It was just on 1 April that Donald Trump thundered yet again, threatening to “bomb Iran to the Stone Age”. He caught those by surprise who were hoping that he would announce the end of the war, accompanied by a declaration of some vague victory. Trump’s message to the world suffering from the results of his war was that those interested in opening the Strait of Hormuz should make their own efforts.
Besides leaving the world more confused and worried, Trump has made people wonder about the possibilities of ending the war. There are three problems regarding this difficult question: on what terms will the war end, how will the warring parties agree to end the conflict, and who will negotiate the cessation of hostilities?
All these issues are difficult, especially when one cannot assume with certainty what would make Trump happy—is it to force Iran to surrender its nuclear or missile technology, change the regime, or destroy it to pieces? And it is not even clear when he will feel satisfied about attaining either of his objectives. What should also be clear is that Trump may often give the impression that he is about to announce the end of the war, but he has no intention to do so.
Trump’s list of desires, on the other hand, tends to make the Iranian regime persistently belligerent. It is not left with an air force or navy, but has battle-hardened soldiers and Revolutionary Guards, and, thus far, an intent to go down fighting, especially if its destruction is its enemy’s intent. Unfortunately, all of this is happening at a time when the global geopolitical system established after the end of the Second World War has collapsed. Trump has practically killed the United Nations, and there is no power structure around to help negotiate between the warring parties. This is what makes the role of anyone who may appear non-partisan and exchange messages critical.
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There are no two opinions or divisions among Pakistan’s ruling elite regarding which side they would take if there were a war between Tehran and Riyadh. But this is also what makes Islamabad active in making efforts to facilitate talks—it is conscious of the high cost of conflict if it expands to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Its role as a facilitator is what is helping Pakistan avoid getting involved in the war. This is the one option it has to convince Riyadh not to jump to its side in a conflict.
It is important to note that despite Iran continuing to bomb Saudi Arabia, which has American bases, Riyadh has still held back and not jumped into the war. The Saudis would rather Washington complete the job it started rather than contribute its own forces. This particular shade of Pakistan’s neutrality is appreciated by Tehran, which is not just conscious of the fact that Islamabad has condemned attacks on Iran but that it continues to strategically fence-sit. And this is precisely where Iran would like to see Pakistan sit and not get directly involved. If it did, Iran would activate Shia militancy in Pakistan, which would then result in a response. This is opening a front that both Iran and Pakistan are interested in remaining shut.
