, which served as the primary vehicle for Russian funding and organizational support on the ground.
Despite these efforts, the 2024 referendum narrowly passed, and President Sandu won re-election, though the narrow margins (often less than 1% in the referendum) show how effective the interference was in polarizing the population.
How familiar does this story sound otherwise to what happened in America around the same time?
https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-bomb-threats-to-polling-locations
https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/21/politics/election-social-media-misinformation-republicans
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/republican-bot-campaign-trump-x-twitter-elon-musk-fake-accounts-rcna173692
https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/01/politics/elon-musk-2024-election-spending-millions
https://www.axios.com/2025/02/08/elon-musk-x-followers-us-government
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/pixels/article/2025/02/07/who-are-the-doge-kids-the-disciples-of-elon-musk-tasked-with-hacking-the-us-federal-government_6737883_13.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjgWhgEBuWA
Since the late 1990s, Russia has evolved its "active measures" from traditional espionage into a sophisticated playbook of Hybrid Warfare. This strategy combines cyberattacks, economic pressure, disinformation, and occasionally "deniable" military force.
Here is a timeline of key events where Russia utilized methods similar to those seen in Moldova.
The "Color Revolution" Resistance (2003–2005)
In the early 2000s, pro-democracy movements in former Soviet states threatened Moscow’s influence. Russia responded with direct political interference and media manipulation.
Georgia (Rose Revolution, 2003): Russia backed the incumbent, Eduard Shevardnadze, and later fueled separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to destabilize the new pro-Western government.
Ukraine (Orange Revolution, 2004): Vladimir Putin personally campaigned for the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych. When the opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko, suffered mysterious dioxin poisoning, many pointed to Russian intelligence. Russia also used "political technologists" to stir up divisions between eastern and western Ukraine.
The Cyber Warfare Testing Ground (2007–2008)
Russia began integrating digital sabotage with political pressure.
Estonia (2007): After Estonia moved a Soviet-era war memorial, Russia launched the first major state-sponsored DDoS attack in history. For three weeks, Estonia’s banks, government sites, and media were paralyzed.
Georgia (2008): Coinciding with the physical invasion of Georgia, Russia launched a massive cyber campaign to knock out the Georgian government’s communication lines, effectively "blinding" the country as tanks rolled in.
The Modern Playbook: Information Warfare (2014–2017)
Following the "Revolution of Dignity" in Ukraine, Russia refined the use of "troll farms" and social media weaponization.
Ukraine (2014): During the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Donbas, Russia used "Little Green Men" (soldiers without insignia) to maintain deniability, while a massive social media campaign claimed Ukraine was being run by "Nazis."
United States (2016): The Internet Research Agency (IRA) used thousands of fake personas to inflame existing social tensions (e.g., race, immigration). Simultaneously, military intelligence (GRU) hacked the DNC and leaked emails via WikiLeaks to damage Hillary Clinton’s campaign.
Montenegro (2016): On the eve of an election, authorities thwarted a Russian-backed coup attempt aimed at assassinating the Prime Minister to prevent the country from joining NATO.
The "African Footprint" (2020–Present)
Russia has pivoted to the Global South, using the Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) to offer "regime protection" in exchange for natural resources.
Mali & Burkina Faso: Following military coups, Russia deployed massive disinformation networks to stoke anti-French sentiment. AI-generated videos and social media bots promoted Russia as a "liberating" alternative to Western partners.
Central African Republic: Russia used social media "influencers" and local radio stations to entrench the pro-Russian government and discredit UN peacekeepers.
When the Kremlin seeks to exert control over a neighbor or rival, they often employ a strategy that relies as much on internal subversion as it does on external force. This involves cultivating or identifying local figures—often referred to by terms like "Quislings," "patsies," or "proxies"- who are willing to bypass their own country's sovereignty to facilitate Russian interests.
This "front door" approach is part of a broader doctrine known as Active Measures (Aktivnye Meropriyatiya). Here is how that process typically unfolds:
- Identifying the Vulnerability
The Russian intelligence services (FSB, GRU, and SVR) look for politicians or influential figures with specific traits:
Ideological Alignment: Individuals who share a "Eurasianist" worldview or harbor deep skepticism of Western institutions like NATO and the EU.
Personal Ambition: Politicians who feel sidelined by the current establishment and see Russia as a powerful benefactor that can help them seize or maintain power.
Coercion (Kompromat): In some cases, figures are "captured" through traditional blackmail or financial dependency, though modern strategies often prefer willing partners who require less management.
