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The EU is currently developing a whitelabel app to perform privacy-preserving (at least in theory) age verification to be adopted and personalized in the coming months by member states. The app is open source and available here: https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-app-android-wallet-ui.

Problem is, the app is planning to include remote attestation feature to verify the integrity of the app: https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-app-android-wallet-ui?tab=readme-ov-file#disclaimer. This is supposed to provide assurance to the age verification service that the app being used is authentic and running on a genuine operating system. Genuine in the case of Android means:

The operating system was licensed by Google The app was downloaded from the Play Store (thus requiring a Google account) Device security checks have passed While there is value to verify device security, this strongly ties the app to many Google properties and services, because those checks won't pass on an aftermarket Android OS, even those which increase security significantly like GrapheneOS, because the app plans to use Google "Play Integrity", which only allows Google licensed systems instead of the standard Android attestation feature to verify systems.

This also means that even though you can compile the app, you won't be able to use it, because it won't come from the Play Store and thus the age verification service will reject it.

The issue has been raised here https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-app-android-wallet-ui/issues/10 but no response from team members as of now.

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Amazon removed its entire Google Shopping advertising presence across multiple global markets between July 21 and July 23, 2025, according to industry analysts tracking the unprecedented move. The e-commerce giant's median Shopping ad impression share crashed to zero percent across major territories: from approximately 60% to 0% in the United States, 55% to 0% in the United Kingdom, and 38% to 0% in Germany.

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Full Report.

  • The DSA is forcing companies to change their global content moderation policies. Nonpublic materials obtained by the Committee from the May 2025 workshop make clear that Commission regulators expect platforms to change their worldwide terms and conditions to comply with DSA obligations;
  • The DSA is being used to censor political speech, including humor and satire. Documents produced to the Committee under subpoena show that European censors target core political speech that is neither harmful nor illegal, attempting to stifle debate on topics such as immigration and the environment;
  • Exercises from the Commission's May 2025 workshop show the true definitions of key terms in the DSA and Commission regulators' censorship expectations of social media platforms. For example, the Commission's workshop labeled a hypothetical social media post stating "we need to take back our country"—a common, anodyne political statement—as "illegal hate speech" that platforms are required to censor under the DSA;
  • The censorship is largely one-sided, almost uniformly targeting political conservatives.
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Original article published by CIPESA under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license.

In a July 18, 2025 decision, Uganda’s Personal Data Protection Office (PDPO) found Google LLC in breach of the country’s data protection law and ordered the global tech giant to register with the local data protection office within 30 days.

The decision would place the popular search engine under the ambit of Uganda’s Data Protection and Privacy Act, whose provisions it would have to comply with. In particular, the PDPO has ordered Google to provide – within 30 days – documentary evidence of how it is complying with requirements for transferring the personal data of Ugandan citizens outside of the country’s borders. Google also has to explain the legal basis for making those cross-border data transfers and the accountability measures in place to ensure that such transfers respect Uganda’s laws.

The orders followed a November 2024 complaint by four Ugandans, who argued that as a data collector, controller, and processor, Google had failed to register with the PDPO as required by local laws. They also contended that Google unlawfully transferred their personal data outside Uganda without meeting the legal conditions enshrined in the law, and claimed these actions infringed their data protection and privacy rights and caused them distress.

The PDPO ruled that Google was indeed collecting and processing personal data of the complainants without being registered with the local data regulator, which contravened section 29 of the Data Protection and Privacy Act. Google was also found liable for transferring the complainants’ data across Uganda’s borders without taking the necessary safeguards, in breach of section 19 of the Act.

This section provides that, where a data processor or data controller based in Uganda processes or stores personal data outside Uganda, they must ensure that the country in which the data is processed or stored has adequate measures for protecting the data. Those measures should at least be equivalent to the protection provided for under the Ugandan law. The consent of the data subject should also be obtained for their data to be stored outside Uganda.

In its defence, Google argued that since it was not based in Uganda and had no physical presence in the country, it was not obliged to register with the PDPO, and the rules on cross-border transfers of personal data did not apply to it. However, the regulator rejected this argument, determining that Google is a local data controller since it collects data from users in Uganda and decides how that data is processed.

The regulator further determined that the local data protection law has extra-territorial application, as it states in section 1 that it applies to a person, institution or public body outside Uganda who collects, processes, holds or uses personal data relating to Ugandan citizens. Accordingly, the regulator stated, the law places obligations “not only to entities physically present in Uganda but to any entity handling personal data of Ugandan citizens, including those established abroad, provided they collect or process such data.”

The implication of this decision is that all entities that collect Ugandans’ data, including tech giants such as Meta, TikTok, and X, must register with the Ugandan data regulator. This decision echoes global calls to hold Big Tech more accountable, and for African countries to have strong laws as per African Union (AU) Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention), and the AU Data Policy Framework.

However, enforcement of these orders remains a challenge. For instance, Uganda’s PDPO does not make binding decisions and only makes declaratory orders. Additionally, the regulator does not have powers to make orders of compensation to aggrieved parties, and indeed did not do so under the current decision. It can only recommend that the complainants engage a court of competent jurisdiction, in accordance with section 33(1) of the Act.

Conversely, the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner of Kenya established by section 5 of Data Protection Act, 2019 and the Personal Data Protection Commission of Tanzania established by section 6 of the Protection of Personal Information Act, 2022 are bestowed with powers to issue administrative fines under sections 9(1)(f) and section 47 respectively.

The dilemma surrounding the Uganda PDPO presents major concerns about its capacity to remedy wrongs of global data collectors, controllers and processors. Among its declarations in the July 2025 decision was that it would not issue an order for data localisation “at this stage” but “Google LLC is reminded that all cross-border transfers of personal data must comply fully with Ugandan law”. This leaves unanswered questions over data sovereignty and respect for individuals’ data rights given the handicaps faced by data regulators in countries such as Uganda and the practicalities presented by the global digital economy.

In these circumstances, Uganda’s Data Protection and Privacy Act should be amended to expand the powers of PDPO to impose administrative fines so as to add weight and enforceability to its decisions.

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Using widely available technology, well-known ethical hackers Chris Kubecka and Paula Popovici quickly accessed numerous pornography sites without ever verifying their ages.

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Tech firms must introduce age checks to prevent children from accessing porn, self-harm, suicide and eating disorder content Bluesky, Discord, Grindr, Reddit and X among latest firms to commit to age-gating, while Ofcom lines up targets for enforcement

Sites and apps where children spend most time must make their feeds safer Sites and apps which allow harmful content must protect children from accessing it from the end of this week, Ofcom has warned, as the deadline approaches for tech firms to comply with new rules.

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Microsoft says it will no longer use China-based engineers to support the Pentagon. But ProPublica found that the tech giant has relied on its global workforce for years to support other federal clients, including the Justice Department.

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