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Since the early 1970s, Canada has encouraged academic exchanges with the PRC [People's Republic of China], particularly in science and technology ... This policy was initially framed as a goodwill initiative that allowed Chinese students to access advanced training in Canada while Canadian students studied language, culture, and politics in China. For many years, these exchanges were widely viewed as mutually beneficial. By the early 2000s, however, observers began to note a shift in how some of these academic pathways were being used.
An October 30, 2018 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “Picking flowers, making honey,” described a covert program under which engineers and scientists linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concealed their military affiliations in order to gain access to postgraduate research programs abroad, including in Canada. According to ASPI, this strategy involved individuals affiliated with the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) and other military-linked institutions. What had once appeared to be conventional academic collaboration increasingly raised concerns about state-directed intelligence gathering.
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A 2018 paper by the International Cyber Policy Centre in Australia identified Canada as the third most targeted country by PLA military scientists, after the United States and the United Kingdom. A study by U.S.-based intelligence firm Strider Technologies ... found that researchers linked to the Chinese military had successfully targeted approximately 50 Canadian universities. The University of Waterloo reportedly had the highest number of collaborations with NUDT, followed by institutions such as the University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser University, the University of Victoria, McMaster University, Concordia University, and the University of Calgary. Over a five-year period, researchers from Canada’s top ten universities co-authored 240 papers with Chinese military scientists.
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These findings appear to have had limited impact on how Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) assesses study permit applications.
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Other Western countries have taken more assertive steps. In 2020, the United States expanded visa restrictions on individuals linked to NUDT. A December 21, 2021 report from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) noted that, following these restrictions, some Chinese scholarship recipients began concealing military ties and reframing their research interests to appear less sensitive while still offering potential military value. These findings suggest a level of sophistication that challenges traditional immigration screening methods.
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In a May 2025 interview, China analyst Gordon G. Chang warned that Chinese diplomatic and intelligence operatives have allegedly coerced students abroad into sharing research data, sometimes by threatening family members in China. A May 2025 investigation by The Stanford Review described an alleged intelligence-gathering operation involving an individual posing as a student to access sensitive research and assess political loyalty among Chinese nationals on campus. According to that investigation, platforms such as WeChat were used to monitor and direct activities, and students faced pressure to comply.
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One factor amplifying these concerns is the PRC’s legal framework. Under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, all Chinese citizens and organizations are required to support and cooperate with state intelligence work upon request, regardless of where they reside.
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Allied countries have responded to similar concerns by adopting targeted legislative and policy measures. Australia’s Foreign Relations Act 2020 allows the federal government to review and cancel certain foreign agreements involving universities. The United States has imposed visa restrictions on individuals associated with specific PRC-linked institutions. The United Kingdom’s National Security and Investment Act empowers the government to block or unwind investments in sensitive sectors on national security grounds. These measures aim to manage risk while preserving academic freedom and due process.
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At present, Canada’s immigration system does not appear to apply sufficiently tailored safeguards to prevent study permits from being misused for activities inconsistent with their stated purpose, or to address the risk that some students may be compelled to cooperate with foreign intelligence services. Balancing national security with Canada’s longstanding openness to international students requires a more nuanced approach.
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Canada’s challenge is not whether to remain open to international students, but how to ensure that openness does not unintentionally expose critical research and infrastructure to misuse. A more integrated approach between immigration screening and research security would better align Canada’s immigration policies with its national security objectives.