- Preparing the Ground
Before a physical or political "takeover," Russia works to delegitimize the existing government through the collaborator:
Discourse Manipulation: The collaborator echoes Kremlin narratives—for example, claiming the current government is a "puppet of the West" or that the country’s minority rights (especially ethnic Russians) are being violated.
Creating a "Request for Intervention": A common historical tactic is for the collaborator to "invite" Russian assistance. In the 2014 invasion of Crimea and the Donbas, local "leaders" like Viktor Yanukovych (after fleeing) or nascent separatist heads provided a veneer of "legitimacy" by asking for Russian military protection.
- "Opening the Front Door"
Once the crisis reaches a boiling point, the collaborator facilitates the takeover from within:
Institutional Paralyzation: If the individual holds office, they may order security forces to stand down, allow "unmarked" Russian troops (the so-called "Little Green Men") to occupy key infrastructure, or sabotage the national response to an invasion.
The Puppet Administration: Once the previous government is ousted or the territory is occupied, these individuals are installed as the face of the new regime. This allows Russia to claim it is not an "occupier" but a "liberator" supporting a domestic movement.
Notable Historical and Modern Examples
| Target | The "Collaborator" / Group | Outcome |
|
| Norway (WWII) | Vidkun Quisling | The namesake for the term; he attempted a coup during the Nazi invasion to "save" Norway by collaborating, eventually leading a puppet government. |
| Georgia (1990s) | Various Paramilitary Groups | Supported by the Russian Transcaucasian Military District to oust President Gamsakhurdia after he refused to join the Russian-led CIS. |
| Ukraine (2014) | Viktor Yanukovych / Separatist Leaders | Yanukovych’s "invitation" to Russia for help was used by Putin to justify the deployment of troops into Crimea. |
| Central African Republic | Local Political Elites | Use of the Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) to provide security for leaders in exchange for mineral rights and political alignment. |
The "Patsy" vs. The "Conspirator"
It is important to distinguish between the two:
The Conspirator: Fully aware of the plan, they trade their country’s sovereignty for personal power or wealth. They are active participants in the intelligence operation.
The Patsy (Useful Idiot): This person may genuinely believe they are acting in their country's best interest. They are manipulated through flattery, disinformation, or "friendly" advice from Russian handlers to pursue policies that inadvertently weaken their nation and open the door for Russian influence.
Summary:
A common pattern analysts point to—when talking about how Russia has expanded influence or control without an outright invasion—is what’s sometimes called “entry through the front door.” Instead of forcing their way in, they look for someone inside the target state who can legitimize, enable, or soften the takeover.
Here’s how that typically works, in broad terms:
- Identify a useful insider
Russia looks for a domestic political actor who is:
Ambitious, resentful, or power-hungry
Marginalized by the existing political system
Ideologically aligned (authoritarian, anti-Western, nationalist)
Vulnerable to pressure (corruption, legal trouble, financial dependence)
This person doesn’t have to be popular—just positioned well enough to matter.
- Build dependency
Support can come in many forms:
- Media amplification (favorable coverage, propaganda, disinformation)
- Financial backing or opaque business deals
- Political legitimacy (meetings, recognition, “peace talks”)
- Security guarantees or covert assistance
Over time, the relationship shifts from cooperation to reliance.
- Reframe collaboration as legality
Once the insider gains power—or influence over key institutions—they provide a veneer of legitimacy:
- Inviting “peacekeepers” or foreign troops
- Signing treaties or security agreements
- Calling for “assistance” against alleged internal threats
- Claiming to represent the “true will” of the people
Because the request comes from a recognized authority, the intervention can be framed as lawful rather than aggressive.
- Undermine resistance from within
The collaborator helps neutralize opposition by:
- Discrediting rivals as extremists or foreign agents
- Weakening democratic checks (courts, parliament, press)
- Delaying or sabotaging defensive responses
- Creating confusion about who is actually in charge
By the time the public realizes what’s happening, institutional resistance is often already hollowed out.
- Plausible deniability for Moscow
This method lets Russia argue:
- “We were invited.”
- “This is an internal political process.”
- “We’re protecting stability or minorities.”
- “The West is interfering, not us.”
That ambiguity slows international response and fractures alliances.
The key advantage
A takeover via collaboration is cheaper, quieter, and politically safer than open invasion. It transforms conquest into something that looks like consent—even when it clearly isn’t.
In short, instead of breaking the door down, the strategy is to find someone willing to unlock it—and then claim you were just a guest.
Since the Bank of New York money laundering scandal (1999), the timeline of Donald Trump’s connections and communications with Russia has evolved from business pursuits to intense political scrutiny and, eventually, reported private correspondence during his post-presidency.
Below are the key examples organized by era.
